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Abstract 
Regional Security, Early Warning and Intelligence Cooperation in Africa 
L.A. Hutton 
M.Political Science Full Thesis, Department of Political Studies, University of 
the Western Cape 
This dissertation explores the potential contributions of the mechanisms for 
early warning and intelligence sharing to regional security in Africa. The 
Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) and the Committee on 
Intelligence and Security Services of Africa (CISSA) are centrally concerned 
with the dissemination of information to enable decision-making on continental 
security. The main focus of the dissertation is on the manner in which the 
information generated by the CEWS and CISSA can contribute to regional 
security.  
In order to analyse the potential contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to 
regional security, a sound theoretical framework is proposed so as to explore 
how and why states choose to cooperate, as well as addressing multifaceted 
cooperation and integration at inter-state, government department and non-
state levels. Constructivist interpretations of international cooperation are 
utilised to explore the role of ideas, meanings and understandings in shaping 
behaviour. The focus is placed on the manner in which interaction as provided 
for by the CEWS and CISSA can shape understandings of reality and 
potentially impact on the definition of actors’ interests. This is based on the 
assumption drawn from security community and epistemic community theory 
that, enabling the creation of shared meanings and shared knowledge there is 
the potential for both the CEWS and CISSA to have a positive influence on 
the choices that stakeholders take in favour of peaceful change.  
The theoretical analysis is complimented with an analysis of the 
conceptualisation and design of the CEWS and CISSA. The depth of analysis 
also benefits from international experiences with early warning and 
intelligence cooperation and some of the successes and challenges that lie 
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therein. Some of the key debates in the fields of early warning and intelligence 
were utilised to draw inferences of the potential strengths and weaknesses of 
the CEWS and CISSA as mechanisms to enhance regional security. 
The primary conclusion was that there is potential to consider both the CEWS 
and CISSA as able to make positive contributions to regional security in 
Africa. The importance and power of information lies at the heart of why these 
mechanisms can influence the practice of peace. There is the underlying 
notion that diffusing the power of information and knowledge can lead to new 
patterns of behaviour. Sharing information can shape perceptions, 
expectations and behaviours. It can also break down uncertainty and enable 
actors at community, national and regional levels to better fulfil the regional 
security aspirations of the continent.  
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Chapter 1 - Introduction 
1. Introduction 
Since the formation of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in 1963, the 
norms, practices and institutions regulating multilateral relations on the African 
continent have been evolving. The process of regional integration has 
transformed the way in which peace and security issues are dealt with. The 
change from the OAU into the African Union (AU) in 2000 represented a 
fundamental shift in the objectives and priorities of the organisation and 
presented the opportunity for significant advances in the creation of structures 
to manage the conflict prevention, management and resolution portfolio.  
Central to the change in the orientation of the continental body was the 
awareness that peace and security were necessary to achieve sustainable 
development and economic prosperity. Member States gave the African 
Union the mandate, powers and structures to be better equipped to address 
issues of peace and security. This commitment found voice in the Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of the Peace and Security Council in 2003. This 
Protocol enabled the creation of, what is generally referred to as, the AU 
peace and security architecture consisting of the Peace and Security Council 
(PSC), the Panel of the Wise, the African Standby Force and the Continental 
Early Warning System (CEWS).  
The CEWS was envisaged as a central component of the peace and security 
architecture tasked with the anticipation and prevention of conflict through the 
provision of information and analysis and recommendations for response. The 
early warning system is to be the core of the conflict prevention mandate 
providing the ability for the AU to implement timely responses to prevent the 
outbreak and/ or escalation of conflict. The ability of the CEWS to fulfil this 
ambitious function is predicated on the capacity to collect, analyse and 
disseminate information that is reliable and relevant in a timely fashion.  
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In 2004, just one year after the Protocol establishing the early warning system 
entered into force, the heads of intelligence and security services of African 
states met in Abuja to establish the Committee on Intelligence and Security 
Services of Africa (CISSA). CISSA is a mechanism to enable intelligence 
cooperation on the continent. The primary aim of this structure is to assist the 
AU and all its institutions to effectively address the security challenges 
confronting the continent through providing information and analysis on 
threats as well as providing advice on possible courses of action.  
CEWS and CISSA bear both marked similarities and marked differences. 
Both mechanisms are designed to serve the vision of a stable and secure 
African continent as enunciated in the founding documents of the AU. Both 
CEWS and CISSA have the potential to make positive contributions to 
regional integration and regional security.  
2. Purpose  
This dissertation aims to build upon existing research into regional security 
and conflict prevention in Africa, with a specific focus on the means for 
information sharing, namely the CEWS and CISSA. The possibility exists that, 
in both fulfilling essential roles concerned with the provision of information for 
decision-making to the AU, the CEWS and CISSA will experience certain 
synergies and animosities. The purpose of this research project is to analyse 
the development, norms and functions of the CEWS and CISSA as 
mechanisms that enable intelligence and information sharing on the continent. 
The aim is to explore the roles of both mechanisms in order to understand 
how these structures can contribute to regional security in Africa. 
The main assumption is that information is an essential requirement for 
regional security. This is based on the recognition that timely information is a 
precondition for response. Furthermore, the ability to take decisions relating to 
the prevention, management and resolution of conflict is predicated on the 
ability to understand the complex security environment and to initiate 
informed, reasonable and appropriate response strategies.  
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Both the CEWS and CISSA contribute towards the provision of information for 
security decision-making at continental level. The research is not concerned 
with the policy options for regional security and conflict prevention in Africa, 
but with the information sharing tools that are available on which to base 
these policy decisions. The main concern is with the potential contributions of 
these mechanisms towards regional security on the continent.  
Thus, the research question is: how can CEWS and CISSA contribute to 
regional security in Africa? 
3. Research methodology 
This research project is largely descriptive and exploratory by nature. It entails 
describing the mechanisms for information sharing and the manner in which 
these have evolved. It then seeks to explore the strengths and weaknesses of 
these mechanisms - this entails drawing assumptions and conclusions from 
the preceding descriptive outline. The final task is to consider the manner in 
which these mechanisms for information sharing could operate in context, i.e. 
the way in which they can potentially contribute towards the aims of regional 
security.  
Given that the CEWS is in its infancy and that access to information on the 
operations of CISSA is limited, the focus of the research task is on the 
conceptualisation of the CEWS and CISSA and how these mechanisms are 
designed and imagined to work. The CEWS and CISSA’s design and 
conceptualisation as contributors to regional security will be analysed in the 
context of available literature on early warning and intelligence in order to (a) 
identify the potential for their successes and (b) highlight aspects that may 
inhibit success and (c) make recommendations.  
The method to answering the research question is to adopt a three-step 
approach based on description, conceptual analysis and contextual analysis.  
Description - The first section of the dissertation describes in detail the three 
primary elements being studied – the AU, CEWS and CISSA. This entails 
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drawing on historical perspectives as well as relying on foundation 
documents, such as international agreements and protocols, to lay the 
foundation for analysis. This is presented in Chapters 3, 4 and 5 respectively.  
Conceptual analysis – The second section of the dissertation utilises 
conceptual analysis to draw from the descriptive section an understanding of 
the strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA. This entails 
developing a deeper knowledge of the implications of the mechanisms for 
decision-making at regional level. The key issue for this phase is to draw an 
analysis from the descriptive section of how CEWS and CISSA would function 
operationally. This is captured in Chapter 6 and draws from a wide range of 
literature on the potential strengths and weaknesses of intelligence and early 
warning more broadly, as well as on the challenges facing CEWS and CISSA.  
Contextual analysis - The final section establishes the manner in which each 
mechanism could support regional security, and contributes to achieving the 
security priorities of the AU. This is done by analysing the CEWS and CISSA 
through the theoretical lenses of security community and epistemic 
community theories respectively.  
The logical flow of the argument seeks to establish that, in order to achieve 
the goal of regional security, information is required, and the mechanisms that 
have been established to enable collaboration in terms of information sharing 
have the potential to positively impact on regional security. Due to the 
elements being analysed, this is largely a theoretical study. Both the CEWS 
and CISSA are relatively new mechanisms, and empirical evidence on the 
actual successes and weaknesses is not widely available. The approach 
taken thus draws on theoretical frameworks to extrapolate potential 
contributions to regional security while also relying on literature about the 
strengths and weaknesses of early warning and intelligence more broadly. 
The empirical evidence presented is drawn from a growing body on literature 
evaluating successes and failures in early warning and intelligence.    
In order to fulfil the demands of the research design and to answer the 
research question, data will be sourced from primary and secondary sources. 
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Official documentation such as international agreements and protocols will be 
used to delineate the functions, principles and objectives in which the AU, 
CEWS and CISSA operate. Further information will be gathered from 
academic sources and from practitioners who contribute to papers at 
conferences and for publication in journals. The aim is to balance information 
from academic sources with that from practitioners in order to gather 
theoretical and normative perspectives and empirical evidence based on 
experience.  
4. Rationale 
The rationale for the pursuit of this research project is that, although there is a 
body of literature and study on early warning in Africa with particular reference 
to the CEWS, there is very little synthesis of ideas on the roles of early 
warning and intelligence cooperation at continental level. This is presenting a 
gap between developments at continental level with regard to the creation of 
mechanisms for information sharing and normative and academic 
interrogation of the challenges and opportunities that these developments 
present. There is also a general lack of consideration of the type of 
information that will be required by decision makers and the mechanisms that 
can best deliver different types of information to different actors for different 
purposes.  
Furthermore, there is a general lack of research and examination of the role of 
intelligence in Africa at both national and regional levels. As a tool in the state 
security arsenal, intelligence is often perceived in a largely negative light, and 
the potential positive role of intelligence for conflict prevention, management 
and resolution is often overlooked. This is primarily due to the historical legacy 
of intelligence being used to ensure the continuity of particularly autocratic 
regimes and as a tool to discourage internal dissent. For example, the Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) found that within apartheid South 
Africa, the intelligence and security forces:  
used both overt and clandestine methods to suppress resistance and 
counter armed actions by opponents of apartheid. Overt methods 
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included banning and banishment, detention without trial, judicial 
executions and public order policing. More clandestine and covert 
forms of control included torture, extra-judicial killings and support for 
surrogate forces (TRC Report 1998:165).   
The conditions under which abuses as exemplified above occurred, have 
changed. Not only has the end of apartheid changed the orientation of the 
national intelligence structures in South Africa, but the pursuit of democracy 
elsewhere on the continent has also advanced similar reform. In post-conflict 
situations and democratic transitions, state intelligence agencies have been 
restructured and reoriented from Uganda to Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone and 
Mozambique (see for example Africa & Kwadjo 2009). Democratic 
governance requirements have impacted on the nature, functions and tasking 
of intelligence agencies.  
From a more global perspective, the end of the Cold War and the security 
demands of a globalised world have placed new demands on intelligence 
structures. The global, regional and national contexts in which intelligence 
services in Africa now find themselves call for a fundamentally different 
approach to intelligence operations and the functions thereof. As Hutchful 
(2009) observes: 
Intelligence more than any of the security services has undergone 
profound challenges and transformations over the preceding two 
decades. After a steep recession in the post-Cold War period, 
Intelligence has once again been thrust to the forefront of the global 
public agenda by radically redefined threat environments … that place 
primacy on … Intelligence capabilities.    
However, in Africa interrogation of the role and functioning of intelligence has 
been limited. Hutchful (2009) notes that the silence over intelligence in Africa 
seems to contrast with renewed controversies over the role, strategic mission 
and governance of intelligence in the global arena. Part of the rationale for 
this study, therefore, is to promote research and debate about intelligence on 
the continent and it is an attempt to make a positive contribution to the 
emerging field of intelligence studies in Africa.  
 
 
 
 
  15 
5. Theoretical framework and background of the study  
This is largely an analytical study involving the consideration of two key 
elements (CEWS and CISSA) and their relationship with regional security. As 
such the literature review as outlined here serves only to frame the issues that 
will be explored in the dissertation and to introduce the themes that inform the 
research. Instead of having a formal literature review and a chapter of the 
dissertation devoted entirely to the literature review, the approach adopted 
here is to present the key issues informing the research in Chapter 1 and then 
to draw on primary and secondary resources throughout the development of 
the discussion. The literature review forms part of the dissertation and is 
drawn on as the argument above develops. Furthermore, the theoretical 
lenses used to explore intelligence; early warning and regional security in 
Africa are presented in Chapter 2 and are not presented in any detail here.  
This section will explore the key issues framing the discussion and will then 
present a brief introduction to the concepts of regional security, intelligence 
and early warning.  
5.1.  Parameters framing the study  
The study is framed within certain important parameters that provide the 
overall contextual reference points and place the concepts of early warning, 
intelligence cooperation and regional security in a broader context. These 
parameters are highlighted throughout the various chapters and form the 
central part of the golden thread that ties early warning, intelligence 
cooperation and regional security together. This set of parameters is: 
i) The paradigm shift from state security to human security 
ii) The transnational and cross-boundary nature of security threats 
iii) The impact of globalisation, and particularly advances in information 
and communication technology (ICT). 
These three trends have to a large degree enabled the consideration of early 
warning, intelligence cooperation and regional integration as intricate parts of 
security discourse. Furthermore, this dissertation acknowledges the impact of 
these global trends on the development of the regional security architecture 
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and recognises that these broader global trends have shaped the discourse 
and orientation of security and multilateral relations in Africa.   
5.1.1.  A human security orientation 
The concept of human security became part of global discourse following the 
1994 Human Development Report of the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), which called for a profound transition in thinking – “from 
the narrow concept of national security to the all-encompassing concept of 
human security” (UNDP 1994:24). The UNDP Report highlighted the 
importance of investing in development in order to ensure long-term security 
and has become a cornerstone document recognising the security-
development nexus and the much-lauded phrase that, without security there 
can be no development. Another important aspect emphasised within the 
UNDP Report is that “human security is easier to ensure through early 
prevention1 rather than through later intervention” (UNDP 1994:22).  
The idea of human security has rekindled the debate over what security 
means and how to achieve it (Acharya 2001:442). At the heart of human 
security discourse is the shift from a perception of security as defined in terms 
of the security of the state to a definition of security based on the security of 
the individual. As explained in Hendricks (2006:3): 
In essence, the human security approach seeks to fundamentally 
question, and alter, whom we protect and how that protection is afforded. 
The approach takes individuals, rather than states, as its referent, and 
emphasises the need for a holistic, long-term view of security that 
includes the redress of structural inequities... It identifies different levels 
of security, viz, personal, community, national and international, and 
argues that their interdependence implies that insecurity in one sphere 
has ramifications for other spheres – it is therefore not a case of ‘one at 
the expense of the other’.  
A human security approach, therefore, transcends the centrality of the state 
and recognises that, although “the primary role of the state is to protect 
citizens, given past experiences, this cannot be left as the sole preserve of the 
state” (Hendricks 2006:3). Thus, as Hendricks (2006:3) argues, international                                                         
1 Italics as used in original text 
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and regional organisations have the responsibility to intervene when human 
lives are under threat, and any sustainable transformation has to include civil 
society in the formulation and execution of conflict prevention and post-conflict 
reconstruction agendas. 
The human security agenda, therefore, is an expanded approach to security 
in terms of both the threats that are considered part of the security agenda 
and the actors that are involved in conflict prevention, management and 
resolution. As explained by Acharya (2001:442): 
Although it is presented as a global template on which to recast the 
security philosophies and policies of countries fundamentally to reflect 
the changing conditions and principles of world order, human security 
has also been an instrument of national strategic priorities that often 
have strong domestic roots. As such, human security has been 
presented variously as a means of reducing the human costs of violent 
conflict, as a strategy to enable governments to address basic human 
needs and offset the inequalities of globalization, and as a framework 
for providing social safety nets to people impoverished and 
marginalized by sudden and severe economic crisis.  
 
Human security provided the normative framework for reconsidering the role 
of the state and the manner in which sovereignty is practiced. The notion of 
absolute sovereignty is no longer perceived as a means of isolating the state 
against external involvement, but rather sovereignty is increasingly refined as 
a normative concept of responsibility (Cilliers 2004:39). This view was echoed 
in a 2009 report of the Secretary General of the United Nations (UN):   
The responsibility to protect, first and foremost, is a matter of State 
responsibility, because prevention begins at home and the protection of 
populations is a defining attribute of sovereignty and statehood in the 
twenty-first century (UN 2009:10).  
 
The concept of absolute sovereignty has evolved into a more nuanced 
understanding of the responsibilities and tasks of statehood. “Thus, national 
sovereignty now requires a system of governance that is based on democratic 
and popular citizen participation, constructive management of social 
diversities, respect for fundamental human rights, an equitable distribution of 
national wealth, and opportunities for development” (Cilliers 2004:39). As 
enunciated by the UN Secretary General (UN 2009:10): 
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Responsible sovereignty is based on the politics of inclusion, not 
exclusion. This entails the building of institutions, capacities and 
practices for the constructive management of the tensions so often 
associated with the uneven growth or rapidly changing circumstances 
that appear to benefit some groups more than others.  
The re-thinking of security and sovereignty has, as was predicted in the 1994 
UNDP Report (1994:22), impacted on the norms, structures and behaviours of 
international society in the 21st Century. These changes have occurred at 
conceptual and operational levels in terms of the manner in which security is 
conceptualised and responses to insecurity are formulated. It has also 
manifested in greater responsibility for security being assumed by diverse 
actors, ranging from international organisations to civil society groups, non-
governmental organisations, the private sector and humanitarian assistance 
groups. As Hammerstad (2005:12) observes, an important accompaniment of 
the shifting security paradigm has been the development of more prominent 
regional organisations with stronger institutions and broader and more 
intrusive security mandates.  
Although the rhetoric of human security has gained international recognition 
and is widely accepted in international agreements and statements, the 
practice thereof has been mixed. Too often solutions to insecurity are first 
sought through resort to force and only later are the conditions to foster long-
term security considered. Furthermore, the realisation of human security 
requires commitment to inclusive and equitable governance and enabling 
societies to participate, not as victims but as empowered actors, in conflict 
prevention, management and resolution. This calls for fundamental change in 
the power relations between people and state actors, especially in conflict and 
post conflict states.   
In summary, a human security orientation provides this dissertation with a 
framework in which to explore the changed global security context and the 
changed nature of security threats. It also provides an understanding of the 
increase in relevance of intergovernmental organisations - the AU, in 
particular - regarding conflict prevention, management and resolution. Lastly, 
the human security approach brings conflict prevention to the fore and is part 
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of the global tide urging preventative methodologies such as early warning. 
Thinking about human security, as opposed to state security, opened the 
space for exploring different response mechanisms beyond the national level.   
5.1.2.  The transnational nature of security 
The end of the Cold War ushered in a period in which previous assumptions 
and dominant discourses on security were reassessed. The human security 
paradigm was one part of this reassessment based on the acknowledgement 
that traditional state-centric security threats and the responses were no longer 
the predominant security context. Intra-state violence is just as prevalent, if 
not more so, than inter-state conflict. State borders do not bind sources of 
insecurity and the source of threats now facing countries are much wider and 
more complex (Harris 2004:6). Global advances in communication, 
transportation and commerce have enlarged spaces for transnational 
insecurities such as international organised crime syndicates, drug and 
human trafficking, terrorism, infectious disease, economic crime and 
environmental degradation.  
As ‘new’ sources of risk and insecurity have come to the fore in the globalised 
world, so too have ‘new’ methods to overcome these challenges become 
more discernible. Mills (2001:19) notes that the transnational nature of many 
of the security issues faced by states in the 21st Century “are beyond the 
capacity of both the military and of individual states to tackle unaided. 
Combined and/ or multi-laterally led operations could become the future 
norm.” Although he was referring more directly to national and regional 
military cooperation, the point remains valid - in the modern globalised world 
facing insecurity requires coordinated, cooperative responses. Gibson 
(2005:28) makes a similar point, reflecting that globalisation creates and 
reflects issues that are increasingly outside the scope and remit of nation-
state governments.  
This theme echoes throughout this dissertation, as the importance of 
collaboration and formalising regional security arrangements is the foundation 
on which the potential impact of CEWS and CISSA on regional security is 
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explored. The global trend towards cooperation in the security arena finds 
resonance in developments towards more integrated security responses in 
Africa. The driver for greater cooperation in Africa has been based on the 
need to mitigate the impact of and to prevent the outbreak of violent conflict 
that had become so common a feature of the African landscape in the 1990s.  
Because of the trans-boundary nature of many security threats, the 
relationship between national and regional security has changed. This is not 
to say that either internal or external security is more relevant, but rather that 
the inter-linkages between internal and external security are more 
pronounced. It has become more difficult to distinguish where causes of 
insecurity originate. To mitigate the effects of and vulnerabilities to insecurity 
requires national and transnational responses. The AU peace and security 
architecture is born of this legacy. As recognised in the preamble of the 
Common African Defence and Security Policy, in Africa, security is indivisible 
– “the security of one African country is directly linked to that of other African 
countries”.  
5.1.3. Globalisation and information communication technology 
Advances in communication and technology have created new avenues for 
economic activity and opened security vulnerabilities. Such advances have 
also enabled advances in operational responses to insecurity. Even the 
earliest conceptions of early warning systems relied on the centrality of a 
computer-based system for information management. One of the first 
examples of this were efforts made during the 1970s funded by the United 
States Department of Defence on integrated crisis warning systems. It is 
against the backdrop of multidisciplinary advances in research on decision-
making processes, the use of quantitative variables and indicators, the 
recognition of the credibility of forecasting as a science and the development 
of computer technology that conflict early warning systems became a 
possibility (Andriole & Young 1977:107-108).  
Technological advancement has played a key role not only in the possibilities 
for early warning but also in the modalities for information more broadly. 
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These changes in the manner in which societies can interact with information 
impact upon the manner in which government agencies tasked with 
information functions can operate. The massive increases in the amount of 
publicly available information have challenged fundamental assumptions 
about intelligence and the functions and capacities of intelligence 
organisations. On the one hand, the massive information flows that are 
available in the modern globalised environment, as epitomised by the World 
Wide Web (www), necessitate the requirements of computer based systems 
to manage, store and process information. On the other hand, increases in 
the flow of information and the manner in which information can be stored and 
transferred mean that it is becoming increasingly difficult to keep secrets. It 
calls for a re-examination of when secrecy is required, the stringent 
application of security measures to ensure secrecy when required and a more 
nuanced understanding of why secrets should be kept.  
As Gibson (2005:28) notes, globalisation and the increased ability of 
information to be communicated to interested parties around the globe, has 
also witnessed a significant shift in changing societal expectations. He uses 
transnational civil society organisations (TCSO) to exemplify this impact of 
globalisation as follows (Gibson 2005:28):  
While TCSOs may not have the power to effect change, they have 
certainly understood that moral authority, based on transparent 
knowledge, provides convincing reputational risk management 
challenges for the other entities (offending in their eyes) within global 
commons.  
This globalised advocacy, monitoring and evaluation role of civil society opens 
new space for African civil society groups as active participants in conflict 
management, resolution and prevention. This could be especially relevant in 
terms of the monitoring and evaluating the impact of interventions by regional 
and international actors in conflict situations.  
Information technology brought new capabilities in the field of 
decentralisation, tailored systems and networking (Liaropoulos 2006:7). The 
most essential revolution has been in the way that people can interact with 
information. In the past, information was scarce, expensive and considered 
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authoritative; information nowadays is accessible, cheap and more tangible 
(Liaropoulos 2006:8). This is not to imply that there are no longer barriers and 
controls on information flows. As explained by Keohane and Nye (1998:85): 
The information revolution alters patterns of complex interdependence 
by exponentially increasing the number of channels of communication 
in world politics – between individuals in networks, not just individuals 
within bureaucracies. But it exists in the context of an existing political 
structure, and its effects on the flows of different types of information 
vary vastly … Politics will shape the information revolution as much as 
visa versa.  
Whereas ICT advances have opened the space for information to be used in 
a different way and has enabled new flows of information, the manner in 
which this will manifest is ultimately a matter of politics. As with other fields of 
international activity, the manner in which ICT has enabled information flows 
and the manner in which people are able to interact with technology is 
uneven. The so-called digital divide does, however, not detract from the global 
trend towards increased globalisation of information and the tendency to rely 
on technology for information collection, processing, dissemination and 
storage. Although in 2009, only 6.8% of the population on the continent 
utilised Internet access, Africa is the world’s most rapidly growing market for 
mobile telephony and is also home to some of the fastest growing fixed-line 
markets in the world (Internet World Statistics 2009). 
The relevance of advances in ICT for the purpose of this dissertation is 
twofold. Firstly, ICT enables the operation of early warning systems – 
advances in ICT have meant that a continental early warning system linking 
information sources from across the globe is a possibility. Masses of 
information can be organised, stored and transferred. Interacting with 
information and moving information across great distances can literally be 
done with the click of a button. Furthermore, because of the masses of 
publicly available information, computerised systems are almost a prerequisite 
for the sorting, storage and retrieval of data. Automated data collection 
systems can also assist with mitigating the impact of information overload.  
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Secondly, the speed at which information travels and the ease with which 
people are able to communicate across geographical divides means that 
governments struggle to hold a monopoly on information of a sensitive nature. 
Governments also struggle to maintain definitive technical expertise, as 
expertise is becoming diffused across disciplines and spaces. For example, 
information that 20 years ago was only available from secret government 
satellites is downloadable to any desktop through Google Earth. Although this 
may be perceived as vulnerabilities to state security, this can actually help to 
remove restrictions preventing the sharing of information between states, 
such as certain classification criteria, thus enabling collaboration. The wealth 
of open source information challenges the significance attached to covert 
information. As Best and Cumming (2007:5) explain, secret information may 
be less important “than the combination of open source information, 
information sharing, computer networking, and an ability to sift and analyze a 
dizzying volume of open source information.” 
These factors are important for this dissertation, as both early warning and 
intelligence are most centrally concerned with information. For early warning, 
advances in communications technology is an enabler and the very relevance 
of early warning systems are based on recognition of the value of open 
source information. For intelligence, the challenge of a more open information 
regime is that state intelligence is being challenged to become a sharpened 
and more focused tool. The task of controlling information is increasingly 
difficult and the roles and functions of state intelligence need to be 
conceptualised within this broader framework.  
5.2. Regional security in Africa 
A central component of this study is regional security in Africa and the 
mechanisms that serve the regional security agenda. Institutions are the 
product of the particular historical context in which they were developed. The 
African peace and security architecture is no different. The structures that 
have evolved at continental level bear the markings of the tensions between 
Pan African expectations, national interest and politically palatable and 
resource-able solutions.  
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In 1975, Colin Legum published an article in International Affairs in which he 
considered the successes and failures of the OAU. Legum (1975:208) 
highlighted that Africa is the first continent on which pan-continental 
aspirations have become anything close to reality. The evolution towards 
continental collective security structures has been marked by the continuing 
conflict, insecurity and underdevelopment that plague Africa. When 
considering the successes and failures of regional integration in Africa, 
especially in terms of regional security, the tendency is towards critical 
pessimism and cynicism. Legum (1975) presents a more balanced argument, 
positioning the development of the OAU against the global backdrop in which 
African states achieved independence and positing the OAU as a support for 
newly independent states in a highly competitive global system. Furthermore, 
newly independent African states had to come to grips with not only 
international relations but also inter-African relations. Legum (1975:211) 
notes, therefore, that “(T)he OAU provides the arena within which common 
African policies are forged, or disputed, and where tensions of inter-African 
relations can be released.”  
The tightrope that both the OAU and the AU has had to traverse is the 
inherent tension between regional aspirations and national sovereignty. This 
is a global phenomenon, which preoccupies even the most advanced 
integrated regions. For Africa, this tension has been complicated by the reality 
that the ability of regional organisations to fulfil conflict prevention, 
management and resolution mandates is predicated on the ability to 
contravene the central global norm of respect for national sovereignty. This is 
because of the dominance of intra-state conflict. This dichotomy led Legum 
(1975:213) to conclude “no organisation like the OAU can hope to survive 
once it attempts to intervene – however good the reasons – in the internal 
conflicts of one of its members. This essential constraint is inherent in any 
international organisation; this may be a pity, but no such organisation should 
be condemned for failing in an area which it cannot, realistically, touch”. 
The question then becomes, what can we realistically hope for international 
organisations, the AU in particular, to achieve in the arena of regional 
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security, and what are the mechanisms that can best serve that purpose? 
This is an important point of departure because it is unrealistic to base this 
discussion on the idealistic, yet false, assumption that the AU can realise its 
conflict prevention, management and resolution functions outside of the 
constraints of national sovereignty and the continued relevance of power in 
international relations.  
The approach adopted here is position the AU within the system of sovereign, 
independent states and to understand the manner in which the regional 
organisation can promote peace and security within this specific context. The 
challenge for Africa continues to be the conversion of a continent so long 
dominated by foreign powers into a stable society of states within a system of 
continental order (Legum 1975:219).      
In comparison with the OAU, the AU represented a definitive step by heads of 
state to commit to the creation of regional security. According to Mohammed 
et al (2002:3),  
the establishment of the African Union reflects a global trend away from 
treating security issues as the sole preserve of governments, in favour of 
ideas of common security based upon an international or cosmopolitan 
community of citizens, bound together by multiple ties of common 
interest and a commitment to basic values. 
The notion of regional security is closely tied to the achievement of peace. 
Emmanuel Adler (1998:168) defines peace as “the practice of security 
community sustained by the attachment of collective meanings and purposes 
to physical reality.” This is similar, as quoted by Adler (1998:169), to the 
advancement of “a wider form of international community” as enunciated in 
E.H. Carr’s Conditions of Peace (1964). Drawing on the work of Carr and 
Deutsch (1968), Adler (1998) places the emphasis of building security 
communities on the development of a collective identity – the building of a 
‘we-feeling’.  
Regional security in Africa has taken place against the backdrop of Pan-
African identity and the vision of a common African identity based on common 
historical experiences and common future aspirations. The development of 
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institutions in which regional integration is pursued also enhances the 
development of a sense of community and oneness as through increased 
communication, common meanings and understandings are generated.  
The issues of common identity and collective meaning are central to the 
understanding of the development of regional security mechanisms in Africa 
and are also central to understanding the potential for regional security 
response mechanisms. The notion of security community will be applied to the 
regional security aspirations in Africa with the purpose of establishing that the 
regional institutions – the OAU and AU – are part of an evolution towards 
building a security community on the continent. Casting the AU in this light 
navigates the dichotomy between national and regional aspirations and by 
applying notions of security community theory and a human security approach 
the centrality of national sovereignty is diluted. An evolutionary view is 
applied, as national sovereignty remains a core part of the African political 
landscape, but there are indications that the notion of sovereignty is becoming 
more nuanced as indicated in the discussion on human security above. The 
boundaries of sovereignty are being tested in the modern globalised world.  
The evolution of regional security, the challenges of regional security in Africa 
and the evolution of a continental security community will be further explored 
in Chapters 2 and 3.  
5.3. Intelligence and Early Warning  
The final section of this overview addresses the CEWS and CISSA and 
differentiates between early warning and intelligence. This section serves 
merely as an introduction to the CEWS and CISSA, as these mechanisms for 
collaboration are further discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 respectively. The 
objective of this section, therefore, is to provide an introduction to early 
warning and intelligence collaboration in Africa.  
5.3.1. The Continental Early Warning System 
The CEWS is an information sharing mechanism that has been designed to 
assist the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC) to operationalise its conflict 
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prevention, management and resolution mandate. The purpose of the early 
warning system is to provide the PSC with information to guide the 
formulation of strategic options directed at taking action to prevent conflict. 
The CEWS is an information system that can provide data and indicators that 
will be used to forecast the emergence of conflict (Nhara 1996). 
The notion of early warning has its roots in more technical fields with uses 
such as to forecast natural disasters, food shortages and to guide 
humanitarian relief agencies. The application of early warning to security 
issues and conflict prevention in particular is guided by a human security 
paradigm and is based on the recognition of the responsibility of states to 
protect people from the impact of violence and conflict.  
The CEWS is a system designed for the sharing of open-source information 
from the Regional Economic Communities to the AU and processed to the 
PSC. It is based on principles of collaboration, which extend to the collection 
of information from all open sources, including the utilisation of networks from 
civil society and academia. The CEWS will, theoretically, enable the AU to 
anticipate security problems and facilitate the PSC to initiate response 
strategies based on timely, accurate and reliable information.  
5.3.2. Committee of Intelligence and Security Services in Africa 
The Heads of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa established CISSA 
in August 2004 in Nigeria through the signing of a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU).  
CISSA is a mechanism for information and intelligence sharing between 
states in Africa through the intelligence and security services of those states. 
It serves as a platform for formalising interaction between these services and 
for formalising cooperation on common security matters. Unlike the CEWS, 
CISSA is not a part of the AU, but operates as an independent subsidiary of 
the regional authority with links to the Office of the Chairperson through the 
Intelligence and Security Committee (AU 2005:12). The relationship of CISSA 
to the AU will be explored further in Chapter 5.   
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The evolution of CISSA is indicative of the challenges of balancing regional 
imperatives with national interests. Intelligence by its nature is closely 
associated with state power and is central to conceptualisations of state 
power in international relations. CISSA provides for a blend between national 
and regional intelligence and allows for the formalisation of intelligence 
cooperation for national intelligence capacities to better fulfil the role of 
supporting regional security priorities.   
5.3.3. Differentiating between intelligence and early warning 
A part of the research problem relates to the differences between intelligence 
and early warning and the manner in which these mechanisms can contribute 
towards regional security. The basis of differentiating systems for early 
warning and intelligence in Africa stems from a preoccupation in many circles 
with the distinction of intelligence as firstly, secret and secondly, concerned 
only with issues of state security. The utility of early warning is conceived as 
being based on open sources and collaboration and concerned with the 
broader human security agenda. Evidence of these lines of thought have 
been repeated by Schmeidl (2002:73) and Adelman and Suhrke (1996:75), 
who argued that early warning differs from intelligence in that it serves the 
common good. Nyheim (2008:7) explains: 
From the start conflict early warning was envisaged as distinct from 
intelligence based analysis that focused on protection of state interests. 
It sought multi-stakeholder solutions and gender sensitivity, used open 
source information and aimed at protecting human lives and creating 
sustainable peace based on locally owned solutions. 
Nyheim (2008:7) points to one of the key issues that has differentiated early 
warning from intelligence – the end-users. Intelligence is traditionally 
concerned with the supply of information to national decision-makers on 
issues of national security. Early warning is designed to cater for multiple 
users in an inter-governmental context on issues of global or regional 
importance.  
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Boshoff (2008:106) explains the difference between intelligence and early 
warning in terms of the centrality of sovereignty and the closed nature of 
traditional intelligence systems, presented as follows: 
Table 1: Differences between early warning and intelligence (Boshoff 2008:106) 
Early Warning Traditional Intelligence Systems 
Depends on the collection and 
analysis of information, scenario-
building and the presentation of 
recommendations to decision 
makers 
Depends also on the collection and 
analysis of information, scenario-
building and the presentation of 
recommendations to decision makers 
Focuses on human security Focuses on state security 
Seeks to serve larger objectives 
than those of the state 
Seeks to serve state interest 
Depends on transparent methods 
and sharing of information  
Rely on secrecy, situation rooms and 
encrypted communications of 
classified information 
Transparency in information and 
analysis 
Closed system 
Decentralised and dependent upon 
other sources of information and 
analysis 
Centralised and dependent on in-
house information and analysis 
Cilliers (2005) explains the difference as follows:  
Intelligence systems rely primarily on secrecy, situation rooms and the 
encrypted communication of classified information. Early warning, on 
the other hand, depends primarily upon transparent methods and the 
sharing of information.  
The commonality of intelligence and early warning lies in that both seek as the 
most primary objectives to provide end-users (decision-makers at the AU in 
this context) with timely, accurate, relevant and reliable information on which 
to formulate policy options. This role is the same for intelligence and early 
warning – although the sources of information are difference.  
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Conflict early warning was traditionally concerned with anticipating state 
failure or collapse into conflict, particularly in the mid-1990s. After 9/11 the 
issue of weak, fragile and failed states took on a whole new relevance in 
international affairs. This was no longer the terrain of humanitarian 
organisations and UN agencies – weak states were now seen as an enabler 
of global insecurity. The divide between conflict early warning systems and 
intelligence has become narrower, as it becomes increasingly difficult to 
isolate what is of interest to intelligence and what should be the focus of early 
warning.  
This function of providing information to prevent the outbreak or escalation of 
conflict is at the heart of both modern intelligence and early warning. In order 
to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of CEWS and CISSA and to 
analyse the contribution these structures make in terms of enhancing regional 
security, this dissertation also addresses some of the more fundamental 
challenges faced by both intelligence and early warning.  
The role of CEWS and CISSA in contributing to regional security will be 
analysed in this broader environment influenced by both theoretical 
assumptions (drawn from the theoretical framework that guides this study as 
outlined in Chapter 2) and practical challenges and opportunities garnered 
from local and international experiences. The benefit of such an approach is 
that it grounds the research in both normative and operational realms and as 
such serves to address the issues raised in the research question – i.e. how 
can CEWS and CISSA contribute to regional security in Africa? It is necessary 
to develop an understanding of the broader operational and conceptual 
debates on intelligence and early warning that will inform the potential 
contributions that CEWS and CISSA will make to regional security in Africa. 
These ideas will be explored in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.  
6. Conclusion 
This introductory chapter sought to establish the basis from which the study is 
pursued. This was done through (1) presenting an overview of the purpose, 
rationale and methodology of the study; (2) by providing an overview of the 
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key issues that inform the study; and (3) by introducing the elements being 
studied. As such this dissertation aims to address the potential contributions 
of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security. This chapter has provided the 
broader framework in which the discussion will be further developed. To 
complete the framing of the study, the theoretical assumptions on which the 
study is based will be addressed in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 2 - Theoretical Framework: Of Cooperation and Social 
Constructs 
 
1. Introduction 
This chapter seeks to outline the major theoretical trends that influence the 
understanding of information sharing, intelligence cooperation and regional 
security in Africa as used in this dissertation. This study is situated in the 
international relations discipline, but recognises the shortcomings of 
mainstream international relations theories, most notably the bias towards 
Western experience. Therefore, the study looks through alternative theoretical 
lenses to answer the research question. It is not that relations between states 
in Africa do not conform to the expected patterns of behaviour in international 
relations (such as competition and cooperation), but rather that the path to get 
to the platform of interaction has been fundamentally different from that 
experienced in other parts of the world. This, thus, affects the way in which 
inter-state politics in Africa occurs.    
This chapter examines theoretical perspectives and assumptions informing 
inter-state cooperation. The first section outlines some assumptions about 
international cooperation, on why states cooperate, and the influence of 
international organisations on international relations. The first section is 
primarily concerned with state-centric relations. The discussion then moves to 
consider sub-state levels of international relations that occur both within and 
outside of governments. This is done through utilising trans-governmental 
relations and epistemic community theory.  
The final section of this chapter examines the notion of security communities 
and the relevance of a sense of community that underpins regional integration 
in Africa. The intention is to craft a theoretical framework that can address 
multi-faceted cooperation and integration at state, government department 
and non-state levels. This is because the subject matter addressed in this 
dissertation covers the spectrum of interstate relations (as represented by the 
African Union); inter-departmental collaboration (as exemplified by CISSA) 
and state and non-state cooperation (as evidenced in the CEWS). The range 
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of actors studied in this dissertation is a manifestation of the multi-faceted 
nature of modern international relations and is also indicative of the complex 
network of actors and interests that influence policy-making and 
implementation. The theoretical frameworks presented in this chapter attempt 
to capture that diversity and to present a framework within which to explore 
why states choose to cooperate and how information, ideas and interests can 
shape the national and collective security agenda. 
2. Considering assumptions about international cooperation  
Cooperation between states has been of interest to political scientists for 
many years but came into its own as a field of study during the 1970s. It was 
during this period that attempts by states to organise and institutionalise 
cooperation in economic and security affairs became an accepted feature of 
international affairs. The assumptions on which much of international 
cooperation theory is based, is distinctly ground in the Realist political tradition 
that was predominant in the Cold War era. Trying to understand and explain 
international cooperation in this light is based on three major assumptions 
about the nature of the international system and the international interactions 
that can be expected as a result, namely (Eriksson & Giampiero 2006:228):  
1) The state is the primary unit of analysis 
2) The state acts in rational ways to satisfy its national interest 
3) Power and security are the core values of the state. 
A further important assumption that provides the backdrop for a Realist 
analysis of international relations is the anarchic nature of the international 
system. As Waltz (1993:59) explained even with the end of the Cold War and 
despite changes that constantly take place in relations between states, the 
basic structure of international politics continues to be anarchic. Thus, “each 
state fends for itself with or without the cooperation of others” (Waltz 
1993:59). This implies that when states choose to cooperate, it is out of 
recognition that cooperation is in the interest of the state with positive effects 
on the position of the state in an anarchic system. These positive effects 
would be manifest as benefits to the national interest in terms of access to 
power, increased military security or economic benefit.   
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This style of thinking also led to conclusions about the nature of inter-
governmental organisations as extensions of the state realm positing 
international organisations as “instruments of government, and therefore 
unimportant in their own right” (Keohane & Nye 1974:39). Samuel Huntington 
argued that international organisations are relatively insignificant actors in 
international politics as they are based on accord between states and embody 
the principle of nationality (Huntington 1973:338-339). Similarly, Koremenos, 
Lipson and Snidal (2001:762) argue that states use international institutions to 
further their own goals, and they design institutions accordingly. Realists 
believe that international organisations are shaped and limited by the states 
that found and sustain them and have little independent effect (Waltz 
2000:18). 
Koremenos et al (2001:762) further define international institutions as “explicit 
arrangements, negotiated among international actors, that prescribe, 
proscribe, and/ or authorize behavior (sic)”. International organisations are the 
product of negotiations between states to create structures to enhance 
cooperation and sometimes even to work towards integration. This is the 
foundation of understanding international organisations as put forward in this 
dissertation. More specifically, the OAU and the AU are interpreted firstly as 
institutions designed specifically and purposefully by states to further 
identified interests. Both organisations are products of the particular regional 
and global context of the time and bear the markings of negotiated 
settlements, for example, in the clauses relating to sovereignty, non-
interference and non-indifference, as will be discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 3. Furthermore, as exemplified by the transition from the OAU to the 
AU, the nature and purpose of institutions change as structures vary (Waltz 
2000:18).  
However, a vital difference between an essentially Realist interpretation of 
international relations and the approach to regional integration espoused in 
this dissertation, is the notion that regional organisations are significant 
beyond the impact on the state. The approach to international organisations 
and the AU in particular draws also from the Constructivist assumption that 
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“agents and structures construct each other” (Frederking 2003:364). Thus, 
African states have made decisions that shape the behaviour of the AU, but 
the AU also makes decisions that shape the behaviour of states. This will be 
discussed further in later sections of this chapter.  
The relevance of the field of study of international cooperation emerged as 
interdependence increased and the need to take action on trans-boundary 
issues became more pronounced. Global interconnectedness, which became 
more apparent in the 1960s and 1970s, had security, economic and political 
dimensions. As the distinction between national and global issues began to 
narrow, the levels of communication between states increased. International 
organisations provide a platform for such interactions and facilitate direct 
contact among officials of national governments. This was evidenced by the 
rise of the United Nations and the multifaceted specialised agencies; the rise 
of military blocks such as the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation and the 
increase in international organisations such as the World Bank, International 
Monetary Fund and Greenpeace. As commented by Keohane (1998:82), to 
analyse world politics in the 1990s is to discuss international institutions: the 
rules that govern world politics and the organisations that help implement 
those rules.  
A distinct characteristic of much of the literature on international cooperation 
is a focus on the system level of analysis – looking at sources of and 
constraints on cooperative behaviour as part of the international system. 
Much of this literature applies the tenets of rational choice theory as tools of 
analysis. The underlying principle of rational choice theory is that actors make 
decisions based on a rational assessment of options and choose the most 
beneficial path. As explained by Fiorina (2000), the central premise of the 
approaches known as rational choice is that behaviour is purposive. “Political 
behavior (sic) is not solely the product of psychological drives, socialization or 
organizational norms. Rather, individuals have goals they try to achieve, 
acting as rationally as their knowledge, resources and the situation permit” 
(Fiorina 2000). 
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In a critique of rational choice, Kristen Renwick Monroe (2001:151) argues 
that rational choice is “a paradigm under stress” and proposes the notion of a 
theory of perspective as an alternative paradigm. Monroe (2001:157) further 
proposes “our perceptions of ourselves in relation to others sets and 
delineates the range of options we find available, not just morally but 
empirically.” This theory of perspective is based on identity as a source of 
options – making choice a function of identity (Monroe 2001:157) – and is an 
interesting alternative perspective for explaining cooperative choices by 
African states. The centrality of identity and the perception of self in relation to 
others are explored later in this discussion in relation to Pan-Africanism and 
the importance of African unity as a safeguard against international pressures.  
Another critique of rational choice draws from the notion of actors as unified 
units – “individual actors consciously choosing to pursue their perceived self-
interest” (Monroe 2001:154). The manner in which state interests are 
developed is explored in further detail through considering firstly, a pluralist 
approach looking at sub-state interactions as articulated by Keohane and 
Nye’s (1974) formulation of the importance of trans-governmental relations, 
and secondly, through exploring how ideas, identities, norms and beliefs 
affect the definition of state interest. Although a state-centric approach is 
adopted (as the purpose is to explore how states define their interests), a 
purely rational choice approach is not adopted as state choices are seen to be 
the product of perceptions, ideas, identities and beliefs interacting at sub-
state, national and international levels. The next section will explore 
interactions between states occurring at inter-departmental levels.   
2.1 Trans-governmental relations 
In 1974, as a critique on the state-centric approach to international 
cooperation that was predominant at the time, Keohane and Nye (1974:44) 
put forward an argument to highlight the importance of “bureaucratic contacts 
that take place below the apex of the organizational hierarchy.” The interest 
was in cooperation (and conflict) that takes place between government sub-
units – that is, between national departments. By acknowledging the 
importance of this level of interaction, the centrality of the state as a unitary 
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actor was challenged and a more multifaceted picture of international 
cooperation was put forward.  
The authors define “trans-governmental relations as sets of direct interactions 
among sub-units of different governments that are not controlled or closely 
guided by the policies of the cabinets or chief executives of those 
governments” (Keohane & Nye 1974:43). The most basic and diffuse form of 
trans-governmental relations takes place in meetings between officials from 
different bureaucracies. As explained by Keohane and Nye (1974:44-45): 
Face-to-face communications often convey more information (intended 
or unintended) than indirect communications, and this additional 
information can affect policy expectations and preferences. It is well 
known that international organizations frequently provide suitable 
contexts for such trans-governmental communication. As one official 
said of INTERPOL, ‘What’s really important here are the meetings on a 
social level – the official agenda is only for show’. 
The importance of this trans-governmental perspective, which is picked up 
again in the discussion on epistemic communities, is that one begins to think 
of governments as open decision-making units where various preferences 
and influences - from internal and external, government and non-government 
relations - come to bear. The state-centric realist worldview created the idea 
of states as units and distinct actors. State interests were defined as seeking 
to maximise power – this simplistic formula gave foreign policy a distinctly 
closed and focused agenda. As explained by Farrell (2002:50), Realism 
portrays a world occupied by undifferentiated rational actors (i.e. self-
interested states), whose relations are structured by the balance of material 
power. This perspective can be challenged through recognising that 
international cooperation takes place at various levels and that the state is not 
a single unitary actor with all departments working towards one common 
agenda. In doing so, both a pluralist and a constructivist approach (see 
Section 2.2 below) are incorporated into the analysis, recognising that 
interests and power operating at domestic level influence state preferences 
(Farrell 2002:53) and also that state choices are shaped by attitudes, norms, 
identity and beliefs.  
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Keohane and Nye (1974:45-46) recognise that, as communication and 
coordination between national departments becomes regularised, changes in 
attitudes may result and thus policies or the implementation of policies might 
be affected. “Even where attitudes are not fundamentally affected and no 
major deviations from central policy positions occur, the existence of a sense 
of collegiality may permit the development of flexible bargaining behaviour in 
which concessions need not be required issue by issue or during each period” 
(Keohane & Nye 1974:46).  
The degree of influence of trans-governmental relations can vary from a 
sense of collegiality to policy coordination to coalition building. The relevance 
here is not the degree to which such relations can influence state behaviour 
rather the recognition that such relations build cooperation and provide for the 
development of common positions – even for the development of common 
attitudes, values and behaviours. As Farrell (2002:50) explains, ideas and 
norms operate “all the way down” to actually shape actors and actions in 
world politics.  
International organisations, therefore, can play an important role not only for 
state-to-state interaction at heads of state level, but also in facilitating the 
building of collective responses at lower levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy. 
Furthermore, these trans-governmental relations have the potential to impact 
upon domestic and international policies and practices. An important function, 
even outside of affecting policy, is that increased communication and 
interaction can create a common normative platform from which future policy 
or practice will be fashioned. This is similar to the idea of Skolnikoff 
(1971:772) of international organisations having the function of norm creation. 
The centrality of common norms, behaviours and understandings as a 
precursor for stability is a theme explored throughout this dissertation.   
2.2 Constructivist approaches to cooperation 
Another dimension of international cooperation that deserves further attention 
is the role of international organisations as actors in the global system, as 
indicated in the above section. The basic assumption is that African states 
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have made decisions that shape the behaviour of the AU, but the AU also 
makes decisions that shape the behaviour of states. This is largely based on 
Constructivist approaches to political science which emphasis “the existence 
of social structures – including norms, beliefs and identities – constituting 
world politics” (Frederking 2003:364). Constructivist interpretations of 
international cooperation are important because they situate state behaviour 
in a larger society of rules and institutions (see for example Berger and 
Luckmann 1966). The relevance for this dissertation is that a Constructivist 
approach is concerned with the impact of norms on international security 
(Farrell 2002:49). 
Constructivism is an alternative view to a rationalist approach to international 
relations. As opposed to the rational choice approach as referred to previously 
which relies on making choices in the favour of maximising interest, 
Constructivism is concerned with “the unavoidability of the interpretation of 
reality” (Eriksoon & Giacomello 2006:233). Drawing from the work of 
Finnemore and Sikkink (2001), Kubalkova (2001) and Wendt (1999), 
Frederking (2003:364) presents the following primary positions in 
Constructivist thinking: 
1. Social factors primarily influence human interaction 
2. Social structures help constitute the interests and identities of 
purposive actors; human agency is enmeshed in a web of social 
rules that constitute and regulate agency 
3. Agents and structures construct each other; rules make agents and 
agents make rules. 
Constructivist approaches challenge thinking about international relations to 
transcend both the state and sub-state levels and to consider the influence of 
social structures on political behaviour. Whereas Realists define the actions of 
states in international relations in terms of what they have the power to do, 
from a Constructivist view, states do what they think is more appropriate 
(Farrell 2002:52). In selecting appropriate courses of action, states are guided 
by the social structures that shape world politics. Social structures as the 
broader context for state action is made up of the beliefs, norms and identities 
that influence world politics (Frederking 2003:364). Beliefs, norms and 
identities influence the choices that states make in international relations, as 
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well as the manner in which states construct national interest. Furthermore, as 
much as state behaviour is influenced by beliefs, norms and values, so too 
does state behaviour influence the development of regional or international 
beliefs, norms and values.  
Frederking (2003:365) defines beliefs, norms and values as follows: 
• Beliefs are shared understandings of the world 
• Norms are shared understandings of appropriate actions 
• Identities tell agents who they are and who others are 
The relevance of this approach for the discussion of cooperation that 
underlies this dissertation is the implication that regional security in Africa will 
be served through cooperation and cooperation will be served through the 
choices of sub-state, state and regional actors. The manner in which 
cooperation will manifest is based on the beliefs, norms and identities of the 
actors at various levels. Regional security arrangements in Africa will depend 
on beliefs about the nature of security or insecurity; norms about social 
relationships (i.e. appropriate actions for example on the legitimate use of 
force) and identities about the self and other (adapted from Frederking 
2003:365). In relation to identity and regional security, the notion of Pan-
Africanism is explored further below. However, the relevance of identity as a 
parameter influencing behaviour extends also to interpretations of friend and 
enemy, as well as to inferences about who provides security or at what level 
security responses are triggered. This last point is discussed in relation to 
early warning in Chapter 6 and the assumption that leaders at regional level 
are best situated to provide responses is questioned. Evidence of norms that 
have the potential to influence state choices can be found in the Constitutive 
Act of the AU (as discussed in Chapter 3) and the other declarations and 
protocols of the regional body.   
This first section of the theoretical framework has explored some assumptions 
underlying international cooperation. For the purposes of this dissertation, the 
state is recognised as a central actor in international relations, but it is not the 
only unit of analysis. Furthermore, within the state, there are various forces, 
which influence the determination of national priorities, and these aspects 
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should also be incorporated into an analysis of international cooperation. 
Lastly, the utility of a purely rational choice-based approach to cooperation 
has been questioned and the choice to cooperate has rather been situated 
within the framework of beliefs, norms and identities. It is in the manner in 
which beliefs, norms and identities are constructed that information plays a 
central role and that the role of the CEWS and CISSA is considered in latter 
parts of this dissertation. The concept of epistemic communities and security 
community is presented below to further develop an understanding of the 
implications of beliefs, norms and identities on national and international 
behaviour.  
3 Epistemic communities  
In addressing the importance of trans-governmental relations, Keohane and 
Nye (1974) begin to bridge the gap between international relations and 
domestic policy-making. Adler and Haas (1992:367) take this one step further 
and proclaim that: 
(T)o study the ideas of epistemic communities and their impact on 
policymaking is to immerse oneself in the inner world of international 
relations theory and to erase the artificial boundaries between 
international and domestic politics so that the dynamic between 
structure and choice can be illuminated. 
The purpose of discussing epistemic communities as part of this dissertation 
is an attempt to illuminate the dynamics of structure and choice that have 
resulted in the creation of the particular mechanisms for information sharing 
and intelligence collaboration as part of the African peace and security 
architecture. The structures that have been established are the result of 
complex decision-making, negotiation and strategic alliance formations. 
These structures are also the result of choices made by African actors based 
on an interpretation and perceptions of reality and the options available to 
them. This builds on a Constructivist approach to political behaviour as 
introduced in the previous section. By looking at epistemic communities, the 
central concern is on how meanings and understandings are derived. 
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An epistemic community can be defined as “a network of knowledge-based 
experts who have an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
the domain of their expertise” (Sebenius 1992:351). A central focus of 
epistemic community theory is the importance of collective meaning as the 
basis for creating order and stability. If a certain normative position is 
dominant, then that becomes reflected in the policies and practices of the day. 
Epistemic communities are a vehicle for the development of theoretical 
premises about the creation of collective interpretation and choice (Adler & 
Haas 1992:368). The epistemic community approach then brings to the fore 
the impact and importance of shared interpretations and expectations as the 
basis for policy coordination. Selection of policy alternatives is based on 
understandings of the world, and if a common picture of the world is accepted, 
then certain policy alternatives become more likely for policy selection. The 
major contribution of the epistemic community concept is that it insists on the 
importance of perceptions and learning in international relations and deepens 
our knowledge of how actors define their interests (Sebenius 1992:365).  
At the core of epistemic community theory is an interest in political styles of 
thought and how they combine to create various types of world order (Adler & 
Haas 1992:370). This then turns the focus to cognition and therefore to 
information, which occupies a fundamental position in this dissertation. 
Epistemic communities is a useful framework to study political processes in 
terms of questioning who learns what, when, to whose benefit and why (Adler 
& Haas 1992:370). This reflects notions of social constructs, as mentioned in 
the previous section, that inform political behaviour in terms of beliefs, norms 
and identities. As explained in Eriksson and Giacomello (2006:233): 
At the most basic level, actors have a set of norms – beliefs about right 
and wrong. Norms shape identities – the separation of “we” and “them”. 
In turn, identities shape interests…all these elements are seen as 
inherently dynamic. If interests change, it is because of an underlying 
shift in identities and norms.  
Similarly, Haas (1992:2) argues that how states identify their interests and 
recognise the range of actions deemed appropriate in issue-areas of policy-
making are functions of the manner in which the problems are understood by 
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the policy-makers or are represented by those to whom they turn to for advice 
under conditions of uncertainty. Central to Haas’s hypothesis is that human 
agency lies at the nexus between systemic conditions, knowledge and 
national action (Haas 1992:2). His approach, therefore, is to examine “the role 
that networks of knowledge-based experts – epistemic communities – play in 
articulating the cause-and-effect relationships of complex problems” (Haas 
1992:2). The role of such knowledge-based experts is to help states identify 
their interests, frame issues for collective debate, propose specific policies 
and identify salient points for negotiation (Haas 1992:2). Similar to the way in 
which power is diversified in the international political economy, epistemic 
community theory acknowledges that “control over knowledge and information 
is an important dimension of power and that the diffusion of new ideas and 
information can lead to new patterns of behaviour and prove to be an 
important determinant of international policy coordination” (Haas 1992:2-3).  
As noted by Adler (1998:173) common meanings enable people to live in the 
same normative world. Adler (1998:173) further quotes Taylor’s (1979) words: 
Common meanings are the basis of community. Intersubjective 
meaning gives a people a common language to talk about social reality 
and a common understanding of certain norms, but only with common 
meanings does this common reference world contain significant 
common actions, celebrations and feelings … This is what makes a 
community.  
Members of an epistemic community “share basic values on the subject in 
question, share causal models of the workings of the involved phenomena, 
share inference patterns or the criteria by which knowledge will be validated, 
and have a common policy enterprise or project” (Sebenius 1992:351). In 
other words, epistemic communities can create “shared interpretations that 
frame and structure human practices” (Frederking 2003:365). Thus, by 
examining the role of epistemic communities, one is concerned with the 
generation and role of ideas in world politics.   
As explained by Adler and Haas (1992:374), “epistemic communities play an 
evolutionary role as a source of policy innovations and a channel by which 
these innovations diffuse internationally.” Epistemic communities provide a 
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channel through which ideas can circulate from societies to governments and 
from country to country (Haas 1992:27). Adler and Haas (1992:375) refer to 
this role of epistemic communities as exerting influence on policy innovation 
through (1) framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, (2) 
defining state interests and (3) setting standards. Adler and Haas (1992:375) 
further explain: 
(H)ow governments think of interests, policy objectives, and ways of 
conducting policy coordination depends on how they conceive of the 
context in which particular efforts must be made. By identifying the 
nature of the issue-area and framing the context in which new data and 
ideas are interpreted, epistemic communities bound the range of 
collective discourse on policy, as well as guide decision makers in the 
choice of appropriate norms and appropriate institutions within which to 
resolve or manage problems.  
Prevailing ideas are an important aspect influencing policy choice (Haas 
1992:26). As members of the epistemic community interact with actors at 
national and international levels, ideas and common understandings “can 
diffuse from a small number of key national actors to a much wider group, 
eventually reaching and appealing to the critical mass of governments needed 
to undertake effective international coordination of policies” (Adler & Haas 
1992:379). Adler and Haas (1992:373) explain the policy coordination function 
of epistemic communities as follows: 
(W)e can view foreign policy as a process by which intellectual 
innovations (which epistemic communities help produce) are carried by 
domestic and international organizations (in which epistemic 
communities may reside) and are selected by political processes to 
become the basis of new or transformed national interest … we can 
view international politics as the process by which the innovations of 
epistemic communities are diffused nationally, transnationally, and 
internationally to become the basis of new or changed international 
practices and institutions and the emerging attributes of a new world 
order… Once the expectations and values injected by epistemic 
communities into the policy process are internationally shared, they 
help coordinate or structure international relations.   
The causal logic of epistemic policy coordination is based on three major 
dynamics, namely: uncertainty, interpretation and institutionalisation (Haas 
1992:3). Haas (1992:3-4) explains that in international policy coordination, the 
forms of uncertainty that tend to stimulate demands for information are those 
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which arise from the strong dependence of states on each other’s policy 
choices for success in obtaining goals and those which involve multiple and 
only partly estimable consequences of action. The information required is the 
product of human interpretations of social and physical phenomena (Haas 
1992:4). It is precisely because of the type and purpose of information that 
can be provided by epistemic communities to enable international policy 
coordination, that the notion of considering the broader inter-state intelligence 
community as an epistemic community is advanced in this dissertation. The 
underlying assumption is that, given conditions of uncertainty, as is 
characteristic of the complex security environment, decision-makers can 
utilise information from respective intelligence communities to ameliorate 
uncertainty. Intelligence practitioners are well placed to provide interpretations 
of reality and through the institutionalisation provided by CISSA, there is the 
potential for the development of common meanings which could lead to 
improved policy coordination. The application of epistemic community as a 
theoretical lens to study intelligence collaboration in Africa will be further 
elaborated in Chapter 6. 
The purpose of exploring epistemic communities as a means to understand 
international cooperation and policy coordination is to provide a lens through 
which to view the development of common meanings and ideas. Choices 
towards regional integration and regional security are guided by shared 
beliefs, norms and identities. The epistemic community concept provides a 
means to consider how that social reality is constructed and how ideas can 
diffuse through the national and international system to shape policy choice 
and interests.  
4 The concept of security communities – exploring African 
identity and the sense of community 
The notion of a security community combines the concept of integration with 
the purpose of peace. The work of Karl Deutsch is central in the 
conceptualisation of security communities and forms the basis of the 
understanding of security communities as advanced by other scholars such 
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as Ernst Haas, Emmanuel Adler and Charles Taylor. Deutsch (1957:5) 
defined a security community as  
(A) group that has become integrated, where integration is defined as 
the attainment of a sense of community accompanied by formal or 
informal institutions or practices, sufficiently strong and widespread to 
assure peaceful change among members of the group. 
The primary notion is that community can exist at inter-state level and that 
security politics can be profoundly shaped by it (Adler & Barnett 1998:3). 
Further, those states dwelling within an international community might 
develop a pacific disposition (Adler & Barnett 1998:3). A security community 
can be defined as a condition in which countries have integrated to the point 
where people have dependable expectations of peace (Franke 2008). Adler 
(1998:168) explains that the state or condition of peace is the practice of 
security community sustained by the attachment of collective meanings and 
purposes to physical reality. Mohammed et al (2002:3) highlight that a security 
community is more than an inter-state order that outlaws aggression and 
other forms of conflict - it is a set of complex inter-relationships between all 
branches of government, civil society, the private sector and citizens 
themselves.  
International community results mainly from communication, mutual 
responsiveness and shared identity (Adler 1998:173). “The core of Deutsch’s 
security community approach was the assumption that communication binds 
social groups in general and political communities in particular (Adler 
1998:174). This is in agreement with the previous section presenting 
Constructivism and supports the claim “that fundamental structures of 
international politics are social rather than strictly material and that these 
structures shape actors’ identities and interests” (Wendt 1995:72). Thus, a 
security community can be understood as a type of social structure composed 
of shared knowledge in which states trust one another to resolve disputes 
without war (Wendt 1995:73). Social structures are defined by shared 
understandings, expectations and knowledge (Wendt 1995:173). The 
development of shared understandings, expectations and knowledge is based 
on communication. “Communication alone enables a group to think together, 
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to see together and to act together” (Deutsch quoted in Adler 1998:174). 
Communication is the social glue that enables peoples to share common 
meanings across national borders and a common normative environment 
(Adler 1998:174). 
Although communication and shared meanings provide the normative basis 
for security community behaviour, the extent to which state interests become 
synonymous with collective interest (i.e. the practice of peace) is dependent 
on the extent to and the manner in which social identities involve an 
identification with the fate of the other (Wendt 1994:387). Collective identities 
require the positive identification with the destiny of others as well as the 
identification of the group in relation to other groups (Adler 1998:177). 
Collective identity in turn is the basis for feelings of solidarity, community and 
loyalty and for collective definitions of interest (Wendt 1994:386).  
In an article on collective identity formation, Alexander Wendt (1994:389-391) 
explores the mechanisms that effect the formation of collective identity among 
states. Collective identities are socially constructed and have a particular 
historical context. Wendt (1994:389-391) defines aspects of that particular 
context, which advance collective identity formation. The first aspect relates to 
the structural context denoting that the structures of regional or global 
international systems constitute interaction contexts that either inhibit or 
facilitate the emergence of dynamics of collective identity formation (Wendt 
1994:389). For example, as discussed further in the next chapter, collective 
identity formation in Africa (as embodied by Pan-Africanism) can be 
interpreted as being facilitated by the global international system, because the 
collective identity was forged through common suffering at the hands of 
colonial rule. A further example could be drawn from the impact of the end of 
the Cold War on Africa and the revitalisation of an African agenda popularised 
by the African Renaissance and a more African-owned approach to conflict 
prevention, management and resolution as embodied by the Peace and 
Security Council.  
Aside from the broader structural context which impacts on collective identity 
formation, Wendt (1994:389) also highlights the importance of systemic 
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processes such as rising interdependence and the emergence of a “common 
Other”. Rising interdependence creates more common interests and areas of 
identification of mutual interests, increasing the potential for collective identity 
formation. A common threat or external aggressor creates common 
vulnerabilities and sensitivities. Systemic processes, such as those mentioned 
above, reduces the ability to act unilaterally and increases the extent to which 
actors share a common fate, thus encouraging collective identification. A 
further systemic process that may encourage collective identity formation is 
the transnational convergence of domestic values (Wendt 1994:390). This can 
be evidenced in transnational agreement on, for example, human rights, 
norms and democratic institutions and practices.  
The final aspect of Wendt’s analysis of factors that influence the formation of 
collective identities is the specific actions or strategic practice of states 
(Wendt 1994:390). When actors undertake strategic interactions it involves 
the production or reproduction of identities and interests (Wendt 1994:390). 
Wendt (1994:390) explains: 
If we treat identities and interests as always in process during 
interaction, then we can see how an evolution of cooperation might 
lead to an evolution of community. This can occur as an unintended 
consequence of actions carried out to realize self-interests or as a 
result of a conscious strategy of collective self-transformation.  
This is similar to the explanation offered by Weldes (1998:218) that interests 
are produced, reproduced and transformed through the discursive practices of 
actors. “More specifically, interests emerge out of the representations that 
define for actors the situations and events they face” (Weldes 1998:218). In 
other words, interests shape actions, but actions also shape interests. This 
again exemplifies the inter-relationships between structures and processes 
and highlights that no facet of political behaviour exists in and of itself. Identity 
can only be understood through looking at the definition of interests and 
actions.  
The relevance of this presentation of collective identity formation lies in the 
application of security community to the AU, as will be presented in the 
following chapter Collective identity is central to the vision of security 
 
 
 
 
  49 
community, and the existence of a collective African identity is central to 
considering the potentials for security community behaviour in Africa. The 
aspects of collective identity formation as presented above can be exemplified 
in the African context through an analysis of Pan-Africanism, as will be further 
elaborated in Chapter 3. The primary argument is that the structural, systemic 
and strategic contexts have been conducive for collective identity formation in 
Africa. Although the process of collective identity formation might not be 
complete, in terms of the evolution to community, the foundation of Pan-
Africanism as a collective identity has created a platform for integration 
towards community.  
As part of collective identity formation, Wendt (1994:390) considered the 
impact of interactions, noting “actors form identities by learning, through 
interaction, to see themselves as others do”. Similarly, Adler (1998:175) 
observes that a sense of community also requires particular habits of political 
behaviour, which are acquired through processes of social learning and 
socialization” (Adler 1998:175). Adler (1998:175) explains that people learn 
new habits slowly as background conditions change and these “lessons” and 
expectations are diffused to one another through various processes of 
communication. Such learning involves the questioning of original shared 
meanings and replacing them with others (Adler 1998:176). An example of 
this type of learning and socialisation can be drawn from experiences with 
conflict resolution in the OAU and the AU and the manner in which the notion 
of non-interference transitioned into non-indifference. This is in agreement 
with Adler’s notion that social learning encourages political leaders to see 
each other as trustworthy (Adler 1998:178). Furthermore, Wendt (1994:390) 
highlights the effect of behaviour on community formation by emphasising that 
identities are shaped through interactions. In other words, by teaching others 
and themselves to cooperate, actors are simultaneously learning to identify 
with each other – to see themselves as “we” bound by certain norms (Wendt 
1994:390).  
Security community formation can be understood as a social-cognitive 
process involving the social construction of shared understandings (Adler 
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1998:176). The possibility for the practice of peace to become a reality is in 
part dependent on how much change within the social structure can be 
attributed to shared knowledge. “To say that structures are socially 
constructed is no guarantee that they can be changed” (Wendt 1995:80). 
However, if it is possible for policy-makers to make choices in favour of 
peaceful change, then there is an ethical responsibility on leaders to ensure 
the well being of their populations. The key point could be that, if there are 
enough structures in support of choices favouring peaceful change, then in 
the long-term those practices negating such behaviour could become 
obsolete. As such a security community could be seen to be evolving out of 
increased communication, the development of common normative 
frameworks and security-community-building institutions that encourage 
common behaviour patterns. These behaviour patterns could in the long-term 
become entrenched habits for conflict resolution. Indeed, security 
communities may have humble and self-interested beginnings but according 
to Adler (1998:175)  
With (a) increased communication; (b) a large number of transactions; 
(c) learning and socialization processes, which lead to the generation 
of a common normative framework and common behaviour patterns; 
(d) a ‘core of power’ that attracts weaker states; and under the 
guidance of (e) security-building-institutions and (f) elites that use 
material and symbolic resources to empower a particular set of identity 
traits, to the detriment of others, the cultural affinities (‘a way of life’) 
needed for a collective identity to exist would develop and become 
institutionalized.  
As explained by Wendt (1995:81), to analyse the social construction of 
international politics is to analyse how processes of interaction produce and 
reproduce the social structures – cooperative or conflictual – that shape 
actors’ identities and interests. The scope of this dissertation is concerned 
with collective security in Africa and the manner in which information sharing 
through the CEWS and CISSA can contribute to this. The central assumption 
is that security threats and responses to threats are socially constructed 
based on understandings of reality influenced by norms, identities and 
interests. The focus is on the manner in which interaction as provided for by 
the CEWS and CISSA can shape understandings of reality and actors’ 
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identities and interests. The assumption is that through enabling the creation 
of shared meanings and shared knowledge, there is the potential for both the 
CEWS and CISSA to have a positive influence on the choices that policy-
makers make in favour of peaceful change. This understanding of regional 
security by the CEWS and CISSA will be further developed in the remaining 
chapters of this dissertation with the aim of being able to draw conclusions on 
how the CEWS and CISSA contribute to regional security in the final chapter. 
Firstly, the application of the concept of security community is applied to the 
AU and then in later sections the notion of the CEWS and CISSA contributing 
to security community behaviour is explored.  
The application of security community in this dissertation relies on a pluralist 
view of security community. A pluralist security community can be defined as, 
“transnational regions comprised of sovereign states whose people maintain 
dependable expectations of peace” (Adler 1998:176). A pluralist security 
community does not require the elimination of the sovereign state but rather 
requires sovereign states “to adopt a novel form of regional governance that, 
relying on collective identity and mutual trust for coordination and compliance 
with norms, sustains dependable expectations of peaceful change” (Adler 
1998:177). Collective knowledge makes possible the development of a 
regional governance system based on collective identity (Adler 1998:178). In 
as much as structures and processes influence each other, regional 
governance systems also contribute towards the building of the security 
community. As explained by Adler (1998:178), international institutions help 
states discover new areas of common interest and by helping establish, 
articulate and transmit norms of acceptable and legitimate behaviour, they 
also encourage elites and people to consider themselves to be part of a 
region, thereby building a sense of community and shaping state practices. 
Thus international institutions such as the AU can provide a platform for 
contributing to security community formation. The application of security 
community to the AU will be further explored in the next chapter.  
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5 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the theoretical lenses that inform 
this study. This firmly grounds the dissertation in current theoretical discourse 
and enables the further investigation of the elements of the study (CEWS, 
CISSA and regional security) by raising questions and testing assumptions 
about relationships. This chapter has also provided an introduction to the 
theoretical assumptions that inform further analysis, as will be explored in 
later chapters. The theoretical framework presented here has explored 
assumptions about international cooperation and why states pursue 
cooperation. Moving away from a purely Realist position, the importance of 
ideas, identities and interests has been explored as a way to understand state 
behaviour. A Constructivist approach to international relations was advanced 
to analyse the impact of social constructs on state behaviour. This approach 
is particularly useful for this dissertation because of the central concern with 
the impact of ideas, information and knowledge on decision-making 
processes. By focusing on social constructs, the contribution of the CEWS 
and CISSA to regional security can be interpreted in terms of the manner in 
which these mechanisms can contribute towards the development of common 
meanings, collective understandings and thus regional security as community 
behaviour. 
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Chapter 3 – In pursuit of security community: From the 
Organisation of African Unity to the African Union  
1. Introduction 
Since the formation of the OAU in 1963, the norms and institutions governing 
multilateral relations on the continent have been evolving. This process of 
regional integration has transformed the way in which peace and security 
issues are dealt with. The change of the OAU into the AU in 2000 represented 
a fundamental shift in the objectives and priorities of the organisation as well 
as significant advances towards the creation of institutions to manage the 
conflict prevention, management and resolution portfolio.  
This chapter seeks to contextualise the role of CEWS and CISSA within the 
broader regional security cooperation agenda through providing a succinct 
description and analysis of the regional security architecture. In order to do 
this, the chapter is divided into three parts. The first looks at the evolution of 
the regional security architecture in Africa with specific reference to the OAU 
and the AU. The second section examines the catalysts of change that have 
driven the pursuit of security through cooperation and the manner in which the 
institutional architecture has developed. The third section applies the notion of 
security communities as a means to understand the evolution and structure of 
institutions that make up the African regional security architecture.   
2. Establishing a tradition of collective security: The Organisation 
of African Unity 
The institutionalisation of collective responses to political, economic and 
security issues in Africa began with the formation of the Organisation of 
African Unity (OAU). On the 25th of May 1963, 30 of the 32 independent 
African states signed the OAU Charter in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.  
The purposes of the OAU, as outlined in Article II of the OAU Charter, were: 
(a) To promote the unity and solidarity of the African states;  
(b) To coordinate and intensify cooperation and efforts to achieve a better 
life for the peoples of Africa;  
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(c) To defend sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence;  
(d) To eradicate all forms of colonialism on the continent;  
(e) To promote international cooperation.   
In order to achieve these objectives, member states committed to 
coordinating and harmonising policies in the following fields (OAU Charter 
1963, Article II): 
• Politics and diplomacy 
• Economic development, transport and communications 
• Education and culture 
• Health, sanitation and nutrition 
• Science and technology  
• Defence and security. 
As can be seen in the enunciation of purposes and the approach to achieving 
this policy harmonisation, the focus of the OAU was on political and economic 
issues. Security was mentioned, but more in terms of establishing the 
independence of African states through the eradication of colonialism. At the 
core of the OAU was a need for emerging independent states to have a 
degree of insulation from international political and economic pressures. As 
explained in Ibok (2000:3): 
(T)he ultimate objective of the founding fathers of the OAU … was to 
provide the then fragile African States, emerging from colonial rule into 
a better organized international political and economic environment, 
some degree of a sense of collective security through the minimization 
of individual vulnerability in their relations with their erstwhile colonial 
powers.  
As with all types of organisations, the OAU was a product of its time, and its 
objectives, functions and structures reflected a specific historical trajectory. 
This is relevant in two instances. Firstly, the early 1960s was a period of 
intense upheaval with independent states being born through violence and 
social turmoil. Breaking the shackles of colonial rule was a social and political 
imperative, and the OAU was founded on the belief that integration and 
cooperation would liberate the continent from colonial rule.  
A second important point to note is that the OAU was strongly based on the 
recognition of the centrality of sovereignty and territorial integrity. This is 
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reflected in Article II of the OAU Charter, which affirms the following principles 
of the organisation: 
1) The sovereign equality of all Member States; 
2) Non-interference in the internal affairs of States; 
3) Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity and for the 
inalienable right to independent existence; 
4) Peaceful settlement of disputes by negotiation, mediation, 
conciliation or arbitration; 
5) Unreserved condemnation of political assassination as well as 
subversive activities; 
6) Absolute dedication to the total emancipation of the African 
territories that are still dependent; 
7) Affirmation of a policy of non-alignment with regard to all blocs. 
The centrality of sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference was a 
product of the specific historical context in which the OAU was born. These 
values, beliefs and behaviours had relevance because of the inherent need of 
the newly independent states to assert themselves as states in the global 
state based system. As noted by Møller (2005:44), the founding of the OAU 
can be seen as the codification of an embryonic ‘Westphalian system’ in 
Africa. Statehood is traditionally defined in terms of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Also given the years of colonial dominance, a certain degree of over-
protection of national political space was to be expected. Møller (2005:44) 
observes that the OAU might be seen as a ‘safety net’, protecting the newly 
independent states through their process of state building.  
As commonly observed ‘form follows function’ and the structures of the OAU 
at inception did not cater for a broad security function. The Commission of 
Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration was established with the prime function 
of addressing disputes between member states. During the first decade of its 
existence, the OAU was preoccupied with diffusing tensions between member 
states, particularly tensions arising from boundary disputes and territorial 
claims (Ibok 2000:3).   
It was only in 1993 that the OAU reformed its objectives for peace and 
security. Meeting in Cairo, the Heads of State and Government adopted a 
declaration on the creation within the OAU of a Mechanism for Conflict 
Prevention, Management and Resolution. The establishment of the 
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Mechanism was the third attempt by the OAU to coherently address peace 
and security issues. The other two attempts – the Commission of Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration and the Ad Hoc Committee on Inter-African 
Disputes – had shared the common fate of falling into disuse (Institute for 
Security Studies 2009)   
The creation of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution represented a defining shift in the continental approach to conflict 
prevention, resolution and management – moving from a preoccupation with 
inter-state conflict to a broader mandate to include intra-state conflict. Until 
this time, the principles of sovereignty and non-interference were intractably 
connected and the OAU was precluded from taking collective action to 
address internal conflicts.  
Olonisakin (2000) observes that the establishment of the Mechanism was an 
attempt by the OAU to shift from an ad hoc to a ‘systematic’ approach to 
conflict resolution. The creation of the Mechanism was an attempt by the OAU 
to make itself more relevant to the security and political context of the post-
Cold War environment. Olonisakin (2000) explains the context for the 
reorganisation of the OAU security apparatus in the 1990s: 
Africa was not prepared in the early 1990s for the responsibility that 
was thrust upon it. The principles upon which many organisations in 
the region were founded, were no longer relevant, nor were they 
sufficient to meet the post-Cold War security needs of the continent … 
The OAU’s preference for sovereignty and non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of member states rendered it powerless to address 
situations of poor governance and the abuse of human rights within 
many member states that threatened to erupt into violent conflict in 
some cases. 
The establishment of the Mechanism also heralded a significant change in 
institutional arrangements for and prioritisation of conflict prevention. The 
main aim of the Mechanism was to focus on anticipating and preventing 
situations of potential conflict from escalating, with emphasis on anticipatory 
and preventative measures. At the core of the conceptualisation of the role of 
the Mechanism is the understanding that, while early warning and conflict 
prevention lie at the heart of the OAU’s conflict management objectives, there 
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may be a need for peace-keeping and peace-building in situations where 
conflicts are already present (Olonisakin 2000).  
The Mechanism consisted of a Central Organ, Peace Fund and Centre for 
Conflict Management. Within the Conflict Management Centre, the OAU 
sought to establish an Early Warning Network. In January 1996, a workshop 
was held in Addis Ababa that brought together academics, policy-makers, 
practitioners and other experts to brainstorm on the modalities for establishing 
such a network (Ibok 2000:8). Ibok (2000:8-9) outlines the envisaged Early 
Warning Network as follows: 
(T)he Early Warning Network would have OAU Member States as key 
focal points, including, of course sub-regional organizations … the 
United Nations and its specialized agencies, academic institutions, 
research centres, the media and NGOs. It is the expectation of the 
OAU that the information which will be sourced from such a Network 
would be appropriately analyzed, so that accurate information, data, 
policy options and recommendations, could be provided to the 
Secretary General and the Central Organ, for early political action.      
Plans for the establishment of the Early Warning Network morphed into plans 
for the Continental Early Warning System as the momentum towards greater 
African responsibility for peace and security on the continent accelerated. 
During the 1990s, global and regional impetus for increased regional 
integration and more formalised approaches to regional security drove the 
evolution of the OAU into the AU.  
By 1999 there were calls for the establishment of an AU to replace the OAU. 
The principle decision to establish the AU was taken at the OAU Summit in 
Sirte, Libya in 1999. At the Summit of the OAU on 11 July 2000 in Lome, 
Togo, the Constitutive Act of the AU was adopted. The Constitutive Act 
entered into force with two-thirds of African states having ratified it in 2001. At 
the Extraordinary Summit of the OAU in Sirte, Libya in March 2001, the 
decision was taken that the OAU and the AU co-exist for a period of one year 
to enable a smooth transition. The AU was officially inaugurated at a Summit 
in Durban, South Africa in July 2002.  
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3. Moving towards unity: From the OAU to the AU 
Throughout the 1990s regional cooperation within inter-state organisations in 
Africa remained fraught because regional institutions were weak, 
bureaucratic, under-resourced and toothless. However, during this period the 
seeds were sown for a much more ambitious formal regional security 
structure on the continent (Hammerstad 2005:13).  
The transformation of the OAU into the AU has been described by Bjørn 
Møller (2009:7) as a process of convergence of three projects, namely a 
Libyan quest for Pan African unity, a Nigerian project for a Conference on 
Security, Stability, Development and Cooperation in Africa (CSSDCA), and a 
South African project for an African Renaissance. Although the focus of 
Møller’s 2009 paper is on the role of hegemons in building an effective 
regional security architecture, the three projects or components that he draws 
together have been significant events that shaped the evolution of collective 
security and the design and orientation of the institutional arrangements of the 
AU. The Libyan quest for African unity has inspired a renewed Pan African 
vision of unity, which contributed towards gaining support for the devolution of 
more powers to the AU. The South African vision of an African Renaissance 
provided impetus for more responsibility for peace and security being taken by 
African leaders. Although these are two defining initiatives in terms of the 
evolution of the continental peace and security architecture, it was through the 
CSSDCA that the normative framework for addressing conflict was 
developed. The CSSDCA informed the manner in which the conflict 
prevention, management and resolution mandate of the AU was developed 
and sets an important basis for considering the continental peace and security 
architecture. For the purposes of brevity in this discussion, therefore, only the 
CSSDCA will be elaborated upon.  
3.1 The Conference on Security, Stability, Development and 
Cooperation in Africa 
The CSSDCA was a process among African states to create a framework for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution on the continent. This is 
similar to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe and its 
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successor, the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (Møller 
2005:56). In May 1991, a conference was convened by the OAU and the 
Economic Commission for Africa, in Kampala, Uganda, under the auspices of 
President Museveni. This conference adopted the Kampala Document, which 
recommended the launch of the CSSDCA. This conference is an important 
landmark in the evolution of collective security in Africa, as much of the 
normative framework informing the development of the African peace and 
security architecture was enunciated in the Kampala Document.  
The CSSDCA conceptualised regional security in terms of four calabashes, 
namely: security, stability, development and cooperation. Within each 
calabash specific principles and policy measures are outlined. The four 
calabashes represent a holistic approach to security that predates the 
international popularity of the term human security but actually captures many 
of the same ideas as the notion of human security. According to the Kampala 
Document (1991:2): 
The concept of security goes beyond military considerations; it 
embraces all aspects of the society including economic, political and 
social dimensions of individual, family, and community, local and 
national life. The security of a nation must be construed in terms of the 
security of the individual citizen to live in peace with access to basic 
necessities of life while fully participating in the affairs of his/ her 
society in freedom and enjoying fundamental rights.  
Further than providing a succinct and clear, yet often overlooked, definition of 
what security should entail, the CSSDCA actually provides the outline of the 
principles, mechanisms and tasks of a collective security architecture. The 
CSSDCA was ahead of its time in many respects – the Conference was held 
in 1991, the Mechanism was only constituted as part of the OAU in 1993. The 
Mechanism can be seen as an imperfect attempt at operationalising the 
recommendations of the CSSDCA, and in the transformation into the AU, the 
policy measures articulated in the Kampala Document were further taken on 
board. 
 
 
 
 
  60 
An example of this can be seen in the notion of non-interference and domestic 
insecurity. The CSSDCA noted that, with respect to the principle of non-
interference: 
growing international concern for humanitarian causes and the 
experience in Africa of civil strifes (sic) and acts of wanton repression, 
have led to an increasing concern over domestic conditions pertaining 
to threat to personal and collective security and gross violations of 
basic human rights. The CSSDCA must aim at promoting and 
strengthening this welcome development to enable African countries to 
cooperate in ensuring the security of Africans at all levels (Kampala 
Document 1991:3). 
Regarding actual policy recommendations to advance the cause of collective 
security in Africa, the CSSDCA emphasises the need for timely mediation and 
reconciliation; an African peace-keeping capability; confidence building 
measures to cover exchange of information, joint military training and joint 
studies on continental security issues; and the need for a council of elders 
(Kampala Document 1991:3).  
Although probably anticipated to be more of a permanent part of the peace 
and security architecture, the CSSDCA established the foundations for the 
peace and security architecture that found voice in the AU. The Kampala 
conference represented the start of a movement towards greater collaboration 
in security issues and provided a normative foundation for that movement 
towards greater responsibility for security for all people in Africa.  
The CSSDCA remained dormant until 1999, when it was formally endorsed by 
the OAU. The Kampala Document became the CSSDCA Memorandum of 
Understanding, and the implementation of many of the recommendations of 
the CSSDCA have been mainstreamed into the peace and security 
architecture and assumed by mechanisms and institutions of the AU. 
4. The African Union  
In July 2000 in Lome, Togo, more than 30 independent African states signed 
the Constitutive Act of the AU. The Constitutive Act entered into force in 2001, 
leading to the inauguration of the AU in Durban, South Africa in 2002. This 
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was the culmination of a process towards greater integration that had been 
ongoing since the launch of the OAU. It was, however, during the 1990s that 
the drive towards greater integration really took shape. The factors that 
contributed towards the transformation of the OAU into the AU will be 
discussed later in this chapter. The discussion firstly needs to present a 
clearer view of the nature, functions and structures of the AU.  
Article 3 of the Constitutive Act defines the objectives of the Union as to: 
(a) Achieve greater unity and solidarity; 
(b) Defend the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of 
its Member States; 
(c) Accelerate the political and socio-economic integration of the 
continent; 
(d) Promote and defend African common positions; 
(e) Encourage international cooperation; 
(f) Promote peace, security, and stability on the continent; 
(g) Promote democratic principles and institutions, popular 
participation and good governance; 
(h) Promote and protect human and peoples’ rights; 
(i) Establish the necessary conditions which enable the continent to 
play its rightful role in the global economy and in international 
negotiations; 
(j) Promote sustainable development at the economic, social and 
cultural levels, as well as the integration of African economies; 
(k) Promote co-operation to raise the living standards of African 
peoples; 
(l) Coordinate and harmonise the policies between the existing and 
future Regional Economic Communities; 
(m) Advance the development of the continent by promoting research 
in all fields, in particular in science and technology; 
(n) Work with relevant international partners in the eradication of 
preventable diseases and the promotion of good health on the 
continent. 
When considered in comparison to the objectives of the OAU, the AU is a 
markedly different construct. Evolving from the OAU to the AU, the regional 
body seems to have a sense of identity and purpose. The Constitutive Act and 
Protocols that followed to establish the required institutional architecture were 
carved in response to a changed regional political and security environment 
and to a renewed vigour for achieving security and development through 
integration.  
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This renewed vigour was captured by former President Mbeki in his opening 
address at the first Heads of State summit in Durban in 2002 as follows 
(Mbeki 2002): 
As Africans, we have come to understand that there can be no 
sustainable development without peace, without security and without 
stability. The Constitutive Act provides for mechanisms to address this 
change, which stands between the people of Africa and their ability and 
capacity to defeat of poverty, disease and ignorance. 
Together we must work for peace, security and stability for the people 
of this continent. We must end the senseless conflicts and wars on our 
continent which have caused so much pain and suffering to our people 
and turned many of them into refugees and displacees and forced 
others into exile. 
We must accept that dialogue and peaceful resolution of conflicts are 
the only way to guarantee enduring peace and stability for our people. 
The Constitutive Act provides for such mechanisms. 
The shift in focus and more pronounced peace and security agenda is also 
reflected in the principles of the AU as specified in Chapter 4 of the 
Constitutive Act, as: 
(a) Sovereign equality and interdependence; 
(b) Respect of borders existing on achievement of independence; 
(c) Participation of the African peoples in the activities of the Union; 
(d) Establishment of a common defence policy for the African 
Continent; 
(e) Peaceful resolution of conflicts among Member States; 
(f) Prohibition of the use of force or threat to use force among 
Member States; 
(g) Non-interference by any Member State in the internal affairs of 
another; 
(h) The right of the Union to intervene in a Member State pursuant to 
a decision of the Assembly in respect of grave circumstances, 
namely: war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity; 
(i) Peaceful co-existence of Member States and their right to live in 
peace and security; 
(j) The right of Member States to request intervention from the Union 
in order to restore peace and security; 
(k) Promotion of self-reliance within the framework of the Union; 
(l) Promotion of gender equality; 
(m) Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law 
and good governance; 
(n) Promotion of social justice to ensure balanced economic 
development; 
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(o) Respect for the sanctity of human life, condemnation and 
rejection of impunity and political assassination, acts of terrorism 
and subversive activities; 
(p) Condemnation and rejection of unconstitutional changes of 
governments. 
The orientation of regional cooperation with regard to peace and security in 
Africa was fundamentally altered with the establishment of the AU. As 
reflected in the principles above, the notion of non-interference was qualified 
as one of non-indifference, and the centrality of sovereignty and territorial 
integrity was replaced with sovereign equality, interdependence and respect 
for borders. In both the objectives and principles of the AU, the prioritisation of 
common defence and security, common economic positions and common 
political aspirations are reflected.  
The Constitutive Act does not address the institutional arrangements for 
conflict prevention, management and resolution. In 2002, the Protocol 
Relating to the Establishment of a Peace and Security Council (also known as 
the Durban Protocol or PSC Protocol) was approved. The Peace and Security 
Council (PSC) replaced the Mechanism as “a standing decision-making organ 
for the prevention, management and resolution of conflict” (PSC Protocol 
2002, Article 2).  
Article 2 of the Protocol defines the role of the PSC as “a collective security 
and early warning arrangement to facilitate timely and efficient responses to 
conflict and crisis situations in Africa.” Similar to the role of the Security 
Council at the United Nations, the PSC is the highest decision-making 
authority on peace and security issues within the AU.  
According to Article 6 of the Protocol, the PSC is to perform functions in the 
following areas: 
(a) Promotion of peace, security and stability in Africa; 
(b) Early warning and preventative diplomacy; 
(c) Peace-making, including the use of good offices, mediation, 
conciliation and enquiry; 
(d) Peace support operations and intervention; 
(e) Peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction; 
(f) Humanitarian action and disaster management. 
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Experience with the Mechanism of the OAU had highlighted that, in order for 
the continental peace and security architecture to fulfil a conflict prevention, 
management and resolution mandate, the PSC had to be able to (1) pre-empt 
conflict; (2) deploy force for conflict management; and (3) undertake high level 
mediation. The Protocol, therefore, established the Panel of the Wise, 
Continental Early Warning System and African Standby Force to support the 
PSC.  
The PSC Protocol and the African peace and security architecture that it 
established reflect a commitment to regional security and to a more central 
role for the regional organisation. This evolution from the preoccupation with 
independence and sovereignty of the OAU to non-indifference and greater 
African responsibility for security on the continent as embodied by the AU was 
possible because of an altered regional and global political and security 
environment. The factors that contributed towards the evolution towards 
greater collective security in Africa will be discussed in the next section.  
5. Catalysts of change in pursuit of the collective security agenda 
The end of the Cold War is globally recognised as a watershed for the 
conduct of international relations. The end of the global ideological conflict, 
which played out as much on African soil as elsewhere, resulted in 
fundamentally questioning the pillars that had defined international affairs for 
fifty years. Furthermore, the end of the Cold War did not result in an 
overwhelming peace dividend for Africa. At the end of the Cold War there 
were far-reaching changes in the nature of state power and the conduct of 
warfare in Africa (De Waal 2000:22).   
As explained by Franke (2008:318): 
First, the sudden breakdown of the bipolar system of order that had 
kept African conflicts in check led to a proliferation of violent crises 
throughout the continent. Awash with weapons delivered by their 
respective sponsors (US$ 65 billion worth of weapons had been 
transferred to Africa during the last 20 years of the Cold War alone), 
client states like Somalia descended into chaos once superpower 
support ceased to prop up their regimes. Second, the end of 
superpower competition meant that Africa’s geopolitical and strategic 
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importance declined dramatically … As a result, the amount of 
international aid given to African states fell by more than 21% between 
1990 and 1996 despite the fact that conflict and humanitarian crises 
increased manifold over the same period. This and the negative effects 
of globalization further consolidated Africa’s economic marginalization 
and added to the continent’s long list of pressing problems. 
However, as Africa descended into a turbulent and violent era, there re-
emerged the necessity of continental unity in the face of increasing global 
indifference. This necessity was founded in the need for Africa to become less 
dependent on international crisis intervention. During the 1990s, and 
highlighted by the Rwandan genocide, the international community was 
shown to be unable, sometimes unwilling and unsuitably equipped to respond 
to African conflicts. This period also marked a time in which Africa sought to 
develop its own doctrines and practices to face the security challenges and 
conflict prevention, management and resolution requirements. Exemplified by 
the Economic Community of West African States  (ECOWAS), intervention in 
Liberia (1990) and the Southern African Development Community (SADC) 
intervention in Lesotho (1998), Africa began to assume responsibility for 
urgent action to resolve crises on the continent, in the context of multi-lateral 
institutions and international law (De Waal 2000:xvi).  
There were, therefore, two major outcomes of the turbulent 1990s that require 
further note. On the one hand, there was a call for greater cooperation, action 
and responsibility on the part of African states for security in Africa. On the 
other hand, though, there was the consolidation of states as the primary 
building blocks of the security architecture. Many of the intra-state conflicts 
that broke out in the 1990s were related to contested legitimacy and the 
fragility of political authorities, which had existed because of international 
backing during the Cold War. These conflicts, which often took on ethnic 
dimensions, were centrally concerned with legitimacy and the exercise of 
political authority within the state. As such they solidified in some respects the 
role of the state in African politics.  
As argued by Cilliers (2004:48-49), there is no alternative to geographical 
states as the basic building block for domestic safety and a stable 
international system. What he notes, however, is that, emerging from the 
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1990s, there was the shaping of a global consensus on the norms that apply 
to acceptable state behaviour (Cilliers 2004:49). The notion of what 
constitutes acceptable state behaviour will be further developed in relation to 
the expanded security agenda and the erosion of absolute sovereignty. 
Suffice to say, it was only after this period that the necessity for democratic 
practices became a central component of the African political identity and the 
expectation of access to political space became a shared norm. As 
commented by Carbone (2002:31), with the launch of the AU, a new era 
began for Africa where peace, democracy and good governance are 
considered as necessary prerequisites for development.   
There is an additional dimension to the security context of the 1990s that has 
driven the urgency of the continental security agenda. When thinking about 
the emergence of conflicts during the 1990s, it was not only external factors 
that contributed to widespread violence. African states provided fertile ground 
for conflict to flourish. One of the factors that contribute to this is the 
transnational nature of insecurity on the continent. As De Waal (2000:32) 
noted, the most fertile ground for conflict escalation is in countries that have 
emerged from war or where there is war in neighbouring countries. The 
recognition that the security of one state was intrinsically tied to the security of 
others contributed to the necessity of developing a collective security regime.  
Although the necessity for cooperation and collective security in Africa had 
become a recognised requirement for improved security and thus 
development, the operationalisation thereof demanded overcoming the 
conceptual hurdles that had prevented meaningful and effective cooperation 
in the past (Franke 2008:319). These conceptual hurdles, as Franke calls 
them, revolve around overcoming the divergence between the necessity for 
cooperation and interdependence and the notion of exclusive sovereignty, 
which implies limitations on full cooperation and independence.   
The conceptual shift, which has taken place over the past decade or so, has 
two defining elements. There was the conceptual shift from regime security to 
human security and complimentary to that was the move from non-
interference to non-indifference. Hammerstad (2005:2) highlights that the 
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erosion of the norm of absolute sovereignty and the espousal of a 
comprehensive, people-centred conception of security are complimentary 
processes – “these two processes follow each other and nourish each other, 
both logically and in practical terms.”   
The notion of absolute sovereignty is no longer perceived as a means of 
isolating the state against external involvement, but rather sovereignty is 
increasingly refined as a normative concept of responsibility (Cilliers 2004:39). 
The concept of absolute sovereignty has evolved into a more nuanced 
understanding of the responsibilities and tasks of statehood. National 
sovereignty requires a system of governance based on democracy and 
popular participation, constructive management of social diversities, respect 
for fundamental human rights, an equitable distribution of national wealth, and 
opportunities for development (Cilliers 2004:39).  
According to Hammerstad (2005:12), the erosion of the norm of absolute 
sovereignty and the embrace of a comprehensive understanding of security in 
Africa have been accompanied by the development of more prominent 
regional organisations with stronger institutions and broader and more 
intrusive security mandates. Furthermore, in the 21st century, institutions at 
regional and sub-regional levels have become increasingly important for 
dealing with security threats in Africa (Hammerstad 2005:15). This trend was 
visible during the 1990s as the OAU became more involved in conflict 
prevention, management and resolution and sought effective institutional 
arrangements to deal with the complexity of peace and security issues on the 
continent.  
The shift from non-interference to non-indifference was enabled by the 
learning that had taken place during the OAU era, particularly within the 
context of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution. This learning included experiences with mediation and support for 
political dialogue in the Comoros (1997); intervention in Burundi (1995) and 
peacekeeping in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1999); election 
observation in Niger (1993) amongst others; and conflict resolution and post-
conflict reconstruction in Sierra Leone (1995).  
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These experiences of the OAU of conflict prevention, management and 
resolution helped to build the legitimacy of the OAU as a continental actor in 
the peace and security field. The early attempts at the operationalisation of 
the continental security architecture also marked an important movement 
toward multilateral relations and regional security. The role of the OAU in the 
1990s showed that states would allow the regional body to play a leading role 
in conflict prevention, management and resolution, and were the first 
indicators of the evolution towards a more formalised security community. The 
OAU, taking some responsibility for peace and security, ushered in the era of 
‘African solutions for African problems’.  
6. The African Union as a Security Community 
Franke (2008:316-317) remarks, “At first glance, neither the concept of 
security communities nor any of the other concepts of security cooperation 
currently in academic discourse … seem applicable to Africa’s emerging 
security architecture.” The persistence of conflict on the continent has 
distracted from the application of security cooperation theory to the 
development of the continental security architecture. The very utility of inter-
state security cooperation is questioned due to the continuation of intra-state 
violence and instability. Central to the notion of a security community is the 
unacceptability and inconceivability of the use of force - this challenges the 
consideration of a security community on the African continent.  
However, regardless of the existence of domestic instability, regional security 
cooperation and the AU in particular can be construed as the evolution 
towards a security community because of the evidenced collective African 
identity (previously captured in Pan-Africanist terminology), shared norms, 
values and meanings and common expectations of change. The sociological 
foundations of security community theory have sound reference in the notion 
of African unity.  
In his 2008 article on Africa’s evolving security architecture and the notion of 
an African continental security community, Benedikt Franke identifies three 
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defining traits of Africa’s continental security community. These traits can be 
captured as follows: 
• Common values, meanings and understandings – “In the case of 
Africa, the pressures of the post-Cold War environment combined with 
a return of Pan-Africanist ideology to promote the emergence of a 
shared developmentalist project and a common security culture (that is, 
an intersubjective system of meanings about security problems and 
their required solutions)” (Franke 2008:323) 
• Shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict – “In order to 
qualify as members of a security community … they (states) need to 
display a shared commitment to the peaceful resolution of conflict and 
optimally have institutionalized a practical knowledge of such in some 
kind of rule or regulation structure that generates trust” (Franke 
2008:324). Such institutionalised practices can be evidenced in the 
Constitutive Act of the AU, for example, as well as in the PSC Protocol, 
and when fully operational, the envisaged African security architecture.  
• Increasing institutionalisation of cooperation – since the late 1990s and 
the transformation from the OAU into the AU, regional cooperation has 
been defined by increasing institutionalisation. In fact, with the notion of 
a Union Government finding increasing traction, there are signs that 
the institutionalisation of cooperation within the framework of the AU 
will intensify even further (Franke 2008:325).  
Former President Mbeki captured the evolution towards becoming a security 
community when at the first heads of state summit in 2002, he made the 
following call to action: 
By forming the Union, the peoples of our continent have made the 
unequivocal statement that Africa must unite! We as Africans have a 
common and a shared destiny! Together, we must redefine this destiny 
for a better life for all the people of this continent. 
The first task is to achieve unity, solidarity, cohesion, cooperation 
among peoples of Africa and African states. We must build all the 
institutions necessary to deepen political, economic and social 
integration of the African continent. We must deepen the culture of 
collective action in Africa and in our relations with the rest of the world.  
The establishment of the AU reflects the global trend in favour of ideas of 
common security based on an international community of citizens, bound 
together by multiple ties of common interest and a commitment to basic 
values (Mohammed et al 2002:3). Central to understanding the potential of 
the AU to be considered a security community is the importance of beliefs, 
norms and identity as enunciated in the previous chapter and reflected in 
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Franke (2008) as quoted above. The concept of identity has a position of 
primacy in security community defined in terms of a sense of “we-ness” 
(Adler, 1998:170). Adler (1998:170) notes that peaceful change involves a 
change of identity. Eriksson and Giacomello (2006:233) comment that 
identities shape interests and, if interests change, it is because of an 
underlying shift in identities and norms. Frederking (2003:365) explains: 
Identities2 tell agents who they are and who others are; they enable 
agents to make the actions of themselves and other intelligible … 
interests stem from a particular, constructed representation of the 
relationship between self and other. 
The notion of an African identity and the manner in which this identity 
influences inter-state relations on the continent requires further consideration. 
Frederking (2003:365) asserts that identities are a type of social rule that 
constitute and regulate world politics. The notion of a “we-ness” as Africans 
was highlighted during former President Mbeki’s speech as quoted above. 
The notion of an African identity is closely tied to the notion of Pan-Africanism. 
Bjørn Møller (2005:42) describes Pan Africanism as consisting of several 
elements, namely: 
• A shared mythology of a glorious past of African unity 
• A collective historical memory of victimisation, stemming from the slave 
trade and the colonisation of Africa 
• A sense of community, that is, of all of Africa ‘belonging together’, 
perhaps even in the sense of forming one nation 
• A shared hope for an ‘African Renaissance’.  
The Pan-African movement was formally launched at the London Pan-African 
Conference of 1900 and represented the reaction of African and Afro-
American intelligentsia to European imperialism and white racism3 (Geiss 
1969:190). Independence for the colonised African states was a priority on the 
Pan-Africanist agenda in the post-World War II period (Geiss 1969:193), and 
this remained so even as states were beginning to be granted political 
autonomy. Rupert Emerson (1962:275) notes that with the African scramble 
for independence came a renewed devotion to Pan-Africanism as enunciated                                                         2 Italics as in original text 3 For more detailed accounts of the development of the Pan-African movement see Geiss 
1969 and Emerson 1962 
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by Kwane Nkrumah’s insistence that the independence of African states only 
takes on its full meaning if all of Africa is free and if African unity is achieved. 
The case for African unity rests not only on utilitarian grounds as the need to 
collaborate and to establish a common front against Africa’s enemies (such as 
colonialism) but also on the conviction that Africans are born to share a 
common destiny (Emerson 1962:275).  
Although throughout the years Pan-Africanism has taken on many guises 
from the prioritisation of independence to the notion of an African leviathan 
and to various experimental and compromise positions such as the OAU and 
more recently efforts such as the Pan-African Parliament. “The simplest and, 
all in all, perhaps the most satisfactory version of it (i.e. Pan-Africanism) is 
that sense that all Africans have a spiritual affinity with each other and that, 
having suffered together in the past, they must march together into a new and 
brighter future” (Emerson 1962:280). Thus the notion of a collective African 
identity is based on the belief of a common heritage and the belief in a 
common future. The sense of “we-ness” that sits at the heart of efforts 
towards regional integration in Africa rests upon a common identity that “has 
been forged in the flames of (their) common suffering.” This common suffering 
has its roots in the slave trade and colonial rule, and in order to prevent a 
return to such exploitation, African states are driven towards collaboration and 
unity as the basis for a common future.  
The impact of Pan-Africanism and common identity on national and regional 
politics has been mixed. On the one hand, as argued by Ake (1965:535), Pan-
Africanism has influenced domestic politics by encouraging policies that 
maximise political independence. This prioritisation of independence was 
exemplified by the position of the OAU on non-interference and the centrality 
of territorial sovereignty. Perhaps this could be interpreted as a response to 
the shared understanding of priorities at that time reflective of the experiences 
with colonial rule and the negative impact of foreign involvement on domestic 
affairs.  
An alternative view is that the net effect of Pan-Africanism has been to 
promote “institutional uniformity in Africa by focusing the attention of African 
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governments on common problems and pressuring them into adopting certain 
standard solutions to these problems” (Ake 1965:539). “Increased inter-
African intercourse, consciousness of the continent’s uniqueness, a vague 
belief in a common destiny, and the failure of certain imported Western 
institutions have predisposed Africans to look increasingly within the continent 
for answers to their problems” (Ake 1965:539). Thus, the manner in which 
Pan-Africanism as a common identity impacts upon regional security can be 
situated in terms of the manner in which security interests, threats and 
responses are defined. Indeed a common identity can be said to have 
influenced the prioritisation of independence from foreign rule as a security 
imperative in the immediate post-colonial period, which in turn had national 
and foreign policy implications.  
Perhaps the continued utility of the concept of Pan-Africanism lies not in its 
value as a political ideology, but rather in its effect on social constructs. As 
noted by Anderson (1991:204), narratives of identity have historical frames 
and sociological settings. Pan-Africanism can be interpreted as an imagined 
community; as a way to link fraternity, power and time (Anderson 1991:26). It 
provides a sense of identity and commonality as well as a sense of we-ness 
and continuity. The notion of continuity, so central to Anderson’s (1991) 
conceptualisation of imagined communities, resonates in Pan-Africanism as a 
means for African societies to evolve towards a unified state of peace. 
Adopting an evolutionary approach, one can interpret the continued relevance 
of Pan-Africanism in terms of a continued search of Africans to imagine 
themselves as part of a particular community characterised by independence 
and peace. Pan-Africanism has offered an alternative source of identity in the 
face of a lack of global unity (Africans are distinct by race, history and power 
inequality) and weak and fragmented national identities. It provides an avenue 
for Africans to imagine themselves as part of “a deep, horizontal 
comradeship” (Anderson 1991:7).  
The notion of a common identity can also be exemplified in more current 
events such as the position taken by the AU on the warrant of the 
International Criminal Court issued against Sudanese President Omar Al-
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Bashir or the lack of sanction from SADC against Zimbabwean President 
Robert Mugabe (see for example Human Rights Watch, 2009). In both 
instances a sense of African leaders being unfairly persecuted by Western 
power interests led towards other continental leaders adopting positions of 
unity with them. Thus, a sense of “we-ness” can be said to influence the 
definition of interests and the creation of common meanings.  
The importance of the expectation of peaceful change as characteristic of the 
security community concept finds resonance in the conflict prevention, 
management and resolution prioritisation of the AU. Furthermore, it is within 
this broader conflict prevention, management and resolution context that the 
CEWS and CISSA are relevant. The emergence of these mechanisms is 
evidence of the shared commitment to security, and the orientation towards 
conflict prevention can be linked to the shared commitment to the peaceful 
resolution of conflict.  
Furthermore, as highlighted by Deutsch (quoted in Adler 1998:174), 
communication is the social glue that enables people to share common 
meanings across national borders and therefore a common normative 
environment. Both the CEWS and CISSA are centrally concerned with 
communication and providing platforms for the exchange of information. Adler 
(1998:174) explains that communication processes and transaction flows are 
factories of shared identification and through communication and transactions 
“a social fabric is woven among both elites and the masses, instilling in them 
a sense of community” (Adler 1998:174). Indeed, the existence of a platform 
for intelligence cooperation, in particular, can be interpreted as a reflection of 
community, as states have agreed to cooperate in one of the most sensitive 
areas of state security. The willingness to engage in collaborative intelligence 
efforts is indicative of a sense of “we-ness” as opposed to excessive secrecy 
and exclusive sovereignty.   
Franke (2008) highlights that the peaceful resolution of conflict and the 
expression of power by means short of physical violence characterise a 
security community. At national level, this aspect remains a challenge. The 
resort to violent means to resolve internal conflicts or contestations for political 
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and economic power is a feature of governance in Africa. Mohammed et al 
(2002:5) refer to this phenomenon as the “militarisation of governance”, 
explaining that “decision-makers resort to force because it is quick and, they 
hope, decisive, and because they do not have the patience or skill for other 
means of resolving their problems.”  
As Mohammed et al (2002:4) ask: Is prevailing internal peace an essential 
precondition for an inter-state security order? For the purposes of this 
dissertation, the argument is made that, because of the intractable nature of 
conflict in Africa, the distinction between internal and external security is 
misplaced. Even within the broader global context, the nature of security and 
insecurity in the globalised world order has decreased the relevance of 
borders and the ability to separate national, regional and international security 
concerns and responses. Furthermore, as argued in Mohammed et al 
(2002:4), because of spillover effects of conflicts in Africa and the 
susceptibility of African societies to conflict, all conflicts need to be addressed 
in a systematic inclusive fashion.   
The question then remains that, given the weakness of the building blocks 
that make up the AU, can the AU be considered as a step towards the 
creation of a security community in Africa? The obstacles facing the AU are 
daunting. However, the position advanced in this dissertation is that the AU is 
aspiring towards being a security community, and the ideals expressed in the 
Constitutive Act, protocol and declarations represent the hope of the people 
and leaders of the continent that unity will lead to stability. The building blocks 
of security community are common beliefs, norms and identities. The 
argument presented here is that through the Pan-African agenda there is 
evidence of a common identity, which shapes the definition of interests. The 
Constitutive Act, protocols and declarations can be interpreted as reflecting 
agreed upon common norms and standards of acceptable behaviour – for 
example, defining parameters in which the use of force is legitimate in inter-
state behaviour in the Common African Defence and Security Policy.  
The drive towards integration has coincided with democratic consolidation and 
advancement processes at national level. Regional integration and the AU 
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have to be seen in the broader framework of simultaneous institution building 
at national and regional levels. National identities and values have been 
placed under increasing pressure due to tensions between traditional and 
modern values and the divisive and fragmented practices of post-colonial 
states. Regionalism in Africa needs to be viewed as an alternative to 
nationalism and as a means to overcome some of the weaknesses that have 
been endemic to national governance on the continent. The development of 
identities, norms and values at regional level create a supporting framework 
for the development of expectations of peaceful change.  
The evolution of regional integration in Africa challenges some of the 
theoretical constructs of international relations that are more suited to 
Western contexts in which stable liberal democratic states are opted for 
integration and cooperation as means to extend power and achieve gain. In 
Africa, there has been a two-track process of achieving independence, 
democracy and stability at national level and developing regional mechanisms 
to cope with uncertainty in the inter-state environment. As the process of 
integration continues, the practices of democracy and good governance, as 
well as the development of collective understandings and expectations of 
peaceful change will be advanced. The AU provides a platform for increased 
interactions and for the evolution towards a security community. This should, 
however, not be treated as a given end state. The challenges are immense 
and a cautiously optimistic approach can be advocated. As concluded by 
Franke (2008:334): 
I also called for a less cynical view of inter-African security cooperation. 
Although the tensions and rivalries that have characterized (sic) 
Africa’s institutional landscape have thus far cast a penumbra of doubt 
over the ability of the continent to establish a viable peace and security 
architecture, the past decade has seen several important 
developments. Yet, it is true that many challenges remain… 
Consequently, even though the Deutschian terminology of security 
communities suits the conditions in parts of Africa well, since there has 
indeed been gradual development towards improved security relations, 
this should not be interpreted to mean that there is something 
inevitable about this process.   
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Indeed, the realisation of sustained non-violent change will take new ways of 
thinking and interacting and calls for resilience and commitment to something 
greater than individual well-being.  
7. Conclusion 
Although the entrenched concept of sovereignty has plagued security 
cooperation in Africa since the birth of independent states, regional institutions 
to address conflict prevention, management and resolution have evolved out 
of necessity. Due to the central role that states continue to play, the regional 
security architecture is at best a compromise on the path to greater 
cooperation.  
However, the path towards security and stability in Africa only started with 
independence. Global equality did not come with independence, and the need 
to unify and bound together against global forces has always been a part of 
the African integration agenda. The powerful forces of African identity are the 
foundation for African integration and as such bear relevance for the 
consideration of the AU as evolving towards being a security community in 
which peace becomes the defining characteristic.  
It is in working towards the goals of peace and security that CEWS and 
CISSA are framed, and the potential roles of these mechanisms can only be 
understood against the backdrop of regional integration and regional 
approaches to security as outlined in this chapter. Furthermore, the potential 
role of the CEWS and CISSA has to be viewed within the framework of 
building a security community characterised by shared meanings and 
understandings, common values and identity. This chapter has laid the 
foundation for considering the potential role of CEWS and CISSA in 
contributing to regional security, as will be discussed in Chapter 6. Before 
that, however, the CEWS and CISSA will be discussed in Chapters 4 and 5 
respectively. 
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Chapter 4 - The Development of the Continental Early Warning 
System  
1. Introduction 
The concept of early warning is closely related to the notion of conflict 
prevention. At the level of international organisations such as the AU, the 
necessity of early warning is framed within the need to prevent the outbreak 
or escalation of conflict. Thus, if warning of potential conflict is provided, 
mechanisms to prevent the escalation or outbreak of the conflict can be 
mobilised and deployed. The purpose of this chapter is to further explore 
conflict early warning and to consider the development of the early warning 
system at the AU as a mechanism to provide conflict early warning. This will 
include an analysis of the current status of operationalisation of the CEWS.  
The objectives of this chapter are twofold. Firstly, it aims to consider early 
warning as a means of operationalising the PSC conflict prevention mandate. 
This is done through analysing conflict early warning and conflict early 
warning systems. The second aim is to create a platform from which to further 
analyse the role of the CEWS in contributing to regional security in a way that 
builds on the theoretical framework provided in Chapters 2 and 3. The further 
analysis is enabled through the descriptive analysis of CEWS provided in this 
chapter. 
2. Background to conflict early warning 
Early warning systems for the prevention of conflict are ‘latecomers’ 
compared with their application in other fields (Wulf & Debiel 2009:3). Various 
types of early warning systems have emerged to assist national and 
international actors in the early anticipation of and timely preparation for 
natural disasters, the outbreak of famine, political destabilisation and forced 
migration (Schnabel & Krummenacher 2009:2).  
Andriole and Young (1977:107-108) capture the trajectory of the development 
of early warning thinking in the 1970s as having four important lines: first, 
basic research regarding the sources and decision-making processes of crisis 
 
 
 
 
  78 
proliferated since the early 1960s; second, interdisciplinary research 
regarding the development and use of quantitative variables and indicators 
progressed; third, the art of forecasting convincingly evolved into a credible 
science; and finally, computerised techniques were developed for the storage, 
retrieval, manipulation, and display of data.   
Early warning efforts do not intend to suppress conflict, but rather to respond 
to the way a conflict develops (von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:3). “The 
objective of conflict early warning and crisis prevention initiatives in this sense 
is to prevent the use of violence or to transform the violent conflict into 
constructive dialogue” (von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:3). Conflict early 
warning is conceived as a means of preserving and protecting lives (Nyheim 
2008:7).  
Early warning is concerned with managing uncertainty and developing a 
coherent picture of events before or as they unfold. As Gurr and Moore 
(1997:80) note: 
Those who make foreign and international policy seek more than 
explanation: they want better ‘early warnings’ of impending conflicts so 
that preventative diplomacy and other conflict management tools can 
be brought into play.   
The goal of early warning can be conceived as minimising the impact of 
violence, deprivation or humanitarian crises that threaten the sustainability of 
human development (Davies 2000:1). Theoretically, early warning allows for 
decision-makers to prepare short-term containment strategies and longer-
term proactive strategies to reduce the likelihood of future crises (Davies 
2000:1). Alexander Austin (2004:2) defines an early warning system as:  
(A)ny initiative that focuses on systemic data collection, analysis and/ 
or formulation of recommendations, including risk assessment and 
information sharing, regardless of topic, whether they are quantitative, 
qualitative or a blend of both. 
Modern early warning systems therefore have two focus areas: understanding 
(1) symptoms of conflict and (2) the underlying causes of conflict. As 
enunciated by Nhara (1996): 
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Early warning is ultimately aimed to assist with addressing the ‘root 
causes’ of conflict and must allow for the development of proper 
understanding of situations, their development, conditions for resolution 
and guidance for better settlement. It entails ways of forestalling or 
alleviating the worst effects of conflict, including early intervention to 
transform or resolve conflicts. 
Woocher (2008:3) identifies three components of early warning as: 
1) Estimating the magnitude and timing of relative risks of emerging 
threats; 
2) Analysing the nature of these threats and describing plausible 
scenarios; 
3) Communicating early warning analyses to decision makers. 
As highlighted in the aspects of early warning as identified by Woocher above 
and noted by Cilliers (2005), early warning needs to consist of more than just 
the timely provision and sharing of relevant information and requires the 
analysis of that information as well as the formulation and communication of 
analyses and policy options to relevant end-users. Early warning is thus 
concerned with information collection, analysis and dissemination. As 
explained by Von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller (2006:4), conflict early warning 
systems are designed to provide information on potential conflicts and threats 
to peace and security in a timely manner. “The information is then processed 
to develop scenarios, anticipate most likely developments and to propose 
appropriate response options designed to prevent and/ or limit violent 
conflicts” (von Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:4).  
Most of the accepted definitions of early warning use terminology like 
“relevant end-user” in reference to Cilliers (2005) above. As noted by Wulf 
and Debiel (2009:3), the underlying assumptions of most early warning 
systems is that international actors will take responsibility as protectors as 
soon as adequate information is being processed along with rules and 
procedures for initiating appropriate action at the level of an international or 
regional organisation. As Von Keyserlingk and Kopfmüller (2006:4) explain, 
effective conflict early warning systems should “help mitigate conflict by 
providing strategic advice to decision-makers.” Less attention is paid to 
disseminating early warning information to local levels for response.  
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According to Davies (2000:1-2) early warning systems should: 
• Supply reports from those on the ground regarding highly visible or 
rapidly escalating crises; 
• Provide reliable analyses that identify latent, low-level conflicts or 
instabilities while there is still time to invest in structural development 
and conflict management capacity; 
• Generate analyses that identify key factors driving instability; 
• Provide a basis from which to assess likely future scenarios; 
• Recommend appropriate options for local and international policy-
makers oriented towards early action; 
• Keep track of what preventative strategies have been used in what 
contexts in the past, to what effect and at what cost. 
As indicated in this discussion, the expectations of what an early warning 
system can achieve are ambitious to say the least. Having a concern with 
both structural causes of conflict and with the outbreak of conflict or escalating 
crisis, means that early warning is tasked to provide both strategic and 
operational or tactical reports. Furthermore, as per the conceptualisation of 
Davies above, early warning systems also need to provide some form of 
monitoring and evaluation capacity to track the implementation of preventative 
strategies. 
Conflict early warning raises highly political questions about causes, triggers 
and the impact of various role-players on the development of conflict 
situations. Control of information flows is deeply political and security is not a 
neutral, value-free concept (Cilliers 2006:9). Conflict early warning can be a 
highly contentious undertaking. The contention, however, lies not only in 
understanding what early warning is designed to do, but also in creating 
systems that can provide the type of information required to enable the 
provision of reliable and timely early warning information. The analytical tools 
designed to serve early warning purposes make selections from vast 
quantities of information, organise that information according to pre-
determined parameters and allow for the generation of scenarios. This 
undertaking seeks to simplify fluid and complex conflict situations. The 
manner in which this is done – i.e. the methodological approach – is at the 
heart of much contention surrounding conflict early warning.  
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The debate on conflict early warning methodologies tends to focus on the 
strengths and weaknesses of quantitative and qualitative analytical tools for 
conflict analysis. The difference lies in the manner in which information is 
collected and processed. Qualitative early warning systems rely on field-
based analysts or special envoys, often posted within the region in question, 
to monitor and conduct specific research (Austin 2004:5; Matveeva 2006:14). 
It is often within the realm of non-governmental organisations and 
international advocacy that qualitative methodologies are used. The reports of 
Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International and International Crisis Group 
exemplify qualitative early warning systems. Qualitative data is able to provide 
in-depth, context and actor sensitive and typically narrative information 
(Matveeeva 2006:16).  
According to Austin (2004:6) quantitative early warning systems celebrated 
their heydays during the 1960s when, driven by large government budgets, 
academics and researchers sought to construct theoretical models for 
understanding political behaviour. By the mid 1980s they had lost their flavour 
due to the consuming human and financial resources required (Austin 
2004:6). However, with improved technology and new information sources 
such as the Internet, quantitative early warning methodologies regained their 
significance in the 1990s (Austin 2004:6).  
Quantitative systems aim “to ascertain the preceding contextual structures, 
events and processes that caused the outbreak of violence from empirical 
evidence” (Matveeva 2006:13). In trying to find causes of conflict, quantitative 
early warning systems examine data for causal relationships: when A is 
present, how often does B follow it? (Austin 2004:16). An argument for 
quantitative early warning would be that a state’s macro-structural factors – its 
internal and external economic complex, resource endowment, demographic 
pressures, ethnic and religious diversity and government performance – form 
the conditions that affect its susceptibility to different forms of conflict (O’Brien 
2002:795). Therefore, as explained by O’Brien (2002:795): 
If one could identify and validate the macrostructural factors that make 
states more susceptible to conflict in one configuration and less 
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susceptible in another, then forecasts on these generally predictable 
factors could, in turn, be used to forecast the likelihood that states will 
experience a certain level of intensity of instability at some generally 
specific point in the future.   
The main objective of quantitative early warning is to isolate the factors that 
contribute to the outbreak of conflict or make violent conflict more likely 
(Austin 2004:16). The underlying assumption is that the origins of conflict lie in 
empirically observable casual relationships. However, referring back to the 
discussion in Chapter 2 on social constructions and political behaviour, 
perceptions and understandings of reality drive the definitions of interests, 
behaviours and actions. As Austin (2004:17) observes, the origins of conflict 
do not lie in causal relationships outside of the individual but rather within the 
perception of the individual or group. These reasons for resorting to violent 
conflict cannot be ascertained through empirical evidence alone. Matveeva 
(2006:14) supports this argument, noting that grievance is not a static quota 
given equally to all, but rather an ever-changing force where there are as 
many grievance tolerance levels as there are people.  
Quantitative methods, as indicated by O’Brien (2002) in the above quotation, 
rely on the assumption that socio-economic, macro-structural factors are the 
prime determinants of conflict. As such, issues of power, identity and ideology 
are ignored in favour of the search for objective reasons for the resort to 
violent behaviour. By focusing on social and economic indicators, quantitative 
models often fail to explain why conflict occurred in one country but not in 
another with similar developmental problems (Matveeva 2006:15).  
This should not infer that qualitative methodologies are preferable, as reliance 
on qualitative data has its own shortcomings, most notably “the potential for 
subjectivity and interference of political ideology” (Matveeva 2006:14-15). The 
appeal of quantitative methods lies in the perceived neutrality of observable 
reality and the removing of political and ideological biases that underlie 
qualitative methodologies. Matveeva (2006:17) explains 
Quantitative or statistical methods have as an important asset their 
power in terms of presentation: they convey a sense of objectivity, 
even if on closer examination it is apparent that data is collected from a 
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certain political perspective. Striving for objectivity is an important 
aspiration in the early warning field, but in practice one has to 
acknowledge that all data are prone to subjective interpretation.  
By emphasising its scientific character and devoting attention to objective or 
structural causes of conflict, early warning moves away from scrutinising the 
behaviour of leadership groups and the role of personalities in politics 
(Matveeva 2006:15). Matveeva (2006:15) thus observes that statistical and 
events-based methods are more suited to conflict situations in weak states 
than in authoritarian states. “When issues of conflict are already in the open 
and violence has broken out, it is easier to see who has a stake in violence or 
peace” (Matveeva 2006:15).  
Matveeva (2006:16) notes reluctance on the part of early warning 
practitioners to collect and report on “risky” issues and rather to only explore 
dimensions of conflict they have the capacity and opportunity to act upon. In 
designing early warning systems, methodological decisions are highly political 
decisions based on whom the system serves, who the stakeholders are and 
what conflict prevention tools available. It is not purely a choice of quantitative 
or qualitative methodology, as dual systems can also be employed. 
Methodological choices will, however, impact on the potential of the system to 
provide early warning and will determine the type of information that can be 
provided. Methodological decisions will influence the contexts to be studied 
and the types of conflict to be analysed, and will also determine and be 
determined by the scope of responses available.   
3. Background to the establishment of the CEWS 
Efforts to institutionalise a mechanism for conflict early warning began with 
the establishment of the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management and 
Resolution (hereafter referred to as the Mechanism) in the OAU. At the 29th 
Heads of State summit of the OAU held in Cairo, Egypt in June 1993, the 
declaration to create the Mechanism was adopted. According to the 
declaration, the primary objective of the Mechanism was the anticipation and 
prevention of conflict (OAU 1993 Declaration 3 Item 15). As explained by 
Nhara (1998): 
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The decision to establish this Mechanism within the OAU was reached 
against a realisation that there was no way Africa could improve its 
socio-economic performance…in an ocean of wars, conflicts and 
domestic tension. The Heads of State and Government saw in the 
establishment of such a Mechanism the opportunity to bring to the 
process of dealing with conflicts on the African continent a new 
institutional dynamism, enabling speedy action to prevent or manage 
and, ultimately, resolve conflicts when and where they occur. 
As per the Cairo Declaration, the Mechanism consisted of a Central Organ 
with the Secretary General and Secretariat as its operational arm (OAU 1993 
Declaration 3 Item 17) and a special fund (OAU 1993 Declaration 3 Item 23). 
In 1994, the Mechanism created a Division for Conflict Management tasked 
with the development of policy options and the coordination of activities in 
support of the Mechanism (Cilliers 2005). According to Cilliers (2005), the 
Division for Conflict Management was expected to: 
(a) Collect, collate and disseminate information relating to current and 
potential conflicts; 
(b) Prepare and present policy options to the Secretary General of the 
OAU; 
(c) Undertake or commission analysis and long-term research; 
(d) Support and manage political, civilian and military observer missions 
and coordinate regional training policies to support peacekeeping 
operations. 
Although the institutions and practices of the Mechanism laid the foundation 
for the peace and security architecture of the AU, the notion of a formal early 
warning system was absent. By 1996, the need for an early warning system 
within the Mechanism had become recognised as is highlighted by this extract 
from the 1996 Heads of State summit in Yaounde, Cameroon (AU 1996): 
We hail in advance the imminent institution within the said Mechanism of 
our early warning system (EWS) on conflictual situations in Africa, 
convinced that its establishment should be able to further improve the 
action of the Organization in the area of preventive diplomacy by making 
it possible, notably through pre-emptive action in gathering and 
analyzing pertinent data, not only to establish the existence of a threat to 
the peace, but also to look for a quick way to remove the threat. We 
exhort all potential data collectors to communicate the same information 
in time and provide the OAU Mechanism regularly with any at their 
disposal on warning signs of imminent conflict.  
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The Yaounde Declaration followed on previous steps taken to explore the 
modalities of an early warning system at continental level. In January 1996, 
an experts meeting was held in Addis Ababa “to brainstorm on the modalities 
for establishing such a network so that it could take care of the need for timely 
information on potential conflict situations” (Ibok 2000:8). The original 
conceptualisation of the CEWS was to create an information-sharing network 
with capacity for analysis and the development of policy recommendations at 
the regional level. As explained by Ibok (2000:8-9): 
As envisaged, the Early Warning Network would have OAU Member 
States as key focal points, including, of course subregional 
organisations like ECOWAS, SADC, the Economic Community of 
Central African States (ECCAS), the Arab Maghreb Union (UMA) and 
IGAD among others, the United Nations and its specialized agencies, 
academic institutions, research centres, the media and NGOs. It is the 
expectation of the OAU that the information which will be sourced from 
such a Network would be appropriately analyzed, so that accurate 
information, data, policy options and recommendations, could be 
provided to the Secretary General and the Central Organ, for early 
political action.    
The modalities and methodologies for analysis were not deeply explored 
during this initial experimentation with early warning. The focus was on 
establishing new networks and formalising existing ones “so as to meet the 
need for quality information gathering, analysis and presentation of policy 
options” (Cilliers 2005). The main result of efforts during the 1990s aimed at 
establishing a continental early warning system was the establishment of the 
Situation Room at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa.  
The Division for Conflict Management was mostly occupied with conducting 
fact-finding and observer missions, as was the case with the joint UN and 
OAU missions to the Comoros and Burundi. Special Envoys, such as former 
Heads of State, were also used to encourage dialogue and mediation during 
political crises. In this form, the initial experiments with continental early 
warning lacked true institutionalisation and operated more as an initial 
reaction system. As quoted in Cilliers (2005), a 1999 OAU report entitled ‘A 
Comprehensive Framework for Strengthening the Mechanism’ summarised 
that:  
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More than five years after the adoption of the Declaration establishing 
the Mechanism, the Central Organ still lacks adequate information to 
effectively predict, plan for, prevent and manage the complex and 
numerous conflicts that have plagued the region. It also lacks the 
capacity for in-depth analysis of strategic options on which to base 
decisions. 
Part of the challenge for developing an early warning capacity within the 
Division for Conflict Management was that there was a failure to secure 
agreement and support for an empirically based indicators module around 
which to operationalise the early warning network. At an experts meeting in 
1998, two sets of indicators were discussed but were not adopted by the 
statutory authorities (Cilliers 2005). The proposed sets of indicators were (1) 
for the prediction of impending conflict and (2) to indicate ongoing conflict.  
The development towards a continental early warning capacity began within 
the Division for Conflict Management of the OAU. The OAU was challenged 
by the principles of sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs and the 
fulfilment of the conflict prevention mandate was restricted. However, in the 
1990s, member states began to allow the OAU and the Mechanism in 
particular to play an increasingly active role in conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. Ibok (2000:9) adds: 
Indeed, this improved environment for action has meant that our 
Member States no longer instinctively cling to the concepts of non-
interference and sovereignty. On the contrary, there has been growing 
acceptance of the fact that the OAU can constructively, get involved in 
promoting political dialogue and helping resolve conflicts. The 
readiness of Member States to call upon the OAU to facilitate 
negotiations, observe and sometimes even monitor elections, is a 
manifestation of this growing positive disposition towards the 
Continental Organization.  
The optimistic assessment of Ibok (2000) refers to but one part of the picture. 
Experiences with conflict prevention, management and resolution at the OAU 
laid the foundations for an enhanced conflict prevention, management and 
resolution mandate for the AU. The changed political climate on the continent 
enabled the progression towards greater collaborative security mechanisms. 
However, the sensitivities surrounding security in Africa continue to affect the 
manner in which regional and national security tensions are negotiated. In the 
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context of the CEWS, this is most evident in the approach to indicators and 
conflict early warning. The notion of predicting conflict was always viewed with 
suspicion and caution and developing indicators, which could label states as 
potential conflict zones, was a precarious undertaking. This aspect continues 
to affect the conceptualisation and operationalisation of the continental early 
warning capacity, as will be further discussed below.    
4. Continental early warning: what, why and how 
Since the creation of the PSC of the AU, the concern for the prioritisation and 
institutionalisation of early warning found an answer in Article 12 of the 
Durban Protocol, which made provision for the CEWS. The primary function of 
the CEWS is to “facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (PSC 
Protocol Article 12(1)). According to the Roadmap for the Operationalisation 
of the CEWS, the purpose of the CEWS “is the provision of timely advice on 
potential conflicts and threats to peace and security and to enable the 
development of appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the 
destructive effects of violent conflict” (AU 2008:66).  
Article 12(2) of the Protocol further outlines that the CEWS shall consist of: 
• An observation and monitoring centre, to be known as ‘The Situation 
Room’, located at the Conflict Management Directorate and 
responsible for data collection and analysis on the basis of an 
appropriate early warning indicators module, and 
• Observation and monitoring units of the Regional Mechanisms to be 
linked directly through appropriate means of communications to the 
Situation Room, and which shall collect and process data at their level 
and transmit the same to the Situation Room.  
Similar to the original conceptualisation of the CEWS under the OAU, the 
Protocol further establishes that the effective functioning of the CEWS will be 
facilitated through collaboration with the UN and its agencies, other relevant 
international organisations, research centres, academic institutions and non-
governmental organisations (PSC Protocol Article 12(3)).  
Furthermore, the CEWS was tasked to develop “an early warning module to 
be based on clearly defined and accepted political, economic, social, military 
 
 
 
 
  88 
and humanitarian indicators, which shall be used to analyse developments 
within the continent and to recommend the best course of action” (PSC 
Protocol Article 12(4)). This early warning module is commonly associated 
with the development of some type of automated electronic process enabled 
by technology to assist with bulk information processing. Besides being a 
practical consideration because of the masses of open source information that 
would need to be processed, Cilliers (2005) notes that the use of an 
automated system might provide a degree of “technical protection”. He 
explains (Cilliers 2005): 
The use of some type of automated electronic process (as opposed to 
having an approach based only on human deductive reasoning) would 
provide a degree of objective automation to the work of early warning. 
Having decided on particular indicators of emerging conflict, an 
indicator’s module would, in theory, trigger some type of red light report 
and compel the provision of an alert to the Commission and possibly 
the PSC. In this manner, the inherent suspicion of the political 
manipulation of data as part of early warning could be averted and the 
staff of the CEWS would be provided with some level of ‘technical 
protection’. 
This point should be noted for further discussion as the highly political nature 
of the content of early warning reports could present a significant challenge to 
the ability of the CEWS to provide warning and for the PSC to initiate 
preventative action.  
The primary client of the information generated by the CEWS is the 
Chairperson of the Commission of the AU. The Chairperson is tasked in the 
Protocol to use the information from the CEWS to advise the PSC on potential 
conflicts and threats to peace and security in Africa and to recommend the 
best course of action (PSC Protocol Article 12(5)). As explained by former 
Commissioner for Peace and Security, Ambassador Said Djinnit (2008:9): 
This structure (CEWS) is core to the fulfilment of the Union’s conflict 
prevention, management and resolution mandate. Without the capacity 
to monitor, analyse and develop tailored and timely responses and 
policy options to threats to peace and security on the Continent, the AU 
would be severely limited in its ability to address these 
appropriately…In fulfilment of his/ her responsibility to advise the PSC 
on potential threats to peace and security in Africa, as well as 
recommend best courses of action, the Chairperson therefore relies on 
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a well functioning, comprehensive and AU specific early warning 
system…Consequently, the CEWS assumes a critical role as regards 
the ability of key institutions of the Union and other pillars of the peace 
and security architecture to perform their responsibilities.  
The structure of the CEWS can be diagrammatically represented as below: 
Figure 1: Structure of the CEWS (adapted from Cilliers 2005) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In a report of the status of the establishment of the continental peace and 
security architecture presented at the 57th meeting of the PSC on 21 June 
2006 in Addis Ababa, the process towards the establishment of the CEWS 
was outlined. Several important meetings and consultations have formed the 
basis of developing the CEWS. Even before the entry into force of the PSC 
Protocol, the AU Commission hosted an experts meeting on the 
establishment of the CEWS in Addis Ababa from 30-31 October 2003. This 
meeting brought together representatives from civil society, academia, think 
tanks and representatives from governments and inter-governmental 
organisations. The platform for the development of the CEWS was laid at this 
meeting and some of the recommendations are still visible in the 
conceptualisation and operationalisation of the CEWS as detailed in later 
documents.  
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This first experts meeting in October 2003 made the following 
recommendations (PSC 2008:39): 
(a) Begin with significant threats of violence and loss of life as the 
entry point in the AU’s early warning system; 
(b) Build a measureable, verifiable and standard database that is 
simple, user friendly, based on multi-levelled and field-based 
sources; 
(c) Develop an analytical capacity and expertise within the AU on early 
warning, conflict prevention and conflict management; 
(d) Establish diagnostic linkages between analysis and desired 
outcomes so as to provide the AU with regular reports on conflict 
situations. 
The next step in the process was the development of a draft “Roadmap”. This 
was done during an experts meeting organised by the AU Commission from 
27-29 July 2005 (PSC 2008:39).  The draft Roadmap was further deliberated 
upon at the governmental experts meeting held in Kempton Park, South Africa 
in 2006. The purpose of the Kempton Park meeting was to finalise and adopt 
the draft Roadmap (PSC 2008:41). 
4.1 Roadmap for the operationalisation of the CEWS 
At the Meeting of Governmental Experts on Early Warning and Conflict 
Prevention, a Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS (hereafter 
referred to as the Roadmap) was adopted. This section will highlight aspects 
of the Roadmap in order to develop a clearer understanding of the CEWS, 
more specifically in terms of what functions the CEWS has been designed to 
fulfil and the methodology behind it.  
4.1.1. Key elements of the Continental Early Warning System 
The Roadmap highlights that, in order for CEWS to fulfil its conflict prevention 
mandates, there needs to be a strong ink between information, analysis and 
action (AU 2008:66). In order to fulfil this purpose, the following four key 
elements to the operationalisation of the CEWS are identified (AU 2008:66): 
• Data collection 
• Strategic analysis 
• Reports and engagement with decision-makers 
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• Coordination and collaboration. 
These four elements have become the four pillars of the CEWS. In practice, 
separating the elements into four areas of activity is difficult, as overlaps, 
especially between collection and analysis, are unavoidable. The indicators 
module is the central component that ties collection, analysis and 
dissemination together for a common purpose. As explained in the Roadmap, 
data collection and analysis shall be undertaken on the basis of an 
appropriate early warning indicators module (AU 2008:67). As the indicators 
module is central to understanding the conceptualisation and 
operationalisation of the CEWS, it will be discussed in more detail below.  
4.1.2. Indicators Module of the Continental Early Warning System 
Article 12 of the PSC Protocol establishing the CEWS tasks the CEWS to 
develop “an early warning module to be based on clearly defined and 
accepted political, economic, social, military and humanitarian indicators, 
which shall be used to analyze developments within the continent and to 
recommend the best course of action” (PSC Protocol Article 12(4)). According 
to the 2006 Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS (AU 2008:68): 
(T)he implementation of the indicators module will allow the CEWS to 
undertake the systematic monitoring of risk indicators, including the 
analysis of trends and dynamics and their significance in their specific 
structural contexts. While the immediate focus must be on significant 
threats of violence and loss of life, the indicators module must also 
focus on underlying structural causes of conflict.  
This means that the CEWS is envisaged as being able to provide both 
strategic and operational early warning and would require an indicators 
module capable of generating reports on the emergence of conflict and the 
long-term potential for conflict.  
Because of the various purposes of early warning systems, there are various 
early warning modules or methodologies based on specific criteria and 
assumptions and designed for specific purposes. Verstegen (1999) introduced 
four ideal type models: 
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a) Correlation models – focus on structural indicators and future 
outbreaks of violence; 
b) Sequential models – try to understand when particular events lead to 
escalating a crisis; 
c) Conjunctural models – seek to establish what factor combinations lead 
to violence; 
d) Response models – try to identify windows of opportunity for 
intervention in crisis situations. 
The proposal for an indicators module presented at the Kempton Park 
conference and the approach advocated for the CEWS was a mixture of 
Verstegen’s sequential and conjunctural models. The rejection of the 
correlation model approach was based on the apprehension of “making bold 
claims towards a universal explanation of violent conflict and, thus, a single 
list with a limited number of indicators valid for all African countries” (AU 
2008:84). This area of prediction was probably too politically sensitive, as it 
would involve labelling countries in terms of conflict propensity. This serves as 
an example of how the CEWS has developed through negotiating difficult 
political terrain.  
The indicators module developed for the CEWS entails a four-step process: 
(1) matching conflict information against a framework of conflict early warning 
indicators; (2) information gathering; (3) information analysis; and (4) 
production of outcomes and reporting (AU 2008:85). These four steps are 
further outlined in the proposal for the indicators module as presented at the 
Kempton Park conference as follows (AU 2008:85-92): 
Step 1: Matching conflict information against a framework of conflict 
early warning indicators 
The approach of CEWS is to utilise the decisions and commitments of the AU 
and its predecessor the OAU as the foundation for the development of conflict 
indicators. These documents represent a consolidated framework of 
commonly accepted norms and principles which when interpreted ex negativo 
can be translated into a list of attitudes and behaviours that African leaders 
disapprove of (AU 2008:85). An example of how this works is provided below: 
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Table 2: Example of CEWS Indicator Module (adapted from AU 2008:86) 
Objective Documents adopted by the 
OAU and the AU4 
Generic early 
warning indicators 
Prevention and 
reduction of intra- 
and inter-state 
conflicts 
• The AU Non-Aggression 
and Common Defence 
Pact, 2005 
• Solemn Declaration on a 
Common African Defence 
and Security Policy, 2004 
• Objectives, Standards, 
Criteria and Indicators for 
the African Peer Review 
Mechanism, 2003 
• Durban Declaration on the 
Control of Illicit Drug 
Trafficking and Abuse, 
2002 
• AU Plan of Action on the 
Prevention and 
Combating of Terrorism, 
2002 
• Memorandum of 
Understanding on the 
CSSDCA, 2002 
• Horizontal or 
vertical escalation 
of violent conflict 
• Increase in human 
rights violations 
• Armed insurrections 
• Border conflict 
• Border skirmishes 
• Preparation of an 
insurgency from a 
neighbouring 
country 
• Expulsion of identity 
groups 
 
The rationale is to focus on active conflict zones and limit the scope of conflict 
early warning. Evidence of this approach is highlighted in the Roadmap (AU 
2008:68): 
Attention will be focused on a limited number of cases at first which 
either (i) are extremely likely to face violent conflict in the immediate 
future, or (ii) are already in conflict, or (iii) have been in conflict in their 
more recent past.  
Furthermore, as explained in the Roadmap (AU 2008:69), by basing the 
indicators module on existing standards (i.e. the protocols and documents 
from which the early warning indicators were determined) the framework 
ensures “a degree of objectivity in the selection of cases to be brought on the 
political agenda and in front of the PSC.”  
This means that the presence of conflict serves as the basis for attention by 
the CEWS. This then activates step 2 of the early warning process.                                                         
4 A selection of those mentioned in the proposal are provided here merely as an indication. 
The complete list and table is not required for the purposes of this discussion.  
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Step 2: Information gathering – conducting modified Strategic Conflict 
Assessments 
When there is sufficient match between the indicators and current 
developments in a given Member State, the CMD5 has probable cause to start 
analysing the situation (AU 2008:90). Step 2 entails conducting a Strategic 
Conflict Assessment (SCA) to generate an overview of the background and 
dynamics of a violent conflict unfolding and to address more comprehensively 
problems of causation, action and dynamics (AU 2008:90). The SCA seems 
like a generic conflict analysis methodology entailing analysis of actors and 
intentions and factors driving or inhibiting conflict. A three-step conflict 
analysis methodology is adopted to develop an SCA. This can be represented 
as below (AU 2008:90): 
Figure 2: Strategic Conflict Assessment Process (AU, 2008:90) 
 
As per the design of the CEWS, the information for generating the SCA is to 
be sourced only from open sources. These sources of data as identified in the 
Roadmap (AU 2008:67) include: 
• AU field mission reports and field monitor reports 
• Inputs from Member States and the regional economic communities 
• International organisations including the United Nations 
• The media, academia, non-governmental organisations and think-tanks                                                         
5 Conflict Management Division of the Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission 
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An analysis like SCA would be useful for considering the range of options and 
potential intervention strategies during a conflict or escalation towards conflict.  
Step 3: Information analysis – Monitoring 
According to the indicator module as adopted in the Roadmap, on the basis of 
an SCA, the information analysis role of the Conflict Management Division is 
activated (AU 2008:92). “If an SCA produces information of the existence of a 
potential for violent conflict, the situation has to be monitored” (AU 2008:92). 
Such monitoring would be produced in the regular reports, such as Daily and 
Mission Reports, which are discussed further below.  
Step 4: Producing outcomes – Reporting 
The final phase of the process is the production of early warning reports “to its 
end-users to alarm them to up-coming potential of/ or violent conflict and 
enable them to take appropriate political action” (AU 2008:92). These reports 
are to complement the other products of the CEWS.  
The primary responsibility for the collection of information and dissemination 
of reports lies with the Situation Room within the Conflict Management 
Division located at the AU Headquarters in Addis Ababa. On a daily basis, the 
Situation Room “solicits, collates, screens and disseminates relevant 
information to a variety of stakeholders” (AU 2008:67). According to an 
information pamphlet dispensed by the Situation Room6, the Situation Room 
is an integral part of the CEWS and the AU Conflict Management Division 
“where information is monitored continuously on situations of simmering, 
potential and actual conflict, as well as post-conflict initiatives and activities in 
Africa.”  
The Situation Room is responsible for producing several reports including 
News Highlights, Daily Reports, Flash Reports, Country Profiles and Mission 
Reports. It is at the level of the Situation Room that issues around information 
management are vital.                                                          6 See Appendix 1 for copy 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In order to fully enable the Situation Room to deliver on the ambitious 
reporting requirements, the Roadmap recommended (AU 2008:68):  
the introduction of an automated data gathering and processing 
system; the introduction of an internal news trends tracking service; the 
development of a system of grading sources and reports to reduce 
information overflow and to increase efficiency; greater use of African 
information sources; and the strengthening of the existing system of 
internal country profiles.  
By 2009, there was an operational automated news clipping service within the 
Situation Room. According to the information pamphlet distributed at the 
Situation Room7: 
The Situation Room has access to online information sources, 
including Dialogue, NewsEdge, Reuters, Agence France Presse (AFP), 
Oxford Analytica and Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). The Situation 
Room, with the support of the Joint Research Centre (JRC) of the 
European Commission, has developed a new software “the Africa 
News Brief”, an automated information gathering tool, which collects 
information from a variety of open sources in real-time and in all African 
languages. It has also designed and developed a CEWS Portal, which 
serves as a one-stop-shop to access data collection and analysis tools. 
It is used for information sharing with the Regional Economic 
Communities (RECs) and archiving relevant documents.  
The modus operandi of the CEWS had to be accepted by member states, and 
what is reflected in the above description seems to be the product of 
negotiation and the finding of a politically acceptable system for continental 
early warning. The methodology of this system is based on a combination of 
quantitative and qualitative methods utilising both country reports and an 
empirically based indicators module. By basing the CEWS indicator module 
on regional agreements and protocols, an attempt was made to imbue the 
system with a degree of objectivity. Furthermore, by basing the system on 
cases that (i) are extremely likely to face violent conflict in the immediate 
future, or (ii) are already in conflict, or (iii) have been in conflict in their more 
recent past (AU, 2008:68), a cautionary approach is applied.  
                                                        7 See Appendix 1 for copy 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This caution could be related to not only the political sensitivities of early 
warning, but also to the possible deployment of conflict prevention tools by the 
AU. Moving from the OAU to the AU marked a fundamental shift regarding the 
issue of intervention. Reports generated by the CEWS would be the basis for 
decisions by the PSC to intervene in conflict situations. When agreeing on the 
indicators on which to base the CEWS, member states were implicitly 
agreeing to criteria on which the PSC would consider deploying fact-finding 
missions, observer missions, high-level mediation teams and even military 
forces. Early warning reports could embarrass governments, question the 
ability of the government to exercise territorial control, bring to light abuses on 
the part of government forces and may even provide a platform for advocacy 
or action at regional level.  
5. Status of Operationalisation of the CEWS 
The notion of a continental early warning system for the AU was first 
considered in 1996. More than 13 years later the system is still not fully 
operational. It is possible to visit the Situation Room at the AU headquarters in 
Addis Ababa. It is also possible to visit the early warning centres at sub-
regional level in Gaborone (SADC), Abuja (ECOWAS) and Addis Ababa 
(IGAD). Progress in some of the other regions has been slow and there is a 
lack of information on the exact status of operationalisation in North Africa, 
Central Africa and East Africa. Most of the progress with operationalisation at 
sub-regional level has been at SADC, ECOWAS and IGAD. The problem of 
overlapping regional structures and overlapping membership, which 
challenges many of the AU peace and security ambitions, also affects the full 
operationalisation of the CEWS. IGAD has one of the longest running early 
warning systems, yet the East African Community also wants to create an 
early warning centre, and COMESA has indicated a similar intention (AU 
2008:154-163).  
Progress towards the full operationalisation of the CEWS at AU Headquarters 
seems to be continuing regardless of the uneven progress at sub-regional 
level. Unlike the African Standby Force, the CEWS does not have to rely on 
 
 
 
 
  98 
commitments and contributions from the regional economic communities to 
exist. With so many information sources and the commitment to open source 
information, early warning reports from the sub-regions would be one source 
for CEWS but not necessarily a defining element.  
The full operationalisation of the CEWS depends, however, on the 
commitment and political will of member states. The main challenge seems to 
be that the inherently political nature of early warning could lead to 
commitment in rhetoric only. Whether or not it will ever be able to occupy a 
central position in conflict prevention on the continent remains to be seen. The 
challenges relating to the operationalisation of the CEWS may point to larger 
challenges facing the early warning field. Matveeva (2006:46) concludes that 
there is more to be done to improve early warning practice and to raise 
awareness of what it can deliver. David Nyheim (2008:7) explains that, in 
spite of increased resources going into early warning, key shortcomings of 
governmental and multilateral interventions in violent conflict remain, including 
faulty analysis, late, uncoordinated and contradictory engagement and poor 
decision-making. “Conflict early warning as a field of conflict prevention is 
today undergoing significant scrutiny” (Nyheim 2008:7). As the efficacy of 
conflict early warning is being globally questioned, so too will the potential of 
the CEWS as the base for conflict prevention decision-making be questioned. 
These questions will be further explored in Chapter 6.  
6. Conclusion 
By 2009, the CEWS was producing regular reports from the sources as 
named in the previous section. The quality and impact thereof are difficult to 
ascertain and the added value of early warning is unproven on a continent 
that continues to be faced with conflict. Early warning systems as central to 
multilateral conflict prevention have an ambitious agenda. For the AU and its 
CEWS, the ambitions of creating a multi-user open source information system 
have been complicated by questions of methodology, capacity, resourcing 
and ultimately politics.  
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The purpose of this chapter was, however, not to provide an evaluation of the 
CEWS, but rather to outline the development of the CEWS and to explore the 
conceptual and operational framework that informs its functionality. It is only 
with this basis that an analysis of the potential contribution of the CEWS to 
regional security can be further explored.  
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Chapter 5 - Formalising Intelligence Cooperation – The Role 
of the Committee on Intelligence and Security Services of 
Africa  
1. Introduction 
Intelligence cooperation in Africa was inspired by continental aspirations 
towards collective security and the institutionalisation of common defence and 
security systems. The need for mechanisms to enable working together within 
the secret domain of state power has further evolved out of necessity to utilise 
the tool of intelligence to combat transnational security threats. The purpose 
of this chapter is to explore the evolution of the Committee on Intelligence and 
Security Services in Africa (CISSA) as a mechanism for information sharing 
and confidence building at continental level. This will provide a basis from 
which to explore the contribution of CISSA to regional security in later 
chapters. However, in order to be able to contextualise CISSA as a 
mechanism for intelligence cooperation, some background information will be 
provided to explore the nature of intelligence and the role of intelligence 
cooperation as a feature of the modern globalised security environment.  
2. Defining intelligence 
For the purposes of clarity, it should be noted that in this dissertation the term 
intelligence is used in a twofold manner.8 Firstly, it is used to refer to 
information products produced by state intelligence agencies. Intelligence as 
such is the product of the intelligence process – sometimes referred to as the 
intelligence cycle – which most simplistically contains three basic elements 
namely, (1) collection, (2) analysis and (3) dissemination. Intelligence as a 
product is the analysed information supplied to decision and policy-makers; 
information generated from open and closed sources for decision-making 
purposes. Chesterman (2006:3) defines this analytical product of intelligence 
agencies as “risk assessment intended to guide action.” 
                                                        8 This is similar to the distinction made by Mark Lowenthal (1999) in his book Intelligence: 
from Secrets to Policy in which he utilises three dimensions to define intelligence as a 
process, intelligence as a product and intelligence as an organisation.  
 
 
 
 
  101 
The second manner in which the term is employed is in reference to the state 
actors that are charged with the collection, analysis and dissemination of 
information for decision-making purposes. The main concern is with public 
sector intelligence actors, although cognisant of the fact that actors outside of 
the public arena do in the modern world engage in intelligence related 
activities.  
Intelligence is distinguished from other forms of information and actors by the 
authority to utilise secrecy. This means that state intelligence actors utilise 
covert and open methods to collect information. Covert collection is a 
fundamental characteristic of intelligence. Covert collection refers to 
information obtained without the consent of the government of body that 
controls it (Chesterman 2006:3). The ability to act under the cloak of secrecy 
is possibly the most controversial element of intelligence. Secrecy is, 
however, a useful trait to use to differentiate intelligence from information and 
intelligence agencies from other information providers.  
A second distinctive facet of intelligence is that it is most often concerned with 
national security. Intelligence, as Abram N. Shulsky (1993:1) defines it, is 
"information relevant to a government's formulation and implementation of 
policy to further national security interests." It is commonly defined in 
government documents as information about threats or potential threats to the 
state and its people. For example, according to the South African National 
Strategic Intelligence Act 39 of 1994, the functions of both the domestic and 
foreign intelligence services are to gather, correlate, evaluate and analyse 
intelligence in order to identify any threat or potential threat to the security of 
the Republic or its people.  
These aspects of intelligence are succinctly presented in Michael Herman’s 
articulation of the two main functions of intelligence as “collecting information 
by special, covert means, and acting as government’s experts on targets or 
subjects mainly of a national security kind” (Herman 2002:229).  
Intelligence is concerned with providing decision-tailored information. 
Intelligence products are geared to serve the distinct purpose of providing 
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information on which to base decisions. In military terms, intelligence is a 
force optimiser. Information about the adversary’s capabilities, geographical 
locations and intentions forms the basis of battle planning and allows for the 
optimal application of military power. Intelligence also enables the ability to 
utilise the all-important element of strategic surprise. It is this origin of the 
notion of national intelligence capabilities that was captured by military 
strategist Carl Von Clausewitz (1976:117), “By ‘intelligence’, we mean every 
sort of information about the enemy and his country – the basis, in short, of 
our plans and operations.” 
In most countries the role of warning of imminent attacks or the escalation of 
conflict falls to the intelligence sector. Indeed, the very function of conflict 
early warning has its roots as much in humanitarian disaster relief as it does 
in military intelligence. Following the failure to detect North Korea’s surprise 
attack on South Korea in 1950, the United States established a warning 
system that drew on increased communication between its regional 
commands around the world (Cavelty & Mauer 2009:126). The United States 
intelligence community switched to an indicator-based warning system in the 
1960s based on the premise that the USSR could not mount an attack without 
some preparatory efforts (Cavelty & Mauer 2009:126). The US intelligence 
community developed a worldwide network of “Indications and Warning 
Centres” to keep track of certain indicators that could predict the intention of 
the Soviet Union to launch an attack against the US or its interests (Hulnick 
2005:595).  
The organisations and practices of the intelligence community are shaped by 
the particular geopolitical and technical requirements of the time and are 
designed in response to a given set of historical circumstances (Rolington 
2006:739; Cavelty and Mauer 2009:126). Changes in the broader political and 
security context result in shifts in conceptualisation and functions of 
intelligence. The requirements for intelligence in independent African states 
today are remarkably different from those of the colonial states for example. 
The nature of the global intelligence environment will be briefly explored in the 
next section.  
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3. Shifting global intelligence paradigms 
Some scholars observe that the end of the Cold War “brought about nothing 
less than the collapse of an international system” (Gaddis 1993:53). Perhaps 
that view is extreme, but the end of the Cold War presents a watershed in 
international relations in which the forces which dominated inter-state 
relations changed and resulted in a testing and re-evaluation of previous 
assumptions and mind-sets (Cavelty and Mauer 2009:128). The end of the 
Cold War raised fundamental questions about the nature, role and functions 
of national intelligence apparatus. As noted by Andrew Liaropoulos (2006:6), 
whereas the Cold War provided a reasonably predictable and linear 
framework for the intelligence community, the same cannot be said for the 
security environment at the beginning of the 21st century. There is greater 
complexity and variety of enemies and threats.  
It was, however, the shock of 9/11 and the massive intelligence involvement 
in the war on terror that drove the re-evaluation of paradigms for 
understanding the nature, roles and requirements of intelligence in the 
modern globalised world. Many of the analyses that followed the 9/11 attacks 
“pointed directly to the need for an entirely new way of developing insight and 
anticipating surprises, one which places less emphasis on secrets or 
restricted channels for sharing information and more emphasis on open 
source information and creating networks of expertise that connect diverse 
thinking across disciplines as well as continents” (George 2007). As Scharf 
(2004:6) notes, the challenges for the intelligence community are even bigger 
now in the era of globalisation, organised crime and terrorism.  
The global call for a new paradigm for intelligence is based on the recognition 
that the traditional manner of thinking and conducting intelligence is no longer 
useful to counter risks associated with insecurity. The traditional intelligence 
paradigm, which only became a formalised global norm in the post-World War 
II era, was based on the development of critical information through a 
national, classified system of collection and analysis (George 2007). The 
focus of critical information prescribed by the dominant traditional paradigm 
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related mostly to the capacities and intentions of foreign states – be it in the 
form of military, political or economic data.   
Traditionally intelligence functioned to gather information (from all sources) on 
a specified threat in order to be able to better apply the tools of power to 
counter such threats. The evolution of an intelligence function has in general 
been associated with contestation for power and influence – be it against 
domestic or foreign enemies, generally confined within a state-centric security 
paradigm. Changes in the security paradigm have resulted in changes in the 
manner in which threats to security are interpreted. These threats are 
geographically unbounded and many of them cannot be countered through 
military or security means (for example HIV/AIDS; climate change; migration; 
urbanisation). Furthermore, the threats to traditional state security have also 
changed and have become largely transnational in nature. When referring to 
transnational threats the primary assumption is that the concern is with 
security vulnerabilities that transcend national boundaries when at least one 
actor is a non-state agent (see for example Evangelista 1995). 
The transnational nature of security and the diversity of the security paradigm 
issues have driven intelligence cooperation to a higher priority. As observed 
by Roger George (2007) 
What distinguishes today’s tests and makes the traditional intelligence 
paradigm less effective is the transnational and global character of 
many trends … the compression of time and space and the easy 
movement of people, weapons, toxins, drugs, knowledge and ideas 
have transformed the way threats emerge and challenge the way 
intelligence must operate.  
Cavelty and Mauer (2009:126) explain that the new spectrum of threats is 
dominated by three interrelated characteristics, namely: complexity, 
uncertainty and a diminishing impact of geographical space. Increased 
complexity increases uncertainty. Increased uncertainty increases the 
demand for information. As the importance of national borders become 
challenged and the compression of space and time opens opportunities and 
vulnerabilities for the global security order, security actors are challenged to 
evolve to remain relevant to this new global security paradigm. Recognising 
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that modern threats are frequently not geographically bounded, Gijs de Vries, 
the former EU Counter-terrorism Coordinator, noted that, in order to combat 
this threat, “national agencies must work across borders to be effective” 
(quoted in Melady & Hilscher 2008:13). Scharf (2004:6) makes a similar 
observation as follows: 
Whether one is talking within countries or between countries, about police 
intelligence, military intelligence, internal intelligence or external 
intelligence, the relevant institutions have to work closely together, not only 
with their cognate institutions at home, but also with those of partner 
countries too.  
There is, however, a certain paradox in the globalised security context, as 
globalisation enables border-crossing and borderlessness, yet controlling 
borders and national boundaries has become increasingly important. 
Regulating migration flows and containing border disputes remain central to 
state security functions. The reality, however, is that controlling access to 
territories and citizens is difficult in the globalised security context, as 
technology has enabled the increased flow of goods, people and ideas across 
national boundaries, and global inter-connectedness has increased 
interactions between people around the world – whether for work, sport or 
entertainment. The paradox lies, therefore, in the increased relevance of the 
state as a geographical unit in a system in which the centrality of and ability to 
control geographical units is being challenged by transnational security actors 
and vulnerabilities. Thus, in order to counter threats that transcend state 
borders, new patterns of interaction are required.  
The shifting security paradigm is predicated on the waning distinctions that 
can be made between local, regional and global security issues. Paul Monk 
(2005) explains that the technologies generated in the Cold War – especially 
weapons of mass destruction, information technology and global 
communications – have undermined the basis of the liberal nation-state 
through the creation of threats and pressures against which the nation-state 
finds it increasingly difficult to defend itself under the terms of the 20th Century 
strategic paradigm of threat, deterrence and retaliation. The security paradigm 
shift is based on vulnerability, pre-emption and resilience (Monk 2005). It is 
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within these parameters that CISSA has emerged – as a mechanism to 
combat transnational vulnerabilities, to enable pre-emptive action (as 
exemplified in the prevention of the coup in Equatorial Guinea) and to 
increase the resilience of the regional security architecture to unexpected 
change.  
4. From national to international intelligence cooperation 
As noted in the previous section, the transnational nature of security threats in 
the modern climate requires changes in the way that national intelligence 
structures operate. Definitions of threats and vulnerabilities determine the 
agenda of an intelligence service. The nature of transnational security threats, 
such as terrorism, mercenaries, small arms proliferation, drug smuggling and 
organised crime, means that the security risk operates in and manifests from 
various locations despite of national boundaries involving actors of various 
nationalities. National intelligence structures are, therefore, “monitoring 
threats to their national security interests and homelands that are far more 
diverse, interconnected and dynamic than ever before” (George 2007). This 
means that the individual actions of any single government or intelligence 
service may prove ineffective in detecting, deterring or preventing insecurity 
(George 2007).  
Africa and Kwadjo (2009:9) capture the post-Cold War shift in intelligence in 
terms of the emergence of new security threats as legitimate focus areas for 
intelligence services. They explain that these new threats “included post-
conflict civil wars, genocidal activities, transnational crimes such as money 
laundering; international terrorism; people, drug and arms smuggling; and 
political extremism” (Africa & Kwadjo 2009:9). As explained by Herman 
(2002:232): 
The shift is towards a different class of target: non-state entities, semi-
states and the so-called rogue states. The range is familiar. 
International terrorism is one well-established category, and others 
have included individuals and firms involved in activities such as 
dealing in nuclear material, the development of weapons of mass 
destruction and delivery systems, arms trading, sanctions-busting, 
drugs and other criminality; ‘pre-state’ groups seeking statehood 
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through insurrection and civil war; collapsing and fragmenting ‘post-
states’; and some transnational corporations. 
States in Africa face the same range of threats as the above global trend 
refers to. As explained by the Executive Secretary of CISSA during a 
conference in Pretoria, South Africa in October 2009, the African security 
environment in the twenty-first century continues to be marked by inter-state 
and intra-state conflicts, organised crime manifesting in the form of cross 
border threats such as terrorism, piracy, vehicle theft, smuggling and 
counterfeiting. “These threats have made the geographic distinction between 
domestic and foreign security theatres irrelevant and demands of intelligence 
and security services to adopt seamless operational approaches in combating 
actual and potential threats” (Dlomo 2009:1).  
As Africa and Kwadjo (2009:10) note, intelligence services in Africa have 
found both conflict and post-conflict scenarios the focus of their attention, as it 
has increasingly been demonstrated that the troubles of a neighbouring 
country are bound to impact on another’s domestic stability. Gibson (2005:31) 
captures the same notion by highlighting that the intelligence community 
should treat risk on a global rather than state level. “That security threats can 
seldom be contained by national borders underscores the need for the 
intelligence services to operate in a regional context and cooperate with other 
services to achieve commonly-identified solutions” (Africa & Kwadjo 2009:10).   
Furthermore, as noted by Nederveen Pieterse (2002:3), transnationalisation 
both requires and prompts flexible approaches and making optimal use of 
information. The need for flexibility has been captured above in terms of the 
need for national and cooperative security strategies. The requirement and 
promotion of information can be interpreted in terms of the increased value 
being attached to knowledge derived from intelligence. Because many of the 
targets are intrinsically secretive, intelligence has become indispensable 
(Herman 2002:232). Examples of legitimate targets for intelligence services 
that rely on secrecy include organised crime, terrorism, the smuggling of arms 
and drugs and counterfeiting. This means that the global trend of intelligence 
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being a growing field of activity will continue and will be as true for Africa as 
for other parts of the world.  
The legitimate role of intelligence as a source of policy information, especially 
for conflict prevention, management and resolution, has not been traditionally 
associated with intelligence on the continent. The global trend could have a 
positive impact on the functioning of intelligence in Africa. Dlomo (2009:1) 
notes that the security environment has increased the need for agile, adaptive 
and collaborative domestic and foreign security services between and among 
themselves and their neighbours. This is a call for intelligence to become a 
key part of the fight against insecurity in Africa.  
Michael Herman (2008:200) explains that international cooperation between 
intelligence agencies is a feature of modern intelligence, “overlaying the 
received picture of it as a secretive, exclusively national entity.” This is based 
on the necessity of cooperation as outlined above. By the start of the 21st 
century, several states had recognised the necessity of cooperation amongst 
their intelligence agencies, as seen by the 2004 instalment of the first 
European Union Counter-Terrorism Coordinator and the creation of a South 
American Intelligence Center in Brazil in 2006 (Melady & Hilscher 2008:18).  
Although international cooperation between intelligence services is not a new 
phenomenon, it has grown exponentially since 9/11 (Born 2007:2). Melady 
and Hilsher (2008) focus on intelligence cooperation in the context of counter-
terrorism and provide interesting accounts of successes of intelligence 
cooperation (Melady & Hilscher 2008:21-22): 
Over the last few years there have been countless examples of 
national intelligence agencies working side by side to prevent attacks.  
Most notably in July 2006, through the sharing of information, United 
States, British and Pakistani intelligence officials were able to thwart an 
attempt by suspected Al-Qaeda terrorists to blow up ten jets leaving 
the United Kingdom for the United States. Meanwhile, close 
cooperative ties between Russian, Ukrainian, and Azerbaijani security 
services enabled them to uncover and foil a plot, hatched by Chechen 
rebels, to assassinate Russian President Vladimir Putin at a meeting of 
former Soviet states in Yalta in 2000. 
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Besides intelligence collaboration to serve national and international security 
threats, there is another aspect to the increasing importance of international 
intelligence collaboration. The multiplicity of actors on the global arena and 
the role of international organisations in global peace and security, create a 
challenge of national intelligence machinery to support international decision-
making. The actors within the modern security environment are more diverse 
and diffuse than were their counterparts in the Cold War era (Cavelty & Mauer 
2009:127). It is not only the diversity of threats that has increased, but also 
the diversity of actors actively involved in the security paradigm. More states 
are involved in international affairs; regional organisations and non-state 
actors all have complex interests in international peace and security.  
The utility of a state-based closed system of information is questionable in the 
multifaceted global order. Herman (2002:234) enunciates this as a vision “of 
national intelligence services collectively developing groups of states as their 
corporate clients, alongside their well-established, individual, national 
governments.” Gibson (2005:31) takes this a step further and urges that, in 
order to remain relevant as a national resource, “the intelligence community 
will have to graduate from the secret, tactical, puzzle-solving ethos of a static 
Cold War, on behalf of governments, to an open, strategic, mystery-
understanding ethos of a contemporary complex global society, on behalf of 
the public.”   
Chesterman (2006:2) asks whether collective security is possible when the 
evaluation of current threats and the calibration of responses turn on the use 
of national intelligence that, by its nature, cannot be openly shared. He argues 
that, because multilateral responses to emerging threats are inherently more 
legitimate and preferable to unilateral action, intelligence can and should play 
a role in collective security structures at regional and international levels 
(Chesterman 2006:3). The demands of global security have emphasised the 
need to develop multinational and international intelligence mechanisms. In 
recognition of this need, Herman (2002:235-236) proposes that “supranational 
intelligence machinery” may be in order. He highlights that such supranational 
intelligence machinery could lead to more emphasis on potential of 
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intelligence for reducing interstate misperception and facilitating cooperation, 
for making states more ‘intelligent’ (Herman 2002:236). Notably, Herman 
(2002:236) argues that the process of forming collaborative intelligence 
mechanisms would reduce some of the difficulties over the legitimacy of 
intelligence – this will be further discussed when considering the potential 
contribution of CISSA to regional security.  
Collaboration between states is a complex undertaking in most fields, and 
intelligence would be no different. Building international relationships takes 
time and effort, but the sharing of intelligence requires relationships of trust 
and mutual interest as foundations. As Herman (2008:208) explains: 
Cooperation at its closest depends upon individuals who have grown 
up in their national organizations, done business against common 
enemies, socialized together for years and helped each other out of 
difficulties on the way. There is also a genuine sense of professional 
community…there is also a sense of common problems and the search 
for solutions…Agencies in close collaboration over long periods 
develop a kind of bonding.   
The point raised about forming a professional community is especially 
important when considering that CISSA has the potential to play a positive 
role in regional security as an epistemic community. This will be further 
deliberated in the next chapter. Suffice to say that increased communication 
and collaboration between intelligence agencies have the tendency to create 
professional networks that identify themselves as a community searching for 
solutions to common problems. These networks do not only have the potential 
to positively contribute to the professionalism of the intelligence trade, but also 
to function as conduits for the development of common understandings and 
common positions so central to the practice of peace in security communities.   
5. Intelligence collaboration: the formation of CISSA 
The Committee of Intelligence and Services of Africa (CISSA) was 
established in August 2004 in the wake of the failed coup plot in Equatorial 
Guinea in March of the same year. Foiling the attempted coup in Equatorial 
Guinea involved cooperation between intelligence and security services 
across borders – particularly between South Africa, Zimbabwe and Equatorial 
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Guinea, setting a precedent for relatively large scale, publicly known, 
collaboration in achieving common conflict prevention goals. Steps towards 
institutionalising intelligence collaboration proceeded rather rapidly after this.  
The intelligence and security services of African states met in Luanda, Angola 
in April 2004 specifically to discuss collaboration to combat mercenaries in 
view of the Equatorial Guinea attempted coup. The meeting emerged with a 
commitment to formalising cooperation though the establishment of a 
committee of experts composed of representatives from Algeria, Angola, 
Congo-Brazzaville, Cote d’Ivoire, Mozambique, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sudan and 
Uganda to advance a draft Memorandum of Understanding on the 
establishment of a Committee of Intelligence and Security Services. The draft 
Memorandum was discussed in Johannesburg in June 2004, with particular 
emphasis on the procedures for membership of the committee and the 
development of institutional structures. During a meeting in Abuja, Nigeria on 
26 August 2004, CISSA was launched.  
CISSA is a collective arrangement for intelligence agencies on the continent. 
One should not be misled by the terminology of intelligence and security 
services. The inclusion of the term security services is reflective of the 
sensitivities of intelligence in Africa – the term security service is often more 
politically acceptable than intelligence. As explained by Africa and Kwadjo 
(2009:3), in some countries on the continent, the more acceptable label for 
domestic agencies conducting strategic intelligence work is “internal security 
service”, a label meant to distinguish such structures from those engaged in 
policing activity.  
Secondly, just because the word ‘services’ is used in the title does not mean 
that all of the signatory agencies are bound by democratic governance 
principles or that they are legally constituted state agencies. Furthermore, as 
Africa and Kwadjo (2009:3) point out, the definitional dilemma surrounding 
intelligence in Africa is compounded by the fact that some internal security 
agencies, aside from playing strategic intelligence roles, also have executive 
powers of arrest and detention.   
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There are fundamental democratic governance deficits for many countries on 
the continent in relation to intelligence agencies (See for example Human 
Rights Watch (2006) and Hendricks and Hutton (2009)). Some states have 
not replaced out-dated colonial era regulations that created intelligence 
agencies; other agencies are created by presidential or executive regulation 
(for example Zimbabwe and Nigeria), and others are not even covered by 
legislation of any kind (for example Angola, Morocco and Sudan). A harsh 
criticism of CISSA is that, although enshrining the principle of “respect for 
democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and good governance” 
(Article 6b of the Memorandum), there seems to be no basic democratic 
governance criteria for membership. A more positive interpretation could be 
that through the forum of CISSA, democratic governance interests could be 
advanced, as will be discussed in later sections.  
5.1. Objectives, functions and structure 
Michael Herman (2008:208-209) observes that “multilateral intelligence clubs” 
are usually single-discipline in nature having a “pragmatic and cautious 
flavour about them, limited to particular categories of information.” The 
development of CISSA has followed a similar approach. It started from a 
particular focus on acting against mercenary activity, in particular involvement 
in unconstitutional changes of government. From that common interest and 
need for collective action, the platform for increased confidence building and 
expansion of issue areas has emerged.  
Article 5 of the CISSA Memorandum (2004) outlines the objectives of CISSA 
as to: 
a) Provide leadership with regard to intelligence and security matters in 
furtherance of peace, security and stability in Africa; 
b) Coordinate strategies to facilitate interaction amongst intelligence 
services and exchange intelligence on all common security threats; 
c) Develop and consolidate confidence building measures among 
intelligence and security services; 
d) Provide the PSC of the AU with necessary data and intelligence for the 
adoption of, amongst others, an African policy and strategy for 
peacekeeping and conflict prevention, management and resolution; 
e) Serve as a platform for cooperation with similar organisations to CISSA 
outside of Africa; 
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f) Serve as a back channel of communication between Members during 
crisis; 
The objectives of CISSA reveal several pertinent points about the nature and 
orientation of the structure. Firstly, it is noticeable that there is an intention for 
CISSA to be centrally situated in the African peace and security architecture 
and for the Committee to play a leading role in peace and security matters. 
This is particularly evident in points (a) and (d). This is a rather controversial 
role for the body to assume, as CISSA is not a statutory organ of the AU and 
there are other structures assuming some of those responsibilities, namely 
the Peace and Security Council and the early warning system. There is a 
general lack of specification on the manner in which CISSA fits into the peace 
and security architecture of the AU, but this will be discussed later in this 
chapter.  
Secondly, the role of CISSA as a platform for communication and information 
sharing between intelligence and security services is highlighted. This aspect 
is the core of CISSA and is prioritised in the objectives. In fact, four of the six 
objectives are concerned with communication and cooperation among 
intelligence agencies. This is echoed in the mission statement of CISSA as 
found on their website9, which is: 
To coordinate intelligence, as well as to promote cooperation, 
confidence building measures and capacity building among intelligence 
and security services in Africa.  
There is a certain logic to this, as, in order to achieve the vision of being the 
“primary provider of intelligence to the policy-making organs of the African 
Union10”, there would have to be information sharing and collaboration at 
inter-state level. Information sharing and collaboration at national level is, in 
turn, dependent on building confidence among member services to enable 
communication of sensitive information.   
                                                        
9 http://cissa-au.org/  
10 The vision statement is also taken from CISSA’s website as above.  
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As with the structure of most inter-governmental conventions and protocols, 
the Memorandum also outlines principles guiding the work of CISSA and 
functions of the cooperative body. Article 6 outlines the guiding principles as: 
a) Respect for the sanctity of human life and the need to prevent 
genocide, impunity and other crimes against humanity; 
b) Respect for democratic principles, human rights, the rule of law and 
good governance; 
c) Defence of the sovereignty and the independence of AU Member 
States 
d) Cooperation amongst intelligence and security services in pursuit of 
common security as defined in the Common African Defence and 
Security Policy of the AU. 
The principle of democratic governance and rule of law has already been 
raised and is an issue to which this discussion will return when considering 
the potential contribution of CISSA as a norm-setting institution. Given that 
this provision (b) is in the Memorandum, there is scope for CISSA to 
encourage the formalisation of intelligence services in Africa and to 
encourage the development of democratic governance structures. This would 
include legislation, oversight structures, mechanisms of control and controls 
on the use of intrusive methods of investigation.  
The second notable point about the principles of CISSA is the association with 
the AU, especially in defining itself within the context of common security and 
the Common African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP). In the Solemn 
Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy, security is 
defined in Section I (6) as follows: 
… ensuring the common security of Africa involves working on the 
basis of a definition which encompasses both the traditional state-
centric, notion of survival of the state and its protection by military 
means from external aggression, as well as the non-military notion 
which is informed by the new international environment and the high 
incidence of intra-state conflict. The causes of intra-state conflict 
necessitate a new emphasis on human security, based not only on 
political values but on social and political imperatives as well.  
The definition of security in the Solemn Declaration (Section I (6)) goes on to 
list the issues that the “newer, multi-dimensional notion of security” entails, 
including: 
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• Human rights 
• The right to participate fully in the process of governance 
• The right to equal development 
• The right to have access to resources and the basic necessities of life 
• The right to protection against poverty 
• The right to conducive education and health conditions 
• The right to protection against marginalisation on the basis of gender 
• Protection against natural disasters, as well as ecological and 
environmental degradation. 
Without going too much into an analysis of the CADSP, it is important to take 
note of the framework for common security that CISSA references. Firstly, the 
CADSP places human security at the core of the approach to common 
security, as reflected in the above extracts. However, the CADSP fails to 
translate this philosophy and the principle of inclusive security into meaningful 
policies and strategies. The key gap is informed by the failure to address the 
following question: if we accept that security is based on political and social 
imperatives, what is the role of traditional state security service providers in 
pursuing this human security agenda?  
The CADSP never really narrows the common security agenda down to the 
issues that require common defence and security structures, but rather 
presents a shopping list of issues that have to be addressed to achieve 
stability on the continent. These are as diverse as external aggression; 
genocide; impunity; unconstitutional changes of government; absence of 
popular participation and good governance; absence of the protection of 
human rights; discrimination on the basis of gender; failure to consolidate 
peace; refugees and internally displaced persons; pandemic diseases; 
environmental degradation; human trafficking; the adverse effect of 
globalisation and the dumping of chemical waste (to name but a few of the 
two page list of common security threats).  
In relation to this discussion, by framing its approach to security within the 
CADSP, CISSA is, theoretically, advancing a human security approach. This 
can be seen in a positive or negative light. On the one hand, it can be 
interpreted as acknowledging the broad nature of security and the need for 
national intelligence structures to serve the security needs of the people of the 
continent. On a more critical note, however, the manner in which the human 
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security approach is used to develop a shopping list of security threats allows 
the intelligence services of the continent to adopt a rather broad mandate and 
potentially utilise the intelligence tool for questionable means.  
In order to operationalise the human security approach, an assessment of the 
broad security risks needs to be presented, followed by an assessment of 
which actors have a role to play in mitigating the impact of these risks. Given, 
for example, that African states are vulnerable to the adverse effects of 
globalisation (as indicated in the CADSP), the role of intelligence in mitigating 
this vulnerability would need to be analysed. Such considerations would have 
to take place in order to align the tasking and activities of intelligence to 
national and regional security priorities. The broad and ill-defined approach is 
useful as it allows for room to manoeuvre and enables CISSA to navigate a 
variety of issues. This approach should be questioned, however. Having more 
detailed and focused intelligence efforts allows for specialisation and avoids 
duplication and unnecessary utilisation of resources; it crafts a precision tool 
for a precise purpose.  
Article 7 of the Memorandum details that CISSA shall perform functions in the 
following areas: 
a) Acquisition, processing, analysis and transmission of intelligence on 
any nature of threats 
b) Facilitate capacity building and harmonise approaches to common 
security threats 
c) Coordinate strategies to provide advice on appropriate courses of 
action 
d) Enhance the development of an African security doctrine in order to 
establish a common basis of study and analysis of harmful 
phenomenon and factors to the stability of Members. 
Michael Herman (2002:236) writes the following about possibilities for 
multinational intelligence machinery: 
Coalitions and international and regional institutions should concentrate 
on establishing supranational frameworks further downstream in the 
intelligence process; in producing ‘finished intelligence’, particularly at 
the final stage of (policy-free) assessment. Source protection here is 
less difficult, and the impact on policy-making and decision-taking 
greatest.  
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This would still be based on nations’ own collection and processing. 
Their intelligence services would not be sidelined, but doctrine and 
procedures would be developed for feeding their product into some 
form of supranational assessment. 
Herman’s vision and the conceptualisation of the functions of CISSA as per 
the Memorandum bear striking similarities. Dlomo (2009:3) highlights that 
CISSA is an intergovernmental organisation and not an intelligence service. 
This is not just a matter of semantics. CISSA is not tasked as an intelligence 
collection agency. As an intergovernmental body, the Secretariat of CISSA 
acquires information from national intelligence bodies and then processes and 
transmits such information. Theoretically, as posited by Herman and quoted 
above, this distinction is essential, as it allows for greater collaboration without 
infringing on the secretive and controversial arena of intelligence collection 
and the related issue of source protection. Chesterman (2006:8) observes 
that the prospects of any international organisation developing an 
independent intelligence collection capacity are remote. He attributes this to 
the understandable wariness on the part of states to authorise a body to spy 
on them and also to the larger anomaly in the status of intelligence as an 
activity commonly denounced but almost universally practised (Chesterman 
2006:8).  
Dlomo (2009:4) adds another dimension as to why CISSA should not be 
involved in covert collection. He explains as follows (Dlomo 2009:4): 
CISSA Members provide intelligence to the Secretariat based on the 
Continental Intelligence Production Schedule of CISSA. The 
Secretariat is therefore neither involved in clandestine intelligence 
collection nor in managing human, signals and technical sources of 
information. Whilst open source collection is part of its (the Secretariat) 
brief, the clandestine and secret collection functions are conducted by 
the individual services that are Members of CISSA. This is to enable 
the Secretariat to serve as a conflict resolution organ with clean hands, 
clear conscience and cool heads. The Secretariat can therefore easily 
help with the confidence-building initiatives when there is conflict or 
tension between Members. In this way, the CISSA Secretariat serves 
as an effective back channel of communication as provided for in its 
statutes.  
Thus, by situating CISSA as a platform for information sharing further down 
the line of the intelligence cycle, not only is the issue of covert collection and 
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source protection mitigated, but it also opens the space for consideration of 
other functions for CISSA to play.  
The Memorandum of Understanding, Article 8, establishes that CISSA has 
three permanent bodies namely: 
• The Conference 
• Panel of Experts 
• The Secretariat. 
Article 9 of the Memorandum outlines that the Conference consists of heads 
of intelligence and security services of the Members of CISSA meeting on an 
annual basis prior to the AU Assembly in order to advise the AU Commission 
Chairperson on matters relating to common security threats. The Conference 
is the primary tool for intelligence collaboration at a high level and it sets the 
framework in which cooperation and information sharing takes place. Article 
10 of the Memorandum establishes that the functions of the Conference are 
to: 
(a) Set the general policy guidelines for the CISSA and its institutions; 
(b) Task, receive, consider and take decisions on reports and 
recommendations from the Secretariat; 
(c) Deliberate on any matter referred to it by the AU Commission 
Chairperson; 
(d) Establish a databank for the purpose of exchange of intelligence; 
(e) Consider and adopt the budget of the CISSA; 
(f) Establish any other institution of the CISSA as may be required; 
(g) Select the Secretariat based on the AU principle of equitable 
regional representation. 
The Panel of Experts is composed of a representative of each member 
country (Article 11) as is tasked to inter alia (Article 12): 
• Advise the Conference on its activities 
• Prepare programmes and projects of the Conference; 
• Provide the machinery for coordinating and harmonising the 
programmes, projects and joint operations of the Conference; 
• Ensure the implementation of the decisions of the Conference. 
The third component of CISSA is the Secretariat. The Secretariat of CISSA is 
based in Addis Ababa near the Headquarters of the African Union. According 
to the Memorandum (Article 13), this geographical co-location is to enable 
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easy coordination with the Intelligence and Security Committee in the Office of 
the AU Commission Chairperson. The role of the Intelligence and Security 
Committee will be addressed in relation to the relationship between CISSA 
and the AU in the next section of this chapter.  
Returning to the Secretariat, Article 14 of the Memorandum outlines that the 
roles of the Secretariat are to: 
(a) Submit to the AU Commission Chairperson, through the Intelligence 
and Security Committee, the decisions and deliberations resulting 
from the Conferences; 
(b) Implement the deliberations, follow-up plans, monitor programs, 
actions and strategies of the Peace and Security Council of the AU 
regarding intelligence and security matters; 
(c) Promote the standardisation of data and concepts within the Peace 
and Security Council of the AU, pursuant to deliberations of the 
CISSA; 
(d) Collect data and intelligence from organs of intelligence and 
security services and other institutions of Members necessary for 
the production of studies, forecasts, assessments and perspectives 
of the overall situation in the framework of peace and stability 
monitoring in order to suggest actions necessary to eradicate 
factors of threat or tension; 
(e) Submit to the organs of intelligence and security of Members half-
yearly reports on the stance of the AU and extraordinary reports on 
any situation of any given region or sub-region under tension or 
conflict as well as the forecasts and likelihood of settlement 
(f) Fulfil any other task submitted by the AU Commission Chairperson 
and/ or by the Conference and report back; 
(g) House the database of the CISSA; 
(h) Initiate and manage the budget of the CISSA. 
The Secretariat manages the affairs of the CISSA and runs the headquarters 
of the organisation (Dlomo 2009:3). In terms of information sharing, the 
Secretariat plays a central role as CISSA Members provide intelligence to the 
Secretariat based on the Continental Intelligence Production Schedule of 
CISSA (Dlomo 2009:4). The CISSA Secretariat also fulfils an essential role as 
a conduit for communication and as a mediator. This role was highlighted by 
Dlomo (2009:4) in relation to the Secretariat not being involved in covert 
collection so as to enable it to function as a conflict resolution mechanism and 
for the Secretariat to support confidence-building initiatives.  
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In order to achieve the objectives set by the Memorandum, the Secretariat 
also undertakes field visits to interact with member states and to enable 
intelligence sharing. Dlomo (2009:4) explains that, because of existing 
bilateral cooperation agreements, it is a challenge for some member agencies 
to table written intelligence reports on each other, resulting in poor submission 
of intelligence to the Secretariat. “This obstacle is circumvented through field 
visits undertaken by the CISSA Secretariat that have become the most 
insightful method of intelligence sharing by CISSA Members with the 
Secretariat” (Dlomo 2009:4).  
The CISSA Secretariat has also adopted a broader collaboration role and has 
actively engaged with civil society and experts from outside of government. In 
2008, the representatives from the African Security Sector Network were 
invited to participate in some of the sessions of the annual CISSA Conference 
in Cape Town, South Africa. This was a first on the continent, as civil society 
engagement and participation in matters related to intelligence, especially 
from a governance and reform stance, is not a common phenomenon. 
The approach of engagement with civil society has extended to using external 
resource persons during CISSA workshops and seminars - as was the case 
during discussions on the implications of the International Criminal Court 
decision to issue a warrant of arrest against President Hassan Omar Al-Bashir 
(Dlomo 2009:5). The CISSA Secretariat also hosts seminars at the 
Headquarters in Addis Ababa, bringing experts and international partners to 
share their understandings of emerging security issues of mutual concern 
(Dlomo 2009:5). 
Interestingly, the open source mandate of the Secretariat that was referred to 
previously, has been operationalised in the form of an Early Warning Desk 
being established at CISSA Headquarters in Addis Ababa (Dlomo 2009:8). 
This is quite literally across the road from the AU Headquarters where the 
CEWS is hosted. This brings to the fore questions about the relationship 
between CISSA and the AU structures.  
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6. CISSA and the African Union 
The relationship between CISSA and the AU is based on commitments 
contained in the Memorandum of Understanding on the establishment of 
CISSA. In the preamble, it is stated that the parties to CISSA: 
• Resolved to operate within the framework of the Peace and Security 
Council of the AU and the Common African Defence and Security 
Policy; 
• Acknowledged the need for more efficacious and efficient intelligence 
for the Peace and Security Council of the AU in its deliberations, action 
and adoption of conflict prevention, management and resolution 
strategies; 
• Reaffirmed commitment to the Constitutive Act of the AU and UN 
Charter principles and the standards of international law. 
Furthermore, the Memorandum provides that the mandate of CISSA is based 
on the Constitutive Act of the AU as well as the Protocol Relating to the 
Establishment of the Peace and Security Council. The Memorandum also 
places the AU Commission Chairperson as the primary end-user.  
There are no clear lines of reporting between CISSA and the AU, nor is the 
formal relationship between CISSA and AU structures clearly defined. The 
second bullet point above seems to indicate that CISSA was designed to fulfil 
an information gap at the level of the PSC – an information gap that the 
CEWS was also designed to fill.  
At the Fourth Ordinary Session of the Assembly of the AU, in Abuja, Nigeria, 
in January 2005, CISSA was recognised and collaboration between CISSA 
and the AU was agreed upon (AU 2005:12). The Abuja decision also creates 
an Intelligence and Security Committee, located in the Office of the 
Chairperson of the AU Commission, to receive reports from CISSA (AU 
2005:12). Article 16 of the Memorandum of CISSA also provides for formal 
relationships between CISSA and Regional Intelligence and Security 
Committees. The general aim of these Committees seems to be to provide a 
conduit for communication between CISSA and the regional bodies.  
The relationship between the AU and CISSA is predicated on supplier-client 
relations in which CISSA operates as a conduit to enable the transmission of 
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intelligence from national agencies to the multilateral body for continental 
security decision-making. The lack of processes and systems to enable the 
sharing of intelligence from national to multilateral level has been identified as 
a source of concern at the level of the UN (see for example Chesterman 
2006). In this regard, the establishment of a mechanism to enable and 
facilitate the transmission of information from national intelligence agencies to 
a regional organisation is a global first. Having access to such information 
should enable more informed decision-making at the AU. There are, however, 
serious concerns about manipulation and the potential of stronger states to 
subvert decision-making at the AU through the provision of intelligence biased 
towards national interest. Chesterman (2006:72) provides a good summation 
of the potentials for increased intelligence cooperation at multilateral levels: 
Better intelligence and analysis will not, of course, guarantee better 
decisions – either at the international level or domestically…The test 
should not be, however, whether reforms will prevent great powers from 
pursuing foreign policy objectives decided at the highest levels of 
government. Rather, more effective use of intelligence would lay a 
foundation for more effective use of the multilateral forum, making it harder 
for states participating in that forum to ignore emerging crisis or embrace 
unworkable policies. Over time, it may also encourage greater cooperation 
between states to address those threats that no one state – even the most 
powerful – can address alone.  
7. Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to outline the concept of international 
intelligence cooperation and then to outline CISSA as a mechanism to enable 
cooperation between national intelligence structures in Africa. The aim was 
not to analyse in detail the manner in which CISSA can contribute to regional 
security, but rather to provide the platform from which that analysis can be 
drawn in the next chapter. The context in which international intelligence 
cooperation has become important was discussed before the objectives and 
role of CISSA was further elaborated. The formal relationship between CISSA 
and the AU was also briefly presented.   
Although the preceding two chapters have adopted, out of a necessity drawn 
from the research design, a descriptive and somewhat technical approach, 
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both CEWS and CISSA have the potential to provide normative, strategic and 
operational support for the continental peace and security ambitions. This will 
be explored further in the following chapter.    
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Chapter 6 – Potential Operational Strengths and Weaknesses 
of the Continental Early Warning System and Committee of 
Intelligence and Security Services of Africa  
1. Introduction 
In the two preceding chapters, descriptive analyses of the CEWS and CISSA 
were provided and the main issues informing the development of an early 
warning and intelligence sharing capacity were introduced. The aim of this 
chapter is to explore the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS 
and CISSA by drawing on international and continental experiences with early 
warning and intelligence sharing to elucidate potential opportunities and 
challenges. It presents an exploration of potential operational challenges 
based on the choices that have been made in terms of design and processes.  
The CEWS and CISSA are relatively young institutions with limited 
operational experience and limited available information about operational 
successes and challenges. The approach adopted is to explore the manner in 
which the CEWS and CISSA may contribute to regional security based on an 
understanding of some of the operational challenges that are faced by early 
warning and intelligence in general. This chapter explores the implications of 
the design of the CEWS and CISSA on the potential contributions to regional 
security. A conceptual and contextual analysis of the strengths and 
weaknesses of early warning and intelligence more generically is presented, 
after which the role of early warning and intelligence in the context of regional 
security in Africa is explored within the theoretical framework proposed in 
Chapter 2 – particularly in relation to epistemic community and security 
community theories.  
2. The Continental Early Warning System 
The notion of a continental early warning system for Africa started to gain 
currency in the 1990s, and nearly two decades later the system is only 
partially operational with actual links to conflict prevention difficult to ascertain. 
Evaluating the success or impact of early warning is a matter of much 
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international contention. As Alexander Austin (2004:13) observed, early 
warning is faced by substantial, possibly unobtainable, evaluation criteria. “In 
few other fields, is there such a success criteria as high and ideal as peace or 
the prevention of conflict” (Austin 2004:13).   
This problem of measuring the success of early warning systems is tied to the 
larger problems of methodology and theory that surround the concept of early 
warning. Even in terms of definition and purpose, the notion of early warning 
sways between the production of analytically sound and timely reports to 
broader purpose of preventing violent conflict. These two perspectives were 
introduced in Chapter 4 through definitions of early warning by Davies and 
Austin. Davies (2000:1) underscored that the goal of early warning can be 
conceived as minimising the impact of violence, deprivation or humanitarian 
crises that threaten the sustainability of human development. Whereas Austin 
(2004:2) focused on early warning as “any initiative that focuses on systemic 
data collection, analysis and/ or formulation of recommendations including risk 
assessment and information sharing, regardless of topic.”  
Nyheim (2008:15) notes that there are two schools of thought on the purpose 
of early warning. The first is that early warning should serve as a tool to 
predict the outbreak or escalation of conflict (Nyheim 2008:15). The 
alternative position is that early warning should be linked to strong response 
mechanisms and advocacy efforts at national, regional and international 
levels (Nyheim 2008:16). The difference between these two approaches 
frames the manner in which success and challenges are cast. On the one 
hand, early warning is about producing reports; on the other it is about taking 
action.  
On his popular conflict early warning and early response blog, Patrick Meier 
(2009a) relates the following exchange at an academic conference after a 
presentation on the CEWS: 
When I asked what their measurement of success for CEWS was, the 
answer confirmed my concerns: “The success of CEWS is measured 
by the number of regular, high-quality early warning reports issued per 
year.” 
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“So not operational response, then?” I asked. “No,” the panellist 
confirmed. 
In the context of CEWS, the primary function of the early warning system is to 
“facilitate the anticipation and prevention of conflicts” (PSC Protocol Article 
12(1)). According to the Roadmap for the Operationalisation of the CEWS, the 
purpose of the CEWS “is the provision of timely advice on potential conflicts 
and threats to peace and security and to enable the development of 
appropriate response strategies to prevent or limit the destructive effects of 
violent conflict” (AU 2008:66). The aim of CEWS can therefore be formulated 
as the production of reports to enable response strategies. The focus is on the 
products and not on the impact thereof. In their analysis of the CEWS, Wulf 
and Debiel (2009:15) offer a similar opinion: “The main instruments of the 
CEWS are reports, compiled on the basis of open source information that 
identifies potentially dangerous activity. These reports are the basis for the 
Peace and Security Council decisions.”  
The focus of CEWS on reporting as opposed to response is probably the 
result of a combination of practical and political considerations. In a review of 
early warning systems and tools for the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, Development Assistance Commission, Nyheim 
(2008:31) highlights the following challenges faced by inter-governmental 
early warning systems: 
• Member states’ sensitivity around the monitoring of violent conflict and 
state fragility, as well as sensitivities of labelling states “conflict prone” 
or “fragile”; 
• Political interference and manipulation of analyses prepared because 
of political sensitivities of member states; 
• Lack of conviction among high-level decision-makers about the value 
of early warning. 
The inherently and intricately political nature of early warning, in particular, 
and peace and security issues in general lies at the heart of the practical 
challenges facing the full operationalisation of CEWS and the realisation of 
the full potential contribution to regional security. The challenge for the CEWS 
and the AU in terms of realising the conflict prevention, management and 
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resolution mandate lies in the scale of task before them. Instability, conflict 
and poor governance dominate large swathes of the continent. The same 
leaders who have to face instability and allegations of illegitimacy at home are 
tasked with confronting continental peace and security issues, leading some 
to question whether any true commitment to peace and security can be 
expected from the leaders of Africa. Wulf and Debiel (2009:29) point to this 
fundamental problem: 
Usually, governments are quite aware of acute or emerging major 
conflicts. Often they themselves are the cause of this conflict. 
Sophisticated early warning indicators are not needed to warn about 
such conflicts. However, governments are not usually interested in the 
fact that their abuses of civil rights and the violation of human rights are 
documented or acted upon. Thus, despite mandating secretariats of 
regional organisations, this might only be lip service. In practice, certain 
governments make sure that the relevant regional bodies remain weak 
in early warning, thereby preventing early response.  
In an interview conducted in 2009 with a staff member11 at the Situation Room 
of the CEWS in Addis Ababa, the following operational challenges were 
discussed: 
(a) Limited analytical capacity 
(b) Financial constraints 
(c) Limitations on information communication technology (ICT) 
capacity which influences the capacity to disseminate reports. 
The ICT, resource and skills constraints impede the ability of the CEWS to 
develop quality early warning products and then to ensure that the reports 
reach a broad target audience. This is a matter of investment. In 2008, the 
European Parliament commissioned a study on the CEWS and concluded 
that the CEWS is understaffed and underfunded and thus seriously 
constrained in its activity (quoted in Wulf & Debiel 2009:15). Since the 
inception of CEWS under the OAU, the early warning system has been 
inordinately dependent on funding from non-African states in the international 
community. In a 2005 paper, Jakkie Cilliers estimated that roughly 70 per cent 
of contributions towards CEWS came from non-African sources. Cilliers 
(2005) also pointed out that by mid-2002 the Division for Conflict Management                                                         
11 Alemayehu Behabtu, 24 June 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
 
 
 
 
  128 
had 41 positions – 13 financed by the OAU, 11 by the UNDP and 16 directly 
by donors.  
However, it is not necessarily in the products of early warning that the 
potential contribution of early warning to regional security should be viewed, 
but rather the manner in which the process of early warning affects social 
dynamics. Early warning is not prophecy (Matveeva 2006:7). “Rather, it is a 
political tool for engagement, and ultimately its value lies in the extent to 
which it helps to prevent or mitigate conflict” (Matveeva 2006:7).  
In the African context, early warning systems can provide an opportunity for 
long-term conflict prevention through providing a platform for participatory 
governance. Early warning systems are one of the few mechanisms on the 
continent that have been designed from the start with the involvement of civil 
society and academia, and the role of non-governmental actors is built into 
the operational concepts as reflected in Chapter 4. Von Keyserlingk and 
Kopfmüller (2006:17) observe that an early warning system provides a 
structured framework for the free-flow of information from various sources to 
create a cooperative network of people and institutions. As such there is 
scope to consider the CEWS as a network of state and non-state actors 
committed to conflict prevention and the encouragement of peaceful change. 
The notion of CEWS as providing a platform for participation should be further 
explored as a potential operational success. According to Von Keyserlingk 
and Kopfmüller (2006:10), conflict early warning systems can work as 
capacity building engines to empower people at grassroots level and for 
facilitating transparent interaction between government and civil society. Due 
to the highly sensitive nature of peace and security issues on the continent 
and the governance deficits associated with internal conflict in many states, 
there is no tradition of strong civil society participation. 
Furthermore, the notion of participation as represented here can be seen as a 
positive contribution towards creating a civic culture as a pillar of building a 
security community. The notion of a ‘civic culture’ as described by Adler 
(1998:182) embodies the creation of strong civil societies “which promote 
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community bonds and a common identity through the relatively free 
interpenetration of societies, particularly the movement and exchange of 
people, goods and ideas.” 
It is within the open source nature of early warning that the potential benefits 
thereof lie. Open source information is sharable - information collected by one 
organisation can easily be shared with another (Pallaris 2008:2). Reports can 
travel from Accra to Gaborone to Addis quickly and easily. Information is also 
not restricted to government employees and reports can be shared with non-
state actors that might be in a position to act on it - for example, humanitarian 
organisations offering refugee support and grassroots civil society 
organisations. This is where the real value of open source information lies: it 
can be used to inform the public of serious threats and could mitigate the 
effects of violent conflict. Early warning reports can also provide a platform for 
advocacy and can function as a means to monitor the commitments of 
national and regional actors to peace and security and the responsibility to 
protect.  
The argument being forwarded is that the CEWS has the potential to make 
positive contributions to regional security at both the community and regional 
levels. As explained by Monama (2008:88), for early warning to be effective, it 
requires an interactive, multi-sectoral approach and multilateral systems that 
facilitate cooperation. Early warning “should not be an exclusive preserve of 
bureaucratic institutions, but a communal and collective responsibility” 
(Monama 2008:88). This notion of collaboration with international, sub-
regional and non-state entities is enshrined in the PSC Protocol establishing 
the CEWS. The Protocol states that the effective functioning of the CEWS will 
be facilitated through collaboration with the UN and its agencies, other 
relevant international organisations, research centres, academic institutions 
and non-governmental organisations (PSC Protocol Article 12(3)).  
The collaboration between the CEWS and other actors, particularly at sub-
national level, needs to be more than just for input into the system. Monama 
(2008:95) presents a commonly observed perspective that, in order to 
reinforce the strategic response of international organisations to violent 
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conflict, “it requires a multiple perspective approach from a range of sources 
in a networked interaction to derive knowledge about ‘where, when and how 
to engage’ in preventative action.” One of the views being advanced here is 
that for conflict prevention and regional security to move from the realm of 
ideals and continental aspirations, will require the building of a vibrant 
engaged and empowered civic culture and societies that are able to access 
and/ or initiate conflict prevention, management and resolution at community 
levels. For this to happen, people require access to information – a role that 
the CEWS could theoretically fulfil. Matveeva (2006:36) provides, amongst 
others, the following strengths of civil-society based early warning systems: 
• Civil society can address and act upon certain problems in which 
policy-makers cannot get involved because of political sensitivity; 
• Civil society organisations (CSOs) can capitalise on the strengths of 
individuals and groups that already exist by using local knowledge and 
coping techniques to help prevent conflict or escalation; 
• CSOs can cross-fertilise experiences from different regions and bring 
peace-building knowledge from one conflict zone to another; 
• They can facilitate dialogue between affected people and those with an 
immediate responsibility to protect; 
• CSOs can serve as an accountability mechanism; 
• CSOs can act faster than formal actors as soon as potential for conflict 
has been identified. 
There is, however, a problem with bridging the information divide between 
communities in Africa and the governments that hold on quite closely to 
security related information. Gibson (2005:29) observes that the availability 
and interpretation of information exposes the simple truth that governments 
have been operating on behalf of their cosseted elites rather than their 
populations and that politicians have generally run out of ideas beyond self-
preservation.  
There is an inherent danger that free flows of information will alter patterns of 
complex interdependence (See for example Keohane & Nye 1998:85). From 
the perspective of some governments faced with increased gaps between 
political and economic elites and the majority of the population, the survival of 
the ruling regime could be threatened by an active, organised and 
empowered society able to take responsibility for conflict prevention, 
management and resolution. Indeed it could work counter to the objectives of 
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powerful interests if civilians are forewarned about potential attacks or abuses 
and better prepared to take evasive action. It is, as Keohane and Nye 
(1998:85) predicted, a matter in which existing political structures will shape 
the flows of information and thus the potential impact of the CEWS on 
regional security. Furthermore, the capacity of civil society and local 
populations to prevent conflict should not be over-emphasised – there is a 
role for CSOs, but one should be realistic about expectations in this regard.  
Outside of the potential to consider that the CEWS could be wired towards 
communities at risk and could serve as a platform for improved local response 
to conflict situations, the value of the CEWS to regional security also needs to 
be considered in terms of the relationship between the CEWS and the AU. As 
raised in the previous section, there is the potential for considering that the 
CEWS should be the central information platform of the AU and should serve 
broader decision-making purposes than just the Peace and Security Council. 
This seems to be the vision for the Situation Room, as, according to 
information provided by a staff member in the Situation Room12, the 
objectives are: 
• To collect and provide timely information relating to potential, actual 
conflicts and post-conflict activities; 
• To provide reports on specific issues on request from the decision 
makers in the AU Commission; 
• To provide the AU Headquarters with a 24/7-mission-wide 
information gathering and dissemination capacity; 
• To serve as a Point-of-Contact and Communication Room for the 
Peace and Security Department of the AU Commission. 
The vision of the role of the Situation Room as captured above seems to 
indicate movement towards being the information hub of the AU 
Headquarters. This is difficult terrain to navigate, as on the one hand there 
should be no obstacle to sharing information on conflict and potential conflict 
situations throughout the AU in order to develop common platforms of 
understanding and interpretation of events. On the other hand, this broader 
role could create problems when developing targeted policy 
recommendations. The danger is that the Situation Room will become nothing 
more than a news-clipping service for the AU Headquarters and a                                                         
12 Alemayehu Behabtu, 24 June 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
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communications centre for the Conflict Management Division. An indication of 
the dilution of the Situation Room, and in effect the CEWS, towards these 
kinds of functions can be drawn from the information pamphlet distributed by 
the Situation Room which defines its information dissemination functions as: 
• To serve as a communication unit, at which the official e-mail and fax 
messages of the Conflict Management Division are dispatched and 
received; 
• To disseminate communiqués and press releases, prepared by the 
Commission or emanating from the AU Peace and Security Council to 
Member States, media agencies and other relevant recipients. 
In summary, the CEWS has the potential to make a positive contribution to 
regional security in two spheres – at community and at regional level. At the 
core both contributions should be interpreted within the overarching 
framework of the evolution towards a security community. Thus the aim of 
conflict prevention is served through creating common meanings and 
understandings as the basis for the practice of peace. This broader framework 
of the security community was presented in Chapter 2 and is further reflected 
upon below. 
Adler and Barnett (1998:37) present a three-tiered approach to the 
development of security communities as a means to “isolate the conditions 
under which the development of a community produces dependable 
expectations of peaceful change.” In the context of Africa, evidence can be 
drawn to support the development of a security community at the levels of 
Tiers One and Two. At Tier One, Adler and Barnett (1998:37-38) explain that, 
because of exogenous or endogenous factors, states begin to orient 
themselves in each other’s direction and desire to coordinate their relations. 
As discussed in Chapter 2, the foundations of Pan-Africanism and the desire 
for African unity in the immediate post-colonial era provided the context for the 
development of new social bonds.  
The three-tiered approach to the development of security communities can be 
diagrammatically represented as follows: 
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Table 3: The development of a security community (adapted from Adler and Barnett, 
1998:38) 
 
 
TIER ONE 
 
TIER TWO 
 
TIER THREE 
Precipitating 
conditions 
Factors conducive 
to the development 
of mutual trust and 
collective identity 
Necessary 
conditions of 
dependable 
expectations of 
peaceful change 
 
• Change in 
technology, 
demography, 
economics, the 
environment 
• Development of 
new 
interpretations 
of social reality 
• External threats 
 
Structure: 
 
• Power 
• Knowledge 
 
Process: 
 
• Transactions 
• Organisations 
• Social learning 
Mutual trust 
Collective identity 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependable 
expectations of 
peaceful change 
 
At Tier Two, “states and their peoples have become involved in a series of 
social interactions that have begun to transform the environment in which they 
are embedded” (Adler & Barnett 1998:39). The contention in this dissertation 
is the regional security as embodied by the AU, finds resonance with the 
characteristics of this second tier on the path to the realisation of a security 
community. The manner, in which the CEWS is understood as having the 
potential to contribute to regional security, is analysed in terms of potential 
contributions to enhance the development of a security community at this 
level.  
The CEWS can be interpreted as operating at both structural and process 
levels – to use Adler and Barnett’s distinction. Information has both structural 
and process characteristics, as it not only shapes interactions as part of a 
structural context, but also transforms interactions through transactional and 
learning processes. In the context of the CEWS, early warning information 
has the potential to shape interactions in the form of knowledge as well as to 
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shape collective experience through exchanges of information and social 
learning.  
It is through exploiting the advantages of open source information that the 
CEWS can reach its potential. Sharing reports from the CEWS within the AU, 
Member States and Regional Economic Communities could enable collective 
understandings and create the necessary commitment to enable collective 
responses. As Adler and Barnett (1998:40) explain, part of what constitutes 
and constrains state action is the knowledge that represents categories of 
practical action and legitimate activity. Knowledge as a cognitive structure in 
terms of shared meanings and understandings creates a framework, which 
promotes policy coordination or a shared response.  
At regional and national level, the CEWS has the potential to play a role in 
creating a particular set of ideas that can generate impetus for action. The 
CEWS also represents part of the operationalisation of the regional 
commitment to conflict prevention, management and resolution, which finds 
voice in the instruments of the regional security architecture including the 
African Standby Force and the Panel of the Wise. The full operationalisation 
of the CEWS as part of the commitment to conflict prevention needs to be 
empirically demonstrated before the causal link between the idea of early 
warning and the action of conflict prevention can be asserted. The influence of 
the CEWS as a source of knowledge within the structural context of security 
community evolution needs to be empirically evidenced before the 
achievement of this potential contribution to regional security can be realised. 
At this time, such evidence is limited due to the current status of 
operationalisation of the CEWS.  
In terms of contributing to the development of a security community through 
the process variable at Tier Two level, the CEWS functions on the 
transactional level and also as an instrument to enable social learning. As a 
means to enable exchange of information, the CEWS facilitates 
communication between various actors. Such communication can influence 
the definition of identities and interests  - “qualitative and quantitative growth 
of transactions reshapes collective experience and alters social facts” (Adler & 
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Barnett 1998:41). The flows of information between stakeholders of the 
CEWS at national, sub-regional and continental levels can in and of 
themselves affect change. The crux, however, lies in the transformation of 
communication links and changes in the social environment into political 
reality and changes in institutional and political power. This highlights the 
centrality of social learning as “an active process of redefinition or 
reinterpretation of reality – what people consider real, possible and desirable 
– on the basis of new casual and normative knowledge” (Adler & Barnett 
1998:43).  
According to Adler and Barnett (1998:44), social learning plays a critical role 
in the emergence of security communities and is facilitated by transactions 
that typically occur in organisational settings. Adler and Barnett (1998:44) 
explain: 
First, during their transactions and social exchanges, people 
communicate to each other their self-understandings, perceptions of 
reality, and their normative expectations. As a result, there can occur 
changes in individual and collective understandings and 
values…Second, learning often occurs in institutionalized settings. 
Institutions promote the diffusion of meanings from country to country, 
may play and active role in the cultural and political selection of similar 
normative and epistemic understandings in different countries, and 
may help to transmit shared understanding from generation to 
generation.      
A hypothesis presented here and theoretically validated, is that the CEWS 
can contribute to social learning and to the realisation of regional security as 
embodied by a security community. However, in addition to viewing the 
CEWS as a mechanism for social learning within the AU, there is the potential 
for early warning information to be utilised by a wider audience inclusive of 
non-state actors. There are two areas in which the CEWS can be seen to 
have a potentially positive effect on regional security – both centrally 
concerned with the diffusion of information and ideas. The first is at the level 
of the AU and Member States, where the role of the CEWS has been detailed 
above with reference to Adler and Barnett’s three-tier approach to the 
development of a security community. As an institutionalised entity, the 
practice of information generation, analysis and dissemination will impact on 
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the peace and security architecture through enabling knowledge and social 
learning.  
The other important aspect is that, because of the open source and 
information sharing nature of early warning, the CEWS creates a platform for 
greater participation of civil society. Such participation could extend beyond 
inputs into the CEWS, as reports from the CEWS could potentially also be 
utilised as tools for advocacy and monitoring. Meier (2007:33) notes that a 
genuine change in discourse towards people-centred early warning and 
response would be far more effective and significantly less expensive. He 
further highlights that preventing violent conflict requires not merely identifying 
causes and testing policy instruments, but also building social and political 
movements – the task of advocating for response cannot be separated from 
the analytical tasks of warning (Meier 2007:34). Thus, Meier situates 
communication as central to conflict prevention.  
Communication – the collection and dissemination of information – cannot be 
limited to state and inter-state level. The potential for the CEWS to have a 
positive impact on regional security will be predicated on the ability to serve 
multiple stakeholders - a task particularly suitable to an open source 
information system. Stimulating social learning at local, national and regional 
levels could transform social systems and build more resilient and responsive 
systems for conflict prevention. Response activities are a collaborative effort 
and should involve a variety of actors at different levels and sectors (von 
Keyserlingk & Kopfmüller 2006:17).   
3. The Committee of Intelligence and Security Services of Africa 
At the heart of the potential role of CISSA in contributing to regional security 
are fundamental questions about the nature and functions of intelligence in 
Africa. For CISSA to be a mechanism in service of continental peace and 
security, the association of intelligence with covert action and repressive 
regimes needs to be overcome. Intelligence is too often “seen as an 
instrument of power and ideology, inherently threatening; an instrument of 
internal state power, or part of the power of rich states over poor ones” 
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(Herman 2002:237). What is needed is an intellectual shift where it concerns 
intelligence, emphasising support for international purposes – and in this case 
for African peace and security - and increased legitimacy (Herman 2002:239). 
This means that intelligence would have to be developed as a professional 
field of study and activity - not at all dissimilar from other experts and analysts. 
To give meaning to this, intelligence agencies on the continent would have to 
align themselves with standards of behaviour, appropriate levels of authority 
and restrictions on and sanctions for unbecoming behaviour. This would form 
the basis of changing the morally questionable image of intelligence and 
would also have positive broader democratic governance benefits.  
CISSA has the potential to play an increasingly important role in this regard, 
as Dlomo explains (2009:9-10): 
Topical issues, such as Security Sector Reform or Development, are 
discussed at a multilateral level to ensure a common understanding 
and approach to them. It is during these discussions that democratic 
governance of intelligence becomes a hotly debated topic. Many 
valuable lessons are learnt during these robust debates which are quite 
informative on the thinking of CISSA Members and the fears that they 
may harbour. In most instances the debates tend to lead to requests 
for presentation of papers by the Secretariat and capacity building 
initiatives through Workshops aimed at unifying the understanding and 
approaches of CISSA to contested issues.  
Through such exchanges as well as consultations and dialogues with civil 
society representatives (as mentioned in Chapter 5), CISSA provides a ‘safe’ 
environment in which the highly contentious issue of democratic governance 
of intelligence can be discussed. It is widely accepted that democratic 
governance of the intelligence sector, as part of the broader security sector, is 
part of a broader peace and security agenda. This is encapsulated by Bryden 
et al (2008:3-4): 
At the heart of the African insecurity story is a breakdown in 
governance systems due in large part to rule by patronage and the 
associated misuse of governmental instruments of coercion to entrench 
political and social exclusion. At best, while maintaining a façade of 
viability and stability, this situation has created state repression of local 
populations under authoritarian regimes…At worst, it has led to the 
outbreak of armed conflict and humanitarian tragedy. An underlying 
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argument is that only a fundamental shift in the way security is 
conceived and the pursuit of a governance agenda that puts citizens at 
the centre of security planning and provision can mould these states 
into stable and secure environments where development can thrive.   
Through CISSA issues such as democratic governance, legislation and 
controls on the use of intrusive methods could be discussed. There is the 
possibility that CISSA can contribute towards the development of a 
professional community of practice amongst intelligence practitioners that is 
based on commonly accepted codes of conduct. This could include aspects 
such as legislation and legislative oversight. Dlomo (2009:12) captures this 
notion: 
Although some of the African intelligence and security services are still 
perceived as a source of threat rather than of security by their people 
and that they tend to emphasise the narrow conception of national 
security with a predominant focus and pre-occupation with regime 
security rather than human security, this situation is changing. The 
legacy of the Cold War and more recently the War on Terror, is being 
replaced by the democratization movement in Africa. The principles of 
CISSA and the commitment of 47 Members of this organisation are 
significant but modest steps in that direction.  
The real question about the success and challenges of the operationalisation 
of CISSA is whether or not intelligence in Africa will serve a national or 
continental security goal. Possibly, as argued elsewhere and encapsulated in 
the Common African Defence and Security Pact, national and continental 
security bears more similarities than distinctions. Therefore, intelligence 
serving the purposes of national security has to take regional security into 
account. The focus on national security, so closely tied to the very nature of 
intelligence, has a negative connotation more associated with the security of 
the ruling regime than the security of the territory and its people (see for 
example Herman 2002:237). It could be preferable to operate not from a 
notion of security but from the notion of policy; intelligence does not serve 
national security interests, but rather foreign policy interests. Thus, if foreign 
policy dictates prioritisation of regional security, the objectives and priorities of 
the intelligence services will be subordinated to the interests of national 
foreign policy and therefore to the pursuit of regional security (Shebarshin 
2000:77). 
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Following this logic, the distinction between national and regional security may 
even become redundant, as CISSA can be situated rather as a platform for 
confidence building and information sharing. As such, questions then need to 
be asked about the impact of intelligence on national behaviour and the 
manner in which that impact will be influenced through collaboration. The key 
issue here would be to consider the operational strength of CISSA in terms of 
creating a platform for the sharing of ideas and information and forging 
common understanding. Dlomo (2009:9) explains: 
The strength of CISSA is its ability to bring together African and 
international intelligence officers to reflect on the developments in the 
intelligence field and share ideas on what is to be done by the 
collective and by individual Members. It is a stage where best practice 
is canvassed and ideas garnered.  
Not only does this have the potential to have positive effects on 
professionalism and governance, but such sharing of ideas and information 
can also create common platforms of understanding about intentions and 
actions. The platform provided by CISSA and the function of international 
intelligence collaboration here is to reduce uncertainty and to reduce the 
effect of misperception. Michael Herman (2008:369) notes that the 
predominant effect of misperception is to reduce international security. 
“Intelligence as considered here provides some antidote to misperception-
induced insecurity between states” (Herman 2008:369).  
There is an additional element to the potential operational strength of CISSA: 
as a platform for engagement, created through long-term investment in 
confidence-building, the relationships between intelligence practitioners 
become based on mutual respect and a degree of trust. Thus, CISSA is able 
to function as an additional channel of communication in times of insecurity 
and can function as a conduit for back door diplomacy. This is similar to the 
notion of reducing misperception and can enable negotiation and even 
dispute resolution. In the conflicts in Northern Ireland and South Africa, 
intelligence agencies were utilised as points of contact between opposing 
forces to initiate communication, which laid the foundation for further 
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negotiation between rival leaders (see for example Sanders 2006:301). As 
Shebarshin (2000:79) notes: 
Intelligence services have been actively, though silently, participating in 
all major and minor international conflicts. They did not always succeed, 
which meant bloodshed and material expense. Their potential was not 
fully utilized. 
A final observation on operational strengths of CISSA is that, by being 
removed from the AU, collaboration on sensitive security issues could be 
enabled. Not part of the AU, CISSA may not be prone to the bureaucratic 
inadequacies that plague the regional body. Decision-making and agenda 
setting may be easier and less politicised, as practitioners rather than 
politicians will be making decisions about the collaborative agenda. This does 
however point to the one major operational challenge when considering the 
contribution of CISSA to regional security: CISSA is not formally part of the 
continental peace and security architecture.  
The relationship between CISSA and the AU and the very manner in which 
CISSA came into being outside of the continental peace and security 
architecture could be interpreted as indicative of the elitist, secretive and 
closed nature of the intelligence community. It is almost characteristic of 
intelligence to operate outside of the usual security sector parameters.  A 
cynical view would hold that the establishment of CISSA was in part the 
intelligence services ensuring that they continue to occupy a central position 
in security affairs as the emphasis moved from national to regional structures. 
However, the real question is: How does the relationship between CISSA and 
the AU affect the operational behaviour of the mechanism? CISSA operates 
outside of any system of controls other than at national level. The tasking and 
setting of continental intelligence priorities is determined by the Conference, 
and accountability is provided through a system of internal controls (see 
Dlomo 2009:7-10). This means that the priorities of CISSA reflect a process of 
negotiated national priorities, which takes place among the Directors-General 
of the various agencies. As such, the views of dominant states could easily 
affect the continental intelligence agenda. Furthermore, the tasking does not 
reflect the priorities or coordination with the agenda of the AU. It is rather a 
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sideshow – setting its own agenda and tasking and then communicating with 
the regional body (see for example Dlomo 2009:7-10). This arrangement 
could provide CISSA with some insulation from the political haranguing that 
tends to haunt regional organisations or it could call into question the motives, 
aspirations and intentions of the collective intelligence mechanism.  
The issue of international intelligence cooperation received much attention in 
the post-Cold War and the post-9/11 globalised security context. Cooperation 
between states to combat transnational threats, as was argued in Chapter 5, 
has formed the basis of international intelligence efforts. Similar to Herman, 
Shebarshin (2000:78) cautions that intelligence cooperation has certain built-
in parameters:  
The cooperation of intelligence services is possible only in those fields 
where the interests of their respective states coincide, which happens 
rarely enough and practically never in full measure…Thus, one may speak 
only about cooperation between some services in some matters. Even 
with the best and closest relations between the services, their cooperation 
extends, as a rule, to the exchange of information, joint analysis and 
estimate of certain situations, sometimes to operational support, i.e. it is 
limited to areas removed from the heart of every service - its sources. The 
inherent secrecy of the intelligence work puts natural limits to the closest 
cooperation.   
The importance of the secrecy of sources limits the extent to which 
intelligence agencies will cooperate. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
this is something that CISSA has taken on board. As much as secrecy could 
be an operational weakness when considering intelligence collaboration, by 
not infringing on national collection processes, CISSA is attempting to 
navigate these treacherous waters. Collaboration on open source collection 
(such as the envisaged Early Warning Desk at the Secretariat), exchange of 
information, joint analysis and possible operational support, are the realms of 
traditional intelligence in which CISSA can function.   
Another possible challenge facing CISSA is that sharing information does not 
come naturally to intelligence agencies. There is an inherent contradiction 
between the need to share information (i.e. openness) and the need to keep 
information (i.e. secrecy). Intelligence agencies are not created for sharing 
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information. The idea of sharing intelligence between national governments 
and regional organisations requires a seismic shift in attitudes and practices 
on all sides (Boatner 2000:84). Helene Boatner (2000) documents some of 
her experience with the Central Intelligence Agency as support to the US 
Mission to the UN. She deals extensively with intelligence sharing in the 
context of international organisations and the challenges associated with 
relationships between international organisations and national intelligence 
structures. The following lessons can be drawn from her experiences (Boatner 
2000:88-91): 
• It is the unity of purpose engendered by outlaw behavior that makes 
nations willing to share even some quite sensitive intelligence 
information; 
• Member states should strive to provide as much intelligence as 
possible to an international organisation before an irreversible 
commitment is made, and a structure should be in place for 
accomplishing this; 
• It is generally wise to assume that information given to an international 
organisation is potentially available to all its members before long; 
• If the products are of sufficient importance to justify sharing, they 
should be released to the international organisation with as much 
supporting data as possible; 
• Any international organisation that has a need for intelligence also has 
a need for an analytic element to serve its senior officials and provide 
both the organisational leadership and the member states with an 
overview that supplements the national views put forth by members; 
• Working in an international environment is harder than working in a 
national one. 
Developing a relationship between CISSA and the AU may be one of the 
hurdles facing the operationalisation of a collaborative intelligence capacity. 
Such a relationship needs to be built on mutual trust and respect. CISSA has 
provided a structure in order to facilitate the provision of intelligence to the AU 
in order to inform actions and commitments, but the manner in which the 
relationship develops could determine the effect of CISSA on decision-making 
at the AU.  
In an interview13 with the Executive Secretary of CISSA conducted in 2009, 
the possibility of CISSA one day becoming an organ of the AU was                                                         
13 Dennis Nkosi Dlomo, 25June 2009, Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 
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recognised. In the opinion of the Executive Secretary, it is too soon to 
consider such a move, as there is a general lack of respect for intelligence 
products as the basis of decision-making in Africa and there is no culture of 
respecting the value of intelligence. By keeping CISSA slightly separated from 
the AU, confidence building has been able to take place and relationships 
have been developed between practitioners without always having to revert to 
political positions. The underlying idea seemed to be a concern that, if CISSA 
was incorporated into the AU too soon, it could lead to the politicisation of 
intelligence products and perhaps the misuse of the continental intelligence 
mechanism for the purpose of a strong state or group of states.  
CISSA interestingly reflects the pressures of needing to work regionally within 
the framework of a state-based system with national interests. In a paper on 
intelligence and collective security, Chesterman concludes (2006:71): 
In the absence of an international intelligence gathering capacity, 
states will remain the primary actors in this sphere. International 
organisations are thus forced to draw on national capacities. The result 
is not multilateral intelligence per se, but applications of national 
intelligence to serve national interests that happen to correspond to 
international security.  
Legitimate questions can be asked about the removed position of CISSA from 
the continental peace and security architecture. This is because of the 
sensitive nature of intelligence, and the structure reveals the caution with 
which intelligence collaboration is being pursued. The primary operational 
challenge is building a relationship with the AU Commission and creating a 
relationship that enables continental intelligence products to form part of the 
decision-making process. As David Kahn (2006:134) commented, no matter 
how accurate intelligence is, it will be useless if ignored.  
In the short to medium term, CISSA provides a unique platform for confidence 
building and information sharing among peers. Such a platform can inform 
national policy-making, reduce uncertainty and inform the development of 
common policy positions. It exposes intelligence practitioners to different 
perspectives and has the potential for creating a continental intelligence 
capacity that is at the same time both networked and independent.  
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The approach adopted in this dissertation has been to examine the role of 
CISSA in contributing to regional security through looking at the role of CISSA 
at national and regional levels and the potential to impact upon decision-
making. As explained by Michael Herman (2002:230): 
Far more important, however, is its general effect on national 
behaviour. If it does not make leaders wise in their international 
dealings, it at least reduces their ignorance, and where they are 
receptive it inclines them to display rather less insensitivity and 
recklessness that if they went without it … Use of intelligence 
knowledge figures among the attributes of good governance and 
responsible international citizenship. 
It is the impact of collaboration, as a result of the platform provided by CISSA, 
on national behaviour that allows the consideration that CISSA can function 
as an epistemic community. This is also based on the recognition that the 
complexity of the environment in which states function requires information on 
which to base policy decisions. In the realm of regional security and foreign 
policy, the national intelligence structures can be the source of such 
information and can reduce uncertainty and promote common security goals. 
As such, national intelligence agencies and CISSA can function as a network 
of knowledge-based experts assisting states to articulate “the cause-and-
effect relationships of complex problems, helping states to identify their 
interests, framing issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies and 
identifying salient points for negotiation” (Haas 1992:2).  
Central to the argument made by Haas (1992:2-3) is that “control over 
knowledge and information is an important dimension of power and that the 
diffusion of new ideas and information can lead to new patterns of behaviour 
and prove to be an important determinant of international policy coordination.” 
The importance of information and knowledge is a recurring theme in this 
dissertation. In the context of intelligence cooperation, the argument is that, 
through the platform provided by CISSA, the intelligence agencies on the 
continent can evolve into a robust epistemic community. This community of 
experts can utilise the power of information to influence the development of 
national policy. This by no means infers that national policy-makers always 
rely on intelligence as the basis for policy-making. Rather it implies that, as 
policy-makers are continually challenged to cope with the demands of a 
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complex, integrated security environment, they will turn to experts for 
guidance and state intelligence agencies are well placed to fulfil that function. 
As explained by Haas (1992:3-4): 
The causal logic of epistemic policy coordination is simple. The major 
dynamics are uncertainty, interpretation, and institutionalization. In 
international policy coordination, the forms of uncertainty that tend to 
stimulate demands for information are those that arise from the strong 
dependence of states on each other’s policy choices for success in 
obtaining goals and those which involve multiple and only partly 
estimable consequences of action. 
Haas (1992:4) goes further and explores the type of information that epistemic 
communities would be looked to for, given the environment of uncertainty: 
These forms of uncertainty give rise to demands for particular sorts of 
information … it (information) consists of depictions of social or 
physical processes, their interrelationships with other processes, and 
the likely consequences of actions that require application of 
considerable scientific of technical expertise. The information is thus 
neither guesses nor “raw” data; it is the product of human 
interpretations of social and physical phenomena. 
It is not only because of the demands of complexity and uncertainty that 
intelligence could play a more central role in policy formulation, but also 
because of the type of information that is required for security and foreign 
policy-making. Also given the particular transnational nature of security in 
Africa, through CISSA a broader view can be brought to the national level.  
The role of CISSA as proposed in this dissertation, has distinct associations 
with the functioning of an epistemic community. Decision-makers act and 
react according to their view of the environment and their interpretation of 
reality based on inherited and evolving attitudes, values and beliefs. Sir 
Michael Howard (1984:22) argued that “wars begin with conscious and 
reasoned decisions based on the calculation, made by both parties, that they 
can achieve more by going to war than by remaining at peace.” Whether or 
not decisions about security are based on reliable information is another 
question altogether. In 1968, Karl Deutsch claimed “during the half-century 
from 1914 to 1964, the decisions of major powers to go to war or to expand a 
war involved major errors of fact … in perhaps more than 50 per cent of the 
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cases” (Deutsch 1968:51-52). Barry Buzan (1991:23) took the same notion 
one step further and advanced that: “The natural structure of the system 
(international relations) tends to enhance misunderstanding.” 
 
In the theoretical frameworks presented in Chapter 2, the importance of 
common understandings as the basis for cooperation and collective security 
was highlighted. Intelligence as presented here in the case of CISSA has the 
potential to play a positive role in reducing uncertainty and misconceptions in 
security-related matters on the continent. As Michael Herman (2008:369) 
observed, intelligence can “provide some antidote to misperception-induced 
insecurity between states.” As such CISSA could make a positive contribution 
to regional security both in encouraging the development of common 
understandings and through the provision of a platform to share information 
and reduce misconceptions about the intentions of other states. 
In June 2004, before the launch of CISSA, Wilfried Scharf (2004:6-7) 
presented the following opinion on the potential for intelligence collaboration 
in Africa: 
... clearly the size of the African Union is such that information-sharing 
takes place in circumstances only when it is in the interests of the 
countries to share. The newness of these initiatives, and the hollowness of 
some of the promises of the AU, such as peer review, means that there 
will still be many hurdles to clear before the intelligence-sharing becomes 
more complete and more productive. But one has to remain realistic about 
what can be achieved among such a varied set of interests in different 
places. One cannot ignore the fact that there is a political and/or economic 
pecking order in the continent better known for its propensity for conflict 
and empty promises than for solid co-operation in pursuit of a common 
goal.    
Although slightly pessimistic about the potential for cooperation, Scharf 
presents quite a balanced view about the possibilities of intelligence sharing 
on the continent. Indeed, it is because of the very challenges referred to in the 
above quote that the contribution of CISSA to regional security should be 
interpreted. The progress made towards institutionalising intelligence 
collaboration through CISSA has happened with remarkable speed, and there 
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seems to be commitment from the intelligence agencies on the continent to 
undertake cooperation in pursuit of common goals.  
As a mechanism for regional security, the contribution of CISSA can be 
considered in two ways: (1) as an epistemic community influencing national 
decision-making and (2) as a generator of options for the AU. The argument 
has been made above that CISSA could be considered an epistemic 
community because CISSA can be considered as a network of knowledge-
based experts assisting states to articulate “the cause-and-effect relationships 
of complex problems, helping states to identify their interests, framing issues 
for collective debate, proposing specific policies and identifying salient points 
for negotiation” (Haas 1992:2). The continental community of intelligence 
experts can utilise the power of information to influence the development of 
national policy.  
It is in the domain of the complex continental security environment that 
national decision-makers would turn to intelligence structures for information 
and policy advice. The manner in which the continental security environment 
is interpreted by the state intelligence bodies could impact on the range of 
options pursued by a particular state. Through the institutionalisation of 
cooperation, as provided for by CISSA, the capacity of national intelligence 
structures to interpret the continental security landscape is amplified. 
Similarly, through increased communication and the sharing of information, 
enabled by CISSA, national intelligence capacities could be better equipped 
to deal with complexity and uncertainty. 
CISSA has the potential to have a positive effect on regional security as it 
provides a channel of communication between states that may be parties to a 
conflict. There is the chance that through confidence building, lines of 
communication can be established within a professional community that can 
be utilised for mediation and conflict resolution. There is also the possibility 
that communication and cooperation between intelligence agencies will open 
the space for more collaborative operations and addressing cross-border 
security threats, such as arms smuggling, through multinational operations. 
As Gibson (2005:29) explained through collaboration, intelligence “can deflect 
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governments away from ‘more of the same’ management on behalf of elites 
towards management of global challenges on behalf of the global commons.”  
The alternative consideration of potential contributions of CISSA to regional 
security is to facilitate the effective application of the tools of conflict 
prevention, management and resolution of the AU. Drawing from an 
understanding of intelligence at national level of being a force optimiser, there 
is room for the consideration of CISSA playing that role at regional level.  
Traditionally, intelligence from a primarily military viewpoint served to provide 
information about adversaries’ capabilities, locations and intentions as the 
basis for battle planning to enable the optimal application of military power. A 
similar logic can be applied to CISSA and the tools of the AU peace and 
security architecture. The deployment of the African Standby Force, Panel of 
the Wise or any mediation or observer missions can be facilitated by 
information from national intelligence agencies to enable effective planning 
and deployment. Conflict prevention, management and resolution 
interventions undertaken by the AU are costly and risky. CISSA reports are 
potential sources of information to manage risk and reduce the potential of 
deploying costly resources for limited purpose.  
The role of CISSA in relation to regional security has been cast in a rather 
positive and normative light. This is an optimistic and idealistic view that plays 
on the importance of information for decision-making and assumes that 
policy-makers will utilise intelligence for decision-making purposes. It also 
assumes that there is the capacity within the national intelligence structures to 
serve regional security aspirations. This includes not only a commitment 
beyond the desires of the ruling regime of the state to common goods and the 
common goal of regional stability; it also assumes a commitment at national 
level to information and learning. For national intelligence agencies to be able 
to fulfil the goals of an epistemic community requires investment in and 
development of professional expertise and analysis. National intelligence 
structures could be challenged in some states to move out from under the 
shadow of domestic politics and recruit and train a cadre of non-partisan 
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technical experts in diverse fields such as counter-terrorism, post-conflict 
reconstruction, organised crime and democracy and governance.     
4. Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter was to analyse the potential strengths and 
weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA by drawing on the implications of 
design and structures of these instruments on operational performance. 
Furthermore, the potential contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to regional 
security was discussed through the application of theoretical frameworks as 
presented in Chapter 2. Thus, the role of the CEWS in contributing to regional 
security was analysed in terms of the potential contribution that the early 
warning system can make towards the development of a security community. 
In relation to CISSA, the potential for the network of intelligence and security 
services to function as an epistemic community was explored. In both 
instances, there is the potential for the CEWS and CISSA to have a positive 
impact on regional security as conduits for the dissemination information and 
as mechanisms to create common understandings and ideas. This is, 
however, not a fait accompli and more empirical evidence will be needed 
before this impact can be measured in real - as opposed to potential - terms. 
Such empirical evidence is at the moment very limited. The contribution of the 
CEWS and CISSA to regional security in the long-term is dependent on how 
the regional security architecture continues to evolve and on what roles social 
learning and information play in shaping interests and decision-making at both 
national and regional levels.  
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Chapter 7 – Conclusion  
1. Introduction 
This final chapter seeks to close this dissertation by presenting key 
conclusions on the manner in which the CEWS and CISSA potentially 
contribute to regional security and by proposing a set of recommendations for 
enhancing the contribution of the CEWS and CISSA to regional security. In 
order to do this, a brief synopsis of the main arguments offered in the 
preceding chapters is presented, providing an overview of the argument in its 
entirety. Following that, a set of recommendations are advanced in view of the 
potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS and CISSA as possible 
options to enhance the potential contributions of the CEWS and CISSA to 
regional security.  
2. Summary of key arguments 
The key research question posed at the beginning was how can the CEWS 
and CISSA contribute to regional security. The research was concerned not 
with the policy options for regional security and conflict prevention in Africa 
but with the information sharing tools that are available. The main focus was 
on the manner in which the information generated by the CEWS and CISSA 
can potentially contribute towards regional security. Given that the CEWS is in 
its infancy and that access to information on the operations of CISSA is 
limited, the focus of the research task was on conceptualisation and design. 
Part of the dissertation relied on primary resources such as official 
documentation from the AU to provide a detailed descriptive analysis of the 
CEWS and CISSA.  
The CEWS and CISSA’s potential contribution to regional security was 
analysed through available literature on early warning and intelligence in order 
to (a) identify the potential for their successes and (b) highlight aspects that 
may inhibit success and (c) make recommendations. Furthermore, through 
the application of the theoretical frameworks of security community and 
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epistemic community, inferences were made as to the potential contributions 
of these mechanisms to peace and security.  
Chapter 1 established the basis from which the study was pursued. This was 
done (a) through presenting an overview of the purpose, rationale and 
methodology of the study; (b) by providing an overview of the key issues that 
inform the study; and (c) by introducing the elements being studied. Key 
concepts informing the study such as human security and transnational 
security threats were discussed. These are important reference points as it is 
within this broader security paradigm that multi-lateralism and conflict 
prevention have gained increasing international currency. The modalities for 
early warning and intelligence collaboration have emerged from this specific 
social and historical context and have become tools in the AU peace and 
security architecture because of changes in the security conceptualisation, 
discourse and practice.  
Chapter 2 explored theoretical frameworks that enable the analysis of regional 
security, early warning and intelligence cooperation in Africa. There were two 
key issues: (a) why do states cooperate and (b) under what conditions does 
such cooperation lead to increased security. The intention was to craft a 
theoretical framework that addressed multi-faceted cooperation and 
integration at state, government department and non-state levels. The 
theoretical framework forms the basis from which to explore why states 
choose to cooperate and how information, ideas and interests can shape the 
national and collective security agenda.  
Dominant international relations discourse such as Realism and rational 
choice theory was presented before an argument was made for alternative 
theoretical lenses drawing from Constructivist approaches to international 
political behaviour. Constructivist interpretations of international cooperation 
are important because they situate state behaviour in a larger society of rules 
and institutions, and the role of ideas, identities and values in shaping state 
interest is highlighted. The focus moves from a Realist preoccupation with 
national interest to a more nuanced concern with how actors define interests. 
Constructivist approaches challenge thinking about international relations to 
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transcend the international level and state as the unit of analysis and to 
consider the influence of the sub-state level and non-state actors, including 
social structures and the manner in which values, beliefs and identities 
influence political behaviour.  
Using both epistemic community and security community as Constructivist 
approaches to international cooperation provided this dissertation with a 
theoretical framework in which the role of common meanings, understandings 
and ideas could be explored. This was essential, as both the CEWS and 
CISSA are primarily information collection and dissemination tools, and a 
theoretical framework was required which could assist with analysing the 
effects of information and ideas on regional security cooperation. Security, 
perceptions of threats and responses to threats are socially constructed 
based on understandings of reality influenced by norms, identities and 
interests. The focus was on the manner in which interaction as provided for by 
the CEWS and CISSA can shape understandings of reality and actors’ 
identities and interests. The assumption is that, through enabling the creation 
of shared meanings and shared knowledge, there is the potential for both the 
CEWS and CISSA to have a positive influence on the choices that 
stakeholders take in favour of peaceful change. It is, however, not only the 
products, but also the process of communication that shapes behaviour.  
Chapters 3, 4 and 5 were predominantly descriptive in nature drawing on 
primary and secondary sources to present a detailed understanding of the key 
components of the study – i.e. the AU, CEWS and CISSA. In Chapter 3, the 
evolution of regional security in Africa was discussed, with particular 
emphasis on the importance of a common sense of identity as enunciated in 
Pan-African ideology. The trajectory of regional integration was traced as 
having particular historical, political and sociological influences. As opposed to 
integration in other contexts, in Africa liberal democratic values have not 
preceded cooperation. Rather calls for integration were first based on identity 
and the ideology of Pan-Africanism as a unifying and security-providing factor 
in the face of unequal global competition. The centrality of identity and the 
manner in which this has influenced regional integration in Africa was 
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presented as evidence of the development of a security community on the 
continent. This was established because the role of the CEWS and CISSA 
was later analysed in terms of contributing towards the development of a 
security community characterised by the dependable expectations of peaceful 
change.  
Chapter 4 provided an analysis of the CEWS through, firstly, outlining some 
contemporary literature on early warning and, secondly, drawing from official 
documentation a descriptive presentation of the conceptualisation and 
structure of the CEWS. Some of the key debates in the field of early warning 
were introduced, with particular attention drawn to the methodological 
questions surrounding quantitative and qualitative analyses and the 
implications of design on perceptions about products. For example, part of the 
appeal of quantitative methods is the perceived neutrality of observable reality 
and the removing of political and ideological biases that underlie qualitative 
methodologies. Furthermore, the utility of events-based systems for conflict in 
weak states was noted. This is of relevance for the CEWS, as the regional 
system was designed to focus primarily on active conflict zones so as to 
create the perception of objectivity and political neutrality. Reports generated 
by the CEWS would be the basis for decisions by the PSC to intervene in 
conflict situations. Thus when agreeing on the indicators on which to base the 
CEWS, Member States were implicitly agreeing to criteria on which the PSC 
would consider deploying fact-finding missions, observer missions, high-level 
mediation teams and even military forces.  
Similar to the approach taken in Chapter 4, Chapter 5 presented some key 
debates in the global intelligence field before examining the evolution of 
intelligence cooperation within the framework of CISSA. The literature 
reviewed highlighted that changes in the broader political and security context 
result in shifts in conceptualisation and functions of intelligence. This was 
discussed in terms of shifting global intelligence paradigms influenced by the 
end of the Cold War and the impact of the war on terror. The shifting security 
paradigm is predicated on the waning distinctions that can be made between 
local, regional and global security issues. As sources of insecurity have 
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become transnational in nature, so too have responses to insecurity become 
multi-lateral in nature. It is against this backdrop of international trends 
towards increased security cooperation that the development of CISSA is 
understood. 
The role of CISSA as a platform for information sharing was discussed and 
the implication of the design of a multinational intelligence body was 
considered. The distinction of CISSA is an intergovernmental organisation 
and not an intelligence service is important for the discussion. By leaving 
controversial issues such as collection and source protection at national level, 
space is created for CISSA to provide a platform for communication, sharing 
information and confidence building.   
Chapter 6 presented the central analytical component of this dissertation by 
providing an analysis of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the CEWS 
and CISSA. As the CEWS and CISSA are relatively young institutions with 
limited operational experience and limited available information about 
operational successes and challenges, the approach utilised operational 
challenges faced by early warning and intelligence in general, after which, the 
role of early warning and intelligence in the context of regional security in 
Africa was explored in relation to epistemic community and security 
community theories.  
Dominant international debate on the strengths and weaknesses of early 
warning was discussed with specific reference to the CEWS. It was noted that 
there is contention about measuring the impact of early warning systems. For 
the CEWS, from the conceptualisation of the system, the primary output and 
function is to produce reports to enable response strategies. The strengths 
and weaknesses of the CEWS cannot be interpreted against early response 
or conflict prevention, but rather against whether or not the system provided 
information on which the PSC can base decisions.  
Given this starting point, some further challenges were identified related to 
early warning and decision-making. Two inter-related challenges were 
identified, namely: (a) political sensitivity and (b) resource constraints. The 
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inherent and intricate political nature of early warning lies at the heart of the 
practical challenges facing the full operationalisation of CEWS. International 
experiences with inter-governmental early warning systems have indicated 
high levels of sensitivity, political manipulation of products and lack of 
confidence in early warning information. Furthermore, given governance 
deficits and the dominance of intra-state conflict on the continent, the will of 
African leaders to respond to conflicts – some of which have been caused and 
maintained by the ruling regimes – has been questioned. The CEWS suffers 
from resource constraints that impede its full operation. These include 
technical, financial and human resources.  
However, in view of these real and efficacy threatening challenges, alternative 
views on the potential contribution of the CEWS to regional security were 
posed. This was done through considering not only the potential impact of the 
products of the CEWS, but by also analysing the potential impact of the 
process of early warning on regional security dynamics. Thus, early warning 
was situated as a political tool for engagement that could be used by state 
and non-state actors, inter-governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. The CEWS has been designed with the involvement of civil 
society and academia, and the role of non-governmental actors is built into 
the operational concepts. It provides a structured framework for the free-flow 
of information from various sources to create a cooperative network of people 
and institutions. The notion of a cooperative network was further elaborated at 
the level of civil society organisations and communities as well as at the level 
of the AU.  
The final piece of the analysis of the CEWS was to relate the idea of the 
CEWS as a platform for the free-flow of information to the potential 
contribution to regional security. This was done through the application of the 
development of security communities as presented by Adler and Barnett 
(1998). The argument was made that, in the context of the CEWS, early 
warning information has the potential to shape interactions in the form of 
knowledge as well as to shape collective experience through exchanges of 
information and social learning. For example, sharing reports from the CEWS 
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within the AU, member states and regional economic communities could 
enable collective understandings and create the necessary commitment to 
enable collective responses. Furthermore, as an open source information 
platform, the CEWS enables communication between various actors. Through 
the processes of communication, people exchange views, ideas and values 
as a result of which people can experience changes in collective meanings, 
values and understandings. The CEWS through information generation, 
analysis and dissemination has the potential to impact on regional security 
through enabling knowledge and social learning. Knowledge and social 
learning, in turn, can contribute towards to the development of mutual trust 
and collective identities as the foundation for dependable expectations of 
peaceful change.  
Regarding the strengths and weaknesses of CISSA, the primary challenges 
identified were perceptions about the role of intelligence, legitimacy deficits 
and associations of intelligence with secrecy, repression and regime security. 
This largely negative perception, which is often associated with intelligence on 
the continent, does not enable intelligence agencies to be considered as 
having potentially positive effects on regional security. In order to overcome 
this legitimacy deficit, intelligence would have to be developed as a 
professional field of study and activity. Professionalising intelligence may well 
create standards and norms of behaviour appropriate in democracies, such as 
appropriate levels of authority and restrictions on and sanctions for 
unbecoming behaviour. The position advanced in this dissertation is that 
CISSA could serve as a conduit for the development of a professional 
community of practice amongst intelligence practitioners.  
It is in view of the idea that CISSA could provide a platform for intelligence as 
a professional community, that the notion of CISSA functioning as an 
epistemic community emerges. Not only does this have the potential of having 
effects on professionalism and governance, but such sharing of ideas and 
information can also create platforms of common understanding about 
intentions and actions. In order to fulfil roles associated with the creation of 
common understandings, fundamental questions were raised about the 
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association of intelligence with national security. As had been introduced in 
earlier chapters, the distinctions between national, regional and international 
security vulnerabilities are increasingly difficult to demarcate. The argument 
was made that intelligence serving the purposes of national security has to 
take regional security into account. Alternatively viewed, if regional peace and 
security is part of the foreign policy agenda of the state, the intelligence 
agencies in service of that foreign policy agenda, would need to focus on 
regional security.  
Furthermore, as a platform for communication, CISSA provides an opportunity 
for confidence building and information sharing. This can reduce uncertainties 
and manage expectations, particularly during conflict situations, negotiations 
or disputes. Misperception was noted as a source of insecurity and 
intelligence can function as an anti-dote.  
The relationship of CISSA with the AU was also discussed, as this is an area 
of contention, which can be viewed both as a strength and weakness. The 
primary argument was that, by being outside of the formal regional security 
architecture, CISSA could be spared from some of the bureaucratic 
inadequacies that plague the regional body. Decision-making and agenda 
setting may be easier and less politicised, as practitioners rather than 
politicians will be making decisions about the collaborative agenda. 
Alternatively, a critical view would hold that the establishment of CISSA was in 
part the intelligence services ensuring that they continue to occupy a central 
position in security affairs as the emphasis moved from national to regional 
structures. The structural arrangement outside the AU creates accountability 
and tasking gaps that are not necessarily filled at national level.  
In order to reflect more on the strengths and weaknesses of CISSA and the 
notion of collaborative intelligence, international experiences in this regard 
were noted, most particularly drawn from experiences at the UN level. The 
primary challenge for intelligence agencies when cooperating is overcoming 
the tendency to keep secrets and to forge relationships built on the sharing of 
information – a task not commonly associated with the secret services. This 
returns the discussion once more to the importance of building trust, mutual 
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respect and common understandings. Trust needs to exist not only between 
intelligence practitioners but also between CISSA and the AU. The realisation 
of the potential influence of CISSA on regional security would be determined 
by the manner in which intelligence influences decision-making. This would be 
premised on intelligence being considered as a professional, reliable and non-
partisan tool for decision-making at national and regional levels.  
Thus, the potential contribution of CISSA to regional security was positioned 
in terms of the consideration of CISSA as an epistemic community – a 
network of knowledge-based experts assisting states to articulate problems, 
identify issues, propose policy options and adopt negotiating positions. Similar 
to the way information was positioned in terms of the CEWS and the 
development of a security community, epistemic communities can utilise the 
power of information to influence the development of national policy. Decision-
makers act and react according to their view of the environment and their 
interpretation of reality based on inherited and evolving attitudes, values and 
beliefs. Intelligence agencies have the capacity to influence the manner in 
which decision-makers interpret their environment. Operating at the 
continental level, through CISSA ideas could be diffused to national level and 
common positions can be advanced. Intelligence has the potential to play a 
positive role in reducing uncertainty and misconceptions. As such CISSA 
could make a positive contribution to regional security both in encouraging the 
development of common understandings and through the provision of a 
platform to share information and reduce misconceptions about the intentions 
of other states. 
The argument was made that, in both instances, the CEWS and CISSA could 
positively contribute to regional security as conduits for the dissemination 
information and as mechanisms to create common understandings and ideas. 
This is contingent upon the manner in which regional integration continues to 
evolve on the continent and what roles information will play in decision-
making at national and regional levels. However, how regional integration 
evolves will also be influenced by the CEWS and CISSA as agents for 
regional security.  
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3. Recommendations 
The recommendations presented here have the ambition of being relevant for 
consideration as policy options and items for operationalisation. It is a 
perspective taken in view of the potential strengths and weaknesses of the 
CEWS and CISSA as explored in previous chapters, as well as with 
consideration to future contributions of the CEWS and CISSA to regional 
security. This list of recommendations is in no way absolute, and, as the 
regional peace and security aspirations continue to evolve, so too will the 
mechanisms for information management. A further note is that these 
recommendations are presented here cognisant of political factors, which 
could hinder the implementation thereof, but hopeful that the commitment to 
regional security in Africa will transcend mere rhetoric to improved security for 
ordinary people.  
(a) The ability of the CEWS to serve as an information-sharing platform 
and to contribute to a sense of security community in Africa will be 
served by an online presence. The domain http://www.ausitroom-
psd.org has been registered and is under construction. A website for 
the dissemination of reports and even a virtual space for discussion by 
state and non-state actors could facilitate the development of shared 
understandings and a common (African) identity.  
(b) The idea of creating people-centred early warning systems needs to be 
further explored within the context of the CEWS. The implications of 
operability need to be considered given differences in access to ICT on 
the continent. Avenues for communication and participation should be 
investigated for the CEWS to fulfil the potential role as a conduit for 
information in order to realise a security community.  
(c) A platform for communication between the CEWS and CISSA needs to 
be explored so as to prevent duplication of efforts and inefficient use of 
resources. The value of open source intelligence is recognised and a 
system of complimentary roles of open and closed information should 
be sought. It is questionable, for example, what additional value to 
regional security an Early Warning Desk within the CISSA Secretariat 
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will play when such a capacity already exists within the AU 
Headquarters.  
(d) Intelligence needs to be brought into the continental peace and security 
arrangements. Due to the sensitivities around intelligence, it may need 
to be a long-term plan, but the intelligence domain should not be 
treated differently from other sectors of the security apparatus. For the 
military and police, there are mechanisms for collective security based 
on regional agreements and as part of regional and sub-regional 
organisations. The same standards should be applied to intelligence. 
(e) Similar to the above point, intelligence cooperation should be bound 
not only by an agreement between intelligence agencies, but also by a 
protocol or declaration that sets parameters for behaviour and 
expectations, and establishes clear lines of reporting and authority 
between CISSA and the AU. 
(f) For CISSA to serve the continental peace and security ambitions, the 
setting of continental intelligence priorities and the tasking of the 
CISSA Secretariat should ideally come from the AU or even be done 
with the input of the AU. The efforts of CISSA cannot be separated 
from other efforts at continental level. 
4. Conclusion 
The final chapter of this dissertation has sought to synthesise the main 
conclusions and recommendations that can be drawn from this study. Two 
options have been presented for considering the manners in which the CEWS 
and CISSA can contribute to regional security. In answering the research 
question, the CEWS can contribute to regional security as a platform for 
information sharing and the development of common understandings at the 
level of inter-governmental organisations or at community level. The 
preference placed here is on orienting early warning to communities in order 
for societies to be more able to mitigate the impact of violent conflict. These 
are, however, not mutually exclusive options, and a broader approach to the 
targeted recipients and capacities to prevent conflict would need to be 
considered.  
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For CISSA, the functioning as an epistemic community was explored. This 
paradigm provided options to consider that CISSA could make a contribution 
to regional security through influencing national decision-making. The manner 
in which CISSA could influence decision-making at the regional level was also 
considered. Given the orientation of intelligence as state-based and the lack 
of integration into the continental security architecture, preference was given 
to the notion of CISSA as a platform to enable more informed national 
decision-making and as a tool of conflict prevention through communication 
and negotiation.  
There is reason to consider both the CEWS and CISSA as able to make 
positive contributions to regional security in Africa. The importance and power 
of information lie at the heart of why these mechanisms can influence the 
practice of peace in Africa. Greater access to information can shape 
perceptions, expectations and behaviours. Sharing of information can create 
the development of common positions and understandings. It can also break 
down uncertainty and enable actors at community, national and regional 
levels to better fulfil the human security aspirations of the continent. 
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